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INTRODUCTION 
1. The Problem 
The problem of this dissertation is to present and examine 
the use and the relation of the rationalistic and existential 
perspectives in the theological method of Nels F. s. Ferre. 
Rationalism is defined by Ferr6 as "the theory that the reason of 
the natural man is the final criterion of trutb."1 With regard to 
religion reason of the natural man, for Ferre, means thinking that 
is darkened by sin and is therefore neither aware of its rational-
izations nor its defensive nature. The existential perspective is 
defined as whole thinking which "requires the deepest passions, as 
well as intellect and will, of the whole man."2 The problem 
includes an investigation of the relation of faith and reason, and 
especially the consideration of the validity of assigning distinc-
tive natures, functions, and fields to faith and reason. 
Part of the problem will be the search for the theological 
reconstruction which is implied in such a relation. Because Ferre 
considers his thought and method as going beyond both liberalism 
and neo-orthodoxy, 3 another phase · of the problem will be to eval-
uate his assertion of their inadequacy. However, it should be 
added that be considers himself far closer to liberalism than 
to the neo-orthodox . thinkers. 
1~ 
2. 
3. 
Ferre, FR, 236. (As a rule, references to sources are 
indicated in this work by abbreviations which are explained 
in ~he Bibliography under the author's name.) 
Ferre, FR, 205. 
See Ferre, Art.(l949). 
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The problem of faith and reason is also the problem of 
religion and philosophy. In relation to the Christian faith 
some have maintained that Paul in his letter to the Corinthians 
(I Cor. 2:11,12) was the first to make an attack upon philosophy. 
However, Paul was not writing against those who trusted in 
philosophical or scientific knowledge but against those who 
trusted in esoteric knowledge, pre-gnosticiEm, and law, all of 
which were regarded as revealed. 
The problem became more acute in the thought of Justin 
Martyr and for such early Church Fathers as Irenaeus, Clement, 
Origen, and Tertullian. After his conversion to Christianity 
Justin Martyr could write: 
Philosophy is, in fact, the greatest possession 
and most honourable before God, to whom it leads 
us and alone commends us; and these are truly £ely 
men who have bestowed attention on philosophy. 
But Tertullian in his assault upon philosophy asked, ''What, 
indeed, has Athens to do with Jerusalem? What concord is 
there between the Academy and the Church? 112 And at present 
Karl Barth, the noted Swiss theologian, echoes the same 
Tertullian revolt. 
St. Thomas Aquinas could not accept Tertullian's view of 
philosophy as the source of heresy. According to St. Thomas 
there is no contradiction between faith and reason, but reason 
needs to be supplemented by faith. During the Enlightenment 
the opposite was true. Faith was subordinated to reason and 
reason became the supreme arbiter of truth. It was believed 
1. Justin Martyr, DT, Chapter II. 2. Tertullian, PAH, 246. 
that there was a fundamental harmony between them. Two 
methods were used to bring out this harmony. 
One may cut down faith to fit reason, or one may 
enlarge reason so as to fit faith. The first method 
was adopted by the "deistic" movement and the result 
was such a cramping of faith that eventually "deism" 
became practically synonymous with atheism. The 
other method was adopted by Hegel ••• l 
3 
According to Edgar s. Brightman three main views have been 
developed regarding the relation of faith and reason. 2 The 
first view regarded faith and reason as in complete harmony 
and as having the same content. In this view the task of 
reason is to give a rational account of what one feels and 
practices in religion. With some reservation it can be said 
that Justin Martyr subscribed to this point of view, but more 
accurately it was the view of John Scotus Erigena and Hegel. 
The second view held that faith and ·reason are consistent but 
faith transcends reason without contr~dicting it. St. Thomas 
Aquinas and John Locke adhered to this point of view. Tbe 
third main view was that faith and reason are at least partially 
in conflict, but regardless of contradictions, the propositions 
of faith and reason are true, each in its own realm. Tertullian, 
Averroes, Duns Scotus, William of Occam, and Luther inclined 
toward this view, as did Thomas Hobbes. 
In the history of thought on this problem the general 
view bas been to accept the kinship of faith and reason, but 
the theories of kinship have been expressed in var.ious ways. 
1. Knudson, DG, 77. 2. See Brightman, Art. 
(1945)1. 
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Whereas some thinkers maintain the supremacy of reason in 
both philosophy and religion, others maintain the supremacy 
of reason in philosophy and the supremacy of faith in religion. 
While some assert the independence of both faith and reason, 
others assert the mutual dependence of faith and reason. Such 
differences are also suggested as one re ads the different 
titles about this problem, such as 'reason and faith', 'faith 
and reason', 'reason and revelation', and 'revelation and 
reason'. In the actual writing of a title such as 'reason 
and faith' one of the terms must, of course, be placed first; 
whether in the knowing process the content of one term is 
actually experienced prior to that of the other may well be 
part of our problem. 
2. A Significant Unsolved Problem 
The problem of the relation and use of the existential 
and theoretical perspectives in theological methodology is 
significant because it is an attempt to bring clarity to the 
persistent problem of the relation of faith and reason. 
Albert Knudson writes: 
The relation of faith and reason to each other 
is one of the most complex problems that has f si~ 
arisen in the history of thought and one with 
refer ence to which there has been the widest 
diversity of opinion.l 
In Ferre's method the theoretical and existential 
perspectives are especially significant because his use of them 
1. Knudson, DG, 67. 
is an attempt to correct both an alleged unsatisfactory liber-
alism of the rationalists and the irrationalism found in other 
existentialist approaches. 
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The present writer has called the problem unsolved because 
it is his view that in theological methods the tendency has been 
to use either the existential or the theoretical approach beyond 
I 
their legitimate spheres, and that Ferre, although correcting 
the existentialists at several significant points, inclines too 
far toward an exclusively existential theology. 
The problem is as much alive today as ever due to the 
influence of the dialectical theologians who assert the inadequacy 
of reason as the decisive instrument for religious truth over 
against the more liberal thinkers who defend the supremacy of 
reason. In this respect th~ renewed interest in existentialism 
and in the problem of faith and reason goes back to the work 
of Kierkegaard for such dialectical theologians as Barth and 
Brunner acknowledge the influence of Kierkegaard who protested 
against the use of reason as the final court of appeal in 
religious truth. According to the Danish thinker ultimate 
religious truths can only be found in the subjective, the 
individual, and the existential. 
Among the defenders of reason are various philosophers 
and theologians. In Hegel the defenders of reason have had 
such a single outstanding leader as the irrationalists bad in 
the person of Kierkegaard. In England the supremacy of reason 
bas been maintained by such men as W. R. Sorley, A. S. Pringle-
Pattison, and F. R. Tennant. In America some of the champions 
of reason are W. E. Hocking, E. s. Brightman, A. C. Knudson, 
L. H. DeWolf, J. s. Bixler, H. N. Wieman, and E. W. Lyman. 
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That the problem is still a contemporary one and promises 
to be a controversial issue in the future is also the judgment 
of C. c. Morrison as he writes about Professor DeWolf's book, 
The Religious Revolt Against Reason (1949). Morrison says, 
11We are in for a high and intense controver~y over this new 
theology whose exponents have bad a fairly open field for more 
than a decade. 111 
3. Purpose and Method 
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate what 
contribution can be made to the problem of religious knowledge 
by the emphasis on the objective and existential aspects of 
reason. This, it is believed, can be done effectively by 
examining the works of Nels Ferre wbo has labored with this 
problem and bas set forth his views in several books and 
various articles. Both objective and existential perspectives 
are employed by Ferre in the search for the ultimate. 
After an account of Ferre's life and works the main types 
of existentialism and rationalism will be presented in order 
to arrive at a working definition of existentialism and 
rationalism, and to compare them with Ferre's use of the terms. 
In examining Ferre's works the procedure will be to determine 
if his method is essentially existentialist or rational. 
1. See Morrison, Art.(l949). 
... 
The procedure will include a study or the place given by Ferre 
to reason and faith in the fields or science, philosophy and 
religion. This will be done by investigating the alleged 
limitations or the methods used in these rields and comparing 
them as to bow they differ and how they are related in the 
task or knowledge. 
4. Literature of the Problem 
Though S¢ren Kierkegaard left no system of thought, 
his works constitute the literary trunk of the existentialist 
tree. Emmanuel Meunier regards Kierkegaard as "the titular 
father of the school"l but also recognizes the important 
influence of Pascal. "With the advent of Pascal", says 
Meunier, "we come right up to modern Existentialism. He 
blazed all the trails and be shaped almost every theory.n2 
At present especially four thinkers can be rightly 
designated as existentialists. They are the two atheistic 
existentialists, Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre, and 
the two Christian existentialists, Karl Jaspers and Gabriel 
Marcel. There are numerous others, including many Catholic 
thinkers. Some of the more important dates of existentialist 
literature are the following: 
1855 starb Kierkegaard; 1919 trat Karl Jaspers 
mit seiner Psychologie der Weltanscbauun~en 
bervor; 1927 erscbienen Gabriel Marcelsournal 
1. Meunier, EP, 4. 2. Meunier, EP, 4. 
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I' 
metaphysi6ue und Heideggers Sein und Zeit, 1932 
Jaspers P~ilos!;hie und 1943 Jean-Paul Sartres 
Letre et le ne t • .I 
In addition to the above works, Marcel's Philosophy of 
Existence (1949) and Sartre's Existentialism (1947) should 
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be mentioned. The existentialist tree produced many branches. 
A Russian offshoot touches Soloviev, Chestov 
and Berdyaev. A Jewish branch leads to Buber. 
Through his dialectical theology, Karl Barth 
made no small contribution to the reintroduction 
of Kierkegaard to contemporary philosophy.2 
To give a more complete account of the literature of 
existentialism, it would be necessary to list the works of 
all these men. It would also mean listing, in addition to 
Barth's works, the works of other dialectical theologians 
such as Brunner and Niebuhr. 
A comprehensive enumeration of the literature in which 
the cause of reason is upheld would include the writings of 
many outstanding philosophers and theologians. Among such 
writings are W. E. Hocking's Meaning of God in Human Experience, 
(1912}, Pringle-Pattison's The Idea of God in Recent Philosophy 
(1917), Sorley's Moral Values and the Idea of God (1918), 
F. R. Tennant's Philosophical Theology (1928,1930), A. c. 
Knudson's Doctrine of God (1930), E. s. Brightman's A Philos-
ophy of Religion (1940), and D. c. Macintosh's The Problem of 
Religious Knowledge (1940). 
1. Bochenski, EPG, 160. 2. Mounier, EP, 5. 
Other works which have as their central theme the 
relation of reason and faith and are therefore relevant to 
existential and rational approach in theology are R~ ' T. 
Flewelling's The Reason in Faith (1924), Macintosh's ~ 
Reasonableness of Christianity (1926), Whitehead's ~ 
Function of Reason (1929), the already mentioned Revelation 
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and Reason (1946) by Brunner, Ferre's Faith and Reason (1946), 
H. D. Lewis' Morals and the New Theology (1947), and DeWolf's 
The Religious Revolt Against Reason (1949). This does not 
exhaust the list but it gives some of the outstanding 
literature on the problem. Many thought-provoking book reviews 
and periodical articles have also made a large contribution to 
the literature of the field. 
CHAPTER I 
, 
TP~ LIFE AND WORK OF NELS FERRE 
1. His Earlier Years 
/ 
A portion of the early life of Nels Ferre was soon to 
become a record of struggle and poverty, but the atmosphere 
into which he was born on June 8, 1908, was one of content-
ment.1 His father Frans was . then at the peak of his career. 
The parish at Luleo, a busy litt·le Baltic seaport above the 
Arctic Circle in Sweden, was considered a prize among 
Baptist churches. His eloquence of speech, his love of 
solitude, and scholarly pursuits, and his set ways presented 
a diverse personality. His ministerial studies in America 
10 
and the mastery of several languages--Greek, Hebrew, Sanskrit, 
and Aramaic--supplied an undeniably superior cultural back-
ground. Yet for all this Frans was basically insecure, and it 
wqs his wife Maria who fostered the love and affection toward 
the family. In contrast with her husband she enjoyed mingling 
with people and her gay manner brought her a large circle of 
friends. A devout Christian, she many times dedicated her 
coming third child to the Lord's service, and when Nels was 
born on Pentecost Sunday it was a sign to her that the Lord 
bad answered. 
1. The information in this chapter was derived from a sketch 
of Dr. Ferre's life written by his wife for the Augustus 
Howe Buck Fund, Boston University College of Liberal Arts. 
; 
Within six years after the birth of Nels Ferre the 
world was at war. The family had now purchased an estate 
at Gnesta where Frans served a church. Because his father 
was a Baptist dissenter from the State Church, Nels was 
soon set apart from his classmates. As the son of a 
gentleman farmer be was economically above tbe constituency 
of many of his father's parish. Aware of his personal 
situation and the environment in which be lived, Nels drew 
11 
fearfully apart from any associations with his contemporaries. 
He left for school as early as six o'clock in the morning, 
ran most of the distance of seven 1niles to avoid meeting 
a classmate, and hid behind hedgerows when one did appear. 
After the close of the war the family sold the estate 
and Frans became the minister of a Baptist church in 
Falk8ping. The family had by now increased to eight and 
it was necessary that Nels begin work after finishing the 
public school course. At eleven be was a bill collector. 
Later be became a salesman. It is obvious that his experi-
ences and the desire to know America, as a 'visiting evangelist 
pictured it, made Nels decide to leave Sweden, and at the 
age of thirteen he left alone for America. 
His first e:xperience in America was an unpleasant one. 
Upon arrival at Ellis Island, the passengers on board the 
ship hurried to have their immigration papers approved, and 
when Nels' turn came, the officials examined his papers and 
prevented his being sent ashore because his sponsor had 
12 
failed to arrive. He was thrust into a noisy and bare room 
which presented an atmosphere of strange tongues and offen-
sive odors. These perplexing days of anxiety came to a 
close wben a friend of h is parents came to sign the papers 
thereby admitting him to the mainland. 
2. His Training and Education 
I A Minnesota farm was Dr. Ferre's first workshop in this 
country. It was owned by a pious 3wedish coup le of middle 
age who expected hard work from the boy. 
, 
Ferre, who took up 
every task with a conscientious commitment, fulfilled their 
expectations. The morning chores bad to be completed before 
be could leave for the little country school. In spite of the 
strenuous manual labor and the handicap of learning a new 
language, be made remarkable progress in his academic work. 
Through the help of his brother George be entered Bethel 
Academy, a Swedish Baptist insitution in St. Paul. A 
variety of menial jobs were part of the means through which 
Nels was able to meet his school expenses. His second year 
at Bethel afforded him the first opportunity for play since 
be bad begun to earn his own living at eleven, but before 
the term was over he was strick en with diphtheria and was 
confined in the hospital for weeks. A period of convalescense 
was inevitable making the postponement of his education 
necessary. It was t hrough tbe interest of Axel Olson and 
his wife that t he hospital bills were paid and that a 
home was provided for Nels. The Olsons were Christian 
I 
people of t a ste and refinement, and a fter ye ars of 
indep endence Nels bad some adjustments to make in receiving 
orders and advice. 
When strength and health began to return ·to him, Mrs. 
Olson thought of the possibility of Nels holding preaching 
services in a little church at Wyanette that bad long been 
closed for lack of funds and a pastor. With the doctor's 
permlssion Nels, at the age of fifteen, proceeded to preach 
to a handful of country folk . 
As soon as the r~port of Nels' illness reached his 
mother she became insistent that they leave for America. 
His father was able to secure a church in Springfield, 
Massachusetts, and in May, 1924, Nels received word that 
13 
his parents and his six brothers had arrived. He went to 
live with the family in Springfield a,nd entered Springfield's 
Central High School as a sophomore. His hi gh school years 
were v,ery much like those of any high school youth except 
that he bad a seriousness and a maturity beyond the a ge of 
his classmates. Because of a rigid code of discipline 
grounded in religious fundamentalism, he could not participate 
in many of the normal pleasures and activities of his class. 
Even to take part in the class play was for him a questionable 
adventure to be considered carefully. In high school as in 
his early boyhood days he considered himself an outsider and 
so hid behind his lessons and achieved high recognition for 
his scholastic record. 
During bis high school training the thought of doing 
further study hardly occurred to him. He worked s~mers 
on a farm in Maine, earning additional money by preaching 
and tutoring. These earnings were hardly enough for a 
college education and no financial support could be expected 
from his home because of the large family. The hope for 
additional education became brighter when he beard of the 
Augustus Howe Buck Scholarship Fund at the Boston University 
College of Liberal Arts, and later materialized when be 
entered the college as a Buck scholar. 
The advantages of the fund made it possible for him, 
for the first time, to pursue his academic studies without 
financial worries. The college years were a period of 
intellectual and social growth. His scholastic standing 
was high, and he began to feel more at ease socially 
because he realized that he was accepted in spite of his 
alien birth. In his junior year be became engaged to 
Katherine Pond, daughter of a Boston physician, who had 
been nurtured in a humanistic liberalism in contrast to 
his own conservative religious beliefs. 
Before the close of his undergraduate work he bad 
several opportunities for choosing a career. His brother, 
who was now practicing medicine, challenged him with his 
profession. Some colle ge professors encouraged teaching 
' 
as the work for which he was best suited. A law career 
was another possibility. The decision was not too difficult 
- - -- - -----
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because he had considerd the work of the ministry for some 
time. Consequently he entered Andover Newton Theological 
School in the fall of 1931 following his graduation as 
valedictorian. 
His ultra-conservative views bad become more liberal in 
college, and this change of thought was further motivated at 
the seminary by an atmosphere of different shades of conserva-
tism and liberalism. Historical criticism was a challenge to 
search more deeply into the problem of religious truth. 
At the close of the year be was married to Miss Pond. 
Their first year was spent in a thirteen-room New England 
parsonage at Littleton, Massachusetts, where Nels served as 
interim student pastor in the Congregational Church. Here 
their first son Frederick was born. His next parish was a 
small Baptist church in Lowell, Massachusetts. This pastorate 
took place during some of the dark days of the depression years, 
and because the congregation was made up of many textile 
/ 
workers, Mr. Ferre came face to face with the problem of labor 
and unemployment. His last student parish was the Village 
Church in Dorchester where he also became ordained a Congre-
gational minister a few weeks before graduating with the degree 
of Bachelor of Divinity from Andover Newton. 
I Ferre continued his studies in the Harvard Graduate School 
of Arts and Sciences. While at Harvard, he became intimate 
with A. N. Whitehead whom be regarded as one of his most 
challenging teachers. After two years of study he was granted 
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the Sheldon Travelling Fellov1ship. The family sailed for 
Sweden where Ferre carried on his studies at the Universities 
of Upsala and Lund. ~~ile in Sweden he also studied under tbe 
~ direction of Gustaf Aulen. After his return he was granted the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy from Harvard University. 
3. His Writings and Teaching Career 
~ In the fall of 1937 Ferre was appointed to teach in the 
department of philosophy of religion at the Andover 
Newton School. Later be was appointed Abbot Professor of 
Christian T"heology, one of the oldest and most distinguished 
chairs in American seminaries. 
During his first years of teaching be suffered from a 
severe attack of acute arthritis. Vlliat the specialists in 
that field were unable to do for his health, he was able to 
do with determination and faith. Also about at this time 
a si.x-month-old daughter, Mary Felicia, died of a heart 
ailment. Three other daughters, Mariel Esther, Kathrine 
Verstin, and Faith, have since been added to this union. 
, 
Ferre began to write during the early part of his 
teaching career. His first article, 11 The Meaning of 
Jesus for Modern Theology", was published in Christendom 
in 1938. His first book, Swedish Contributions to Modern 
Theology, was the result of his studies at Upsala and 
Lund Universities, and was also a portion of his dissertation 
for the doctorate. 
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The books which followed in order of their pUblication 
are: The Christian Fellowship, 1940, The Christian Faith, 
1942, Return to Christianity, 1943, Faith and Reason, 1946, 
Evil and the Christian Faith, 1947, Pillars of Faith, 1948, 
Christianity and Society, 1950, Strengthening the Spiritual 
Life, 1951, and The Christian Understanding of God, 1951. The 
book, Faith and Reason, marked the beg inning of a ser ies of 
books on the central theme 11Reason and t h e Christian Faithn. 
Evil and the Christian Faith is .the second book of the series 
and Christianity and Society is volume t hree. The t hree 
volumes comprise Part I of the propsed series. 
,/ In addition to the books published Ferre ba s contributed 
many articles and book reviews to various periodicals. 
The ~eat demands of teaching and writing have not 
; 
prevented Ferre from participation in other activities. 
He is a Fellow of the National Council on Relig ion in 
Hi gher Education and also a contributor to t he Conference 
on Science, Philosophy, and Religion. He is serving on the 
Study Committee of the World Council of Churches. Among 
Protestant denominations be bas been in demand as a lecturer. 
He bas been honored with several important lectureships 
including the Wells Lectures at Texas Christian University, 
the Gay Lectures at Southern Baptist Theological Seminary 
in Louisville, Kentucky, the Hyde Lectures at Andover Newton, 
and Denio Lectures at Bangor Theological Seminary, the Earl 
Lectures a t Pacific School of Relig ion, the Hoff Lectures 
- ~ -- ---- - ---
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at Bethany Biblical Seminary, the Cole Lectures at Vanderbilt 
University where be is Professor of Philosophical Theology, the 
Rall Lectures at Garrett Biblical Institute, the Fondren Lectures 
at the Perkins School of Theology of the Southern Methodist 
University, and the Gates Lectures at Grinnell College. His 
most recent appointment, accompanied by a Fulbright grant, was 
to a lectureship for the academic year of 1951-1952 at Oxford 
University, England. Ferre's appointment in 1950 to the faculty 
of the ,~chool of Religion of Vanderbilt University was gratefully 
received as it afforded him the opportunity to devote most of 
his time to research and to writing. 
CHAPTER II 
THE NlAIN TYPES OF EXISTENTIALISM AND 
RATIONALISM 
1. Existentialism 
i. Definition of existentialism. 
According to Jean Wahl it is the contention of Heidegger 
and Sartre that existentialism defies any definition. 1 It 
stands for the meaning ~ existence is, and it rejects 
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the theory that man bas the intellectual capacity to reduce 
existence to what it is. With respect to knowledge it is the 
Heisenberg principle of indeterminacy applied to the field of 
metaphysics. Those who accept this extreme position maintain 
that no words can do justice to a definition of existentialism 
because the use of words in a definition is already an attempt 
to give the essence of an idea or thing, whereas existentialism 
is the concept that existence precedes essence. 
Existentialists and non-existentialists alike can accept 
the belief that life ' is deeper than any theory about it, but 
the existentialists claim to take the 'something deeper' more 
seriously. 
We SPEAK of the philosophy of existence; this is 
precise.ly what Heidegger and Sartre as well, 
would like to avoid, since we are concerned with 
questions which, strictly speaking, belong to 
solitary meditation and cannot be subjects of 
1. Wahl, SHE, 2. 
1 discourse. 
The author can agree that there is something stubborn 
and irreducible about existence, that existence cannot be 
reduced to the rational as the idealists would have it, nor 
to sense experience as the positivists would have it, nor 
to nature or neutral entities as the naturalists and neo-
realists attempt to do. But an approach to give meaning 
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to existence by concerning oneself with questions that belong 
to solitary meditation and cannot be subjects of discourse 
is an invitation to irrationalism and agnosticism, both of 
which are contradictory to the philosophical spirit. 
To make existentialism more intelligible one must 
proceed to define it positively as well as negatively. 
Existentialism is an attempt to evaluate existence by 
considering the whole of human experience with special 
emphasis on the private and deeply personal experiences of 
man. Existential thinking is a deep personal concern about the 
mystery of one's being, including especially the problem of 
freedom, suffering, and death. It is more concerned about 
human existence than existence in general. Helmut Kuhn 
describes existentialism as, 
a thinking animated and supported by the personal 
life of the thinker 
that school of thought which undertakes to incor-
porate the trial of suffering in its philosophical 
1. Wahl, SHE, 2. 
and theological structure 
a philosophy which tries to win certainty through 
despair.l 
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One of the main characteristics of existentialism is that 
of subjectivity. It is once again a positing of the egocentric 
predicament. It is asserted that in thinking about reality the 
philosopher can never carry on his quest in the relationship of 
an onlooker to a picture. The thinker is always a part of 
reality and he cannot set aside himself nor nature as something 
to be observed without receiving a distorted view of both. 2 
The subject can never completely become object. 
I cannot make an affirmation about my being without 
breaking into it, dividing it, and thus I am at a 
point of betraying it.3 
In the writings of Sartre subjectivity is the first 
principle of existentialism. He defines existentialism as 
a doctrine which makes human life possible and, in 
addition, declares that every truth and every action 
implies a human setting and a human subjectivity.4 
The essential meaning of existentialism is that it is 
impossible for man to transcend human subjectivity.5 
The common ground upon which both atheistic and Christian 
existentialists can agree is that subjectivity is the starting 
point, and this is to say that existence precedes essence. For 
Sartre this means that man first of all exists, appears on the 
scene in the midst of changing nature and society and only 
1. Kuhn, Art. (1949). 
2. Marcel, .PE, 95. 
3. Marcel, PE, 8. 
4. Sartre, EXI, 12. 
5. Sartre, EXI, 20. 
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afterwards does he define himself. 
The insistence upon the priority of existence over essence 
has led to the criticism of classical phil osophies. The 
classical philosophers were concerned with essence, with the 
'what' instead of the 'that'. In their thinking about reality 
they severed themselves from it and lost contact with it. The 
existentialists say that reality must be something more than 
our ideas about it, it must be more than t he objects we experi-
ence; essences are not existents, the that is prior to the 
what.l Werner Brock, interpreting Heidegger's Postscript, writes: 
"Being", and its "truthn, was long before m{\11 came 
into their own by thinking it. Essential thinking, 
i.e. true philosophy, meditat i ng upon "Being", is 
an "event of Being" itself.2 
The recognition of the private and deeply personal in 
/ 
existential thought also finds expression in Ferre's definition 
of existentialism. 
The existential is individual, deeply inward. 
It is the decision where the martyr must face 
death rather than deny or recant.3 
Existential thinking includes depth decisions which cannot 
be made wholly on the basis of previous experience or speculative 
morality, but that involve a trust in which passions, will, and 
intellect co-operate ideally. Existential thinking, 'whole 
thinking', and 'depth thinking' are used synonymously by. Ferre. 
Whole thinking "requires the deepest passions, as well as 
intellect and will, of the whole man."4 Man continuously 
1. Farm, Art.(l950). 3. Ferre, FR, 150. 
2. Heidegger, EB, 239. 4. Ferre, FR, 205. 
attempts to comprehend and to explain his experience and the 
experience of others, but his deepest searchings and thought 
still leaves much shrouded in mystery. Man's deepest needs 
outrun his best ideas. This kind of depth thinking is 
existential thinking. 1 It means "that the whole person is 
involved critically and costingly in the thinking. tt2 vVbole-
response, unavoidable, critical, and personal are the words 
which characterize the existential most adequately. Walter 
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Horton approximates such a . description of the existential when 
.. 
he defines genuine faith as 
a trustful reaching out of the whole man--not 
his mind alone, but his will and emotions too, 
with a 11whole-beartedness" that involves even 
the bodily organism, right down to the tear-
ducts and the pit of the stomach--toward some-
thing he may find it hard to define, but which 
be honestly considers more trustworthy than 
himself, more trustworthy than his wife or 
friends, ••• a bank account, ••• or any of those 
other liabilities in which men customarily put 
their trust.3 
One of the most inclusive definitions of existentialism 
in which the existential is contrasted with the non-existential 
is given by Nico~as Berdyaev. They differ in: 
(1) The primacy of freedom over being or the primacy 
of being over freedom, that is the first and the most 
important; (2) The primacy of the existential subject 
over the objectified world or t he primacy of the 
objectified world over the existential subject; 
(3) dualism or monism; (4:)' voluntarism or intellec-
tualism; (5) dynamism or statism; (6) creative 
activism or passive observation; (7) personalism or 
1. Ferre, FR, 213. 
2. Ferre, FR, 132. 
3. Horton, OCF, XVIII. 
impersonalism; (8) anthropologism or cosmism; 
(9) philosophy of the spirit or naturalism. These 
principles may be combined differently in different 
st stems. I decidedly choose the philosophy that 
affirms the primacy ·or freedom over being, of the 
existential subject over the objectified world, 
dualism, voluntarism, dynamism, creative activism, 
personalism! anthropologism, and the philosophy of 
the Spirit. 
From the various attempts at a definition it can be 
observed that the common characteristics of both Christian 
and atheistic existentialism are: (1) the view that existence 
precedes essence (2) reason is denied the power to give a 
coherent account of reality (3) the emphasis on subjectivity 
in which the vitally personal, the individual, decision and 
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commitment are all-important for an interpretation of reality. 
To do justice to both types of existentialism the following 
definition is presented: existentialism, in contrast to 
speculative thought which primarily stresses objectivity 
in the . sense of the rational and universal, is thinking that 
is more concerned with the structure and destiny of human being 
than with being in general. It is thinking of human experience 
in terms of voluntarism, the subjective, and the inescapable 
deeply personal decisions and commitments. It asserts that 
ultimately in every mental and physical event there is more 
meaning than can be expressed in a human rationale. 
The two types of existentialism have come to a parting or 
the ways at the point or interpretation of the ultimate meaning 
1. ya i mir obyektov, 25, translated and cited by Spinka, 
BCF, 99. 
of ezistence, and especially with respect to the fact of 
suffering and evil. The atheistic school can give no meaning 
to existence apart from the meaning which human persons give 
to it. Reality, it is believed, is not reducible to the 
rationally coherent and therefore there is no basis for 
speaking of the essence of a thing or human nature. Contrary 
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to this view Vergilius Ferm aptly points out that such Christian 
thinkers as Etienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain 
talk about a superessential existentialism which 
is God, a That which is descriptively beyond all 
reason, a That which becomes a What in the encoun-
ter through revelation alone and not through thought.l 
Both types of existential thinking share the experience 
of despair which comes as a result of man's finiteness, calling 
for decision and commitment in the face of man's inability to 
give wholeness to reality. But the decisions are not alike. 
Karl Jaspers declares that: 
the presence of gaps in the world structure, the 
failure of all attempts to conceive of the world 
as self-contained, the abortion of human planning, 
the futility of human designs and realizations, 
the impossibility of fulfilling man himself brings 
us to the edge of the abyss, where we ezperience 
nothingness or God.2 
Where there is no meaning, the result is despair. 
Existence without meaning is an encounter with nothingness,3 
that dreadful freedom4 out of which man creates himself. 
Though both types of existentialism assert the unavoidable 
1. 
2. 
Ferm, Art.(l950). 
Jaspers, PSP, 32. 
3. 
4. 
See Kuhn, Encounter With 
Nothingness. 
See Grene, Dreadful Freedom. 
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experience of dread and anguish, their final attitude toward 
such experience is different. For the Christian existentialist 
the experience of dread can serve a purpose and need not be 
continuous; it is overcome by God's grace. The Christian 
existentialist transcends himself by reaching for something 
greater than himself. The atheistic ex i stentialist also can 
transcend himself b~t only in a purely human sense. The despair 
of the former is due to man's remoteness from God. The despair 
of' the latter is due to his belief' that God does not exist and 
to the '"nothingness 11 that remains. 
ii. Atheis~ic Existentialism. 
Sartre warns that his existentialism is not to be confused 
with the Christian type. He can accept a creation~ nihilo, 
but it is man who is the creator. God, a pattern of human 
nature, and purpose in the universe, are concepts which have 
no place in his thinking. Man appears on the scene, be exists, 
be is the master of his own fate and destiny. Man is indefin-
able because at first he is ncnthing. 1 
The forlornness and anguish that man experiences mean only 
that God does not e.:xist and that we have to face all the 
consequences of this. For a thinker of the Barthian type such 
as Emil Brunner anguish and unrest are the result of man's 
falling away from God and falling into self-love. It is the 
realization of the wrath of God. 2 
1. Sartre, EXI, 18. 2. Brunner, MR, 114-163. 
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Sartre denies that his view is pessimistic. On the contrary, 
he says, it calls for optimism and real responsibility. Life 
bas no meaning until you give it reality, and "value is nothing 
else but the meaning you cboose. 11 1 The theists, declares Sartre, 
escape this terrible responsibility by giving values a cosmic 
rather than a human source, and thereby making men live in a 
false freedom and with a lack of responsibility. There is no 
escape--man is what be makes himself and be is always in the 
making and always responsible. Materialism as well as idealism 
is an escape from responsibility for it reduces man to a 
mechanism and freedom to an illusion. 
Heidegger does not consider birnBelf a philosopher of 
existence in the usual sense of the term. His thinking is 
a philosophy of Dasein with special emphasis on the human 
Dasein which is the consciousness of "being there", or "being 
present". His view can therefore be called the philosophy of 
being remembering that by being he does not mean things in 
the universe. Concerning his interpretat~on of being Jean 
Wahl writes: 
The only form of Being with which we are truly 
in contact is the being or man ••• Only man truly 
exists ••• Animals live, mathematical thing~ 
subsist ••• but none of these things exist. 
Heidegger's view goes b~yond stating that existence 
precedes essence. He affirms that we can never know that 
existence bas essence; the 'that' cannot be reduced to the 
1. Sartre, EXI, 58. 2. Wahl, SHE, 11. 
'what'. The intent of Heidegger is to destroy the idea of 
essence and substance, yet his view of "nothingness" appears 
to denote a quasi-essence or substance which is the source 
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of being, or as Wahl remarks "it differs from everything that 
there is, and therefore must be "Being" itself."1 Our striving 
with nothingness is the attempt to bring order out of chaos. 
Existential seriousness in Heidegger is man's full responsibility 
to shape his own destiny. In agreement with Sartre he believes 
man must do this on his own for his life's journey is a solo 
flight. Heidegger and Sartre differ with respect to the idea 
of relatedness of selves. For Heidegger selves are like 
Leibnitz's monads without windows, whereas for Sartre there 
is an "uneasy absorption of one consciousness into another, 
or their reciprocal making of each other through the 
destruction of each other." 2 
Heidegger and Sartre also disagree with respect to the 
idea of dread. For Heidegger dread is the condition of being 
thrown into the world, and most distressing is the fact of 
being thrown toward death. The -dread which confronts Sartre is 
not so much the fact of death as the fact of freedom. Men are 
condemned to be free and it is the kind of freedom which makes 
man a homeless creature. In the thought of both dread is 
contrasted "to _an everyday self-deceiving manner of existence, 
which ; conceals the tragic terror of the individual's loneliness 
1. Wahl, SHE, 13. 2. Grene, DR, 78. 
beneath a soothing multiplicity of conventional and eternal 
demands."1 
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Heidegger's view of the limitations of knowledge becomes 
evident when he defines truth in the Greek term a)_ n" G c. I tl which 
originally meant "to remain concealed".2 He rejects the 
conventional theory of truth as the right relation between 
thought or representation and a thing. Truth is not restricted 
to a scientific, scholarly and philosophic knowledge. 3 Every 
person who lives in an historic situation is, in his own way, 
concerned with truth. Truth must be related to the whole of 
human Dasein. We can be sure there is much truth which is 
unknown. The problem of truth and untruth is so difficult 
because the 'within the whole' is revelatory and concealing 
at the same time. There is a not-yet-truth of concealment 
and a mystery that precedes and outlasts all uncover1ng.4 
iii. Christian Existentialism. 
The classical philosophers attempted to interpret the world 
rationally. The su:rnmit of this attempt was the thought of Hegel 
who believed that the truth is the whole, and that the whole 
must be rational. Human reason is divine and through progres-
sive stages it can reach its culmination in the divine 
intelligence itself. Against such power of reason and such 
system building Spren Kierkegaard made a strong protest. A 
1. Grene, DF, 54. 3. Heidegger, EB, 148-167. 
2. Heidegger, EB, 144. 4. Heidegger, EB, 175. 
clear example of this revolt, including also his aptness for 
ironical criticism is evident in the fol l owing passage. 
"Now tell me honestly is it (the System) really 
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quite finished? For in that case I shall prostrate 
myself, even though I should r u in a pair of trousers" 
--for by reason of the heavy t r affic to and from the 
system the path is not a little soiled--I always got 
the answer: "No, as yet it is, in fact, not quite 
completed." And so it was pos t poned again--both the 
system and the kneeling.l 
However, Kierkegaard did not reject the idea that reality 
is a rational whole, that reality is a system. 
An existential system cannot be formulated. Does 
this mean that no such system exists? By no means; 
nor is it implied in our assertion. Reality itself 
is a system--for God2 but it cannot be a system for any existing spirit. 
Kierkegaard revolted against Hegel's view that all the 
thesis-antithesis relations could be rationally elevated into 
a synthesis. There is too much in human . experience which does 
not lend itself to a rational system and therefore the synthesis 
is a paradoxical divine synthesis. God is not human reason 
magnified; there is an "eternal qualitative difference between 
God and man 11 , 3 making God the "wholly other". 
In Hegel's thought religion in its highest stage becomes 
one with philosophy; for Kierkegaard philosophy or reason is 
scandalized at the highest stage of religion--the point of the 
1. S~ren Kierkegaard, Samlede Vaerker, ed. A. B. Drachman, 
I. L. Heiberg, and H. o. Lange (2nd ed .; Copenhagen, 1920-
31), VI I, 95, cited by Grene, DF, 18. 
2. Kierkegaard, CUP, 107. 
3. Kierkegaard, Einubing in Christentum, 126; Die Krankheit 
zum Tode, tr. Barthold, 251, citea by Aubrey, PTT, 66. 
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incarnation where the "crucifixion of reason" takes place, 
because re~son cannot give an account of the eternal being 
coming into history at a certain time and place. The incar-
nation is the paradox of paradoxes, only to be grasped by 
faith, and the clearest expression of the antithesis of faith 
and reason. This means decision followed by commitment to 
that which is not rationally justifiable . Out of such 
thinking evolves Kierkegaard's assertion that "truth is 
subjectivity". 1 
For the Danish thinker philosophy is seriously limited 
because of its own nature. The essential characteristic of 
philosophyis objectivity and "in this objectivity one tends 
to lose that infinite personal interestedness in passion which 
is the condition of faith ••• "2 According to his thinking the 
conflict between objectivity and subjectivity is a conflict 
between certainty and passion. 
While faith bas hitherto had a profitable school-
master in the existing uncertai nty, it would have 
in the new certainty its most dangerous enemy. 
For if passion is eliminated, faith no longer exists, 
and certainty and passion do not go together.3 
Christianity is spirit, spirit is inwardness, 
inwardness is subjectivity, subjectivity is 
essentially passion.4 
The speculative philosopher, Kierkegaard maintains, 
does not have the infinite personal interest, nor is it 
1. Kierkegaard, Postscript, 187, cited by Ferre, FR, 74. 
2~ Kierkegaard, CUP, 30. 
3. Kierkegaard, CUP, 30. 4. Kierkegaard, CUP, 33. 
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possible for him to attain it for "his task consists in getting 
more and more away from himself and becoming what might be 
called the contemplative energy of philosophy itself."1 Man 
speaks about a universal history, about giving objectivity 
to the world process and to existence, but bow well bas man 
recorded the passions, the sufferings, and inwardness of 
humanity? How much of a man's conscious experience of a day 
becomes recorded in history, becomes objectified? For Kierke-
gaard "existence involves first and foremost particularity, and 
this is why thought must abstract from existence, because the 
particular cannot be thought, but only the universal." 2 
Kierkegaard's charges against reason are carefully and 
systematically stated and answered in L. Harold DeWolf's book, 
The Religious Revolt Against Reason. The charges against reason 
are divided into four classes. Respectively they are reason's 
objectivity, its presumption, its ineffectiveness, and the evil 
consequences of trust in it.3 
In spite of the alleged inadequacy of reason to give an 
account of reality, Klerkegaard held philosophy in high esteem. 
All honor to philosophy, all praise to everyone 
who brings a genuine devotion to its service. 
To deny the value of speculation ••• would be, 
in my opinion, to prostitute oneself.4 
Karl Jaspers in his discussion of philosophical faitb5 
1. Kierkegaard, CUP, 54. 
2. Kierkegaard, CUP, 290. 
3. DeWolf, RAR, 60-105. 
4. Kierkegaard, Postscript, 54, 
c i ted by DeWolf, RAR, 64. 
5. Jaspers, PSP, 1-7. 
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regards faith as something other than knowledge, but adds that 
it is always allied with knowledge. Faith must not be taken to 
mean the irrational; the life of the spirit does not begin at 
the point of the irrational. "The subjective and objective 
side of faith are a whole."l 
Jaspers does not consider religion as an enemy of 
philosophy but something which continuously troubles it. The 
One of philosophy is not the One of the Bible. The prophetic 
faith is more powerful than the philosophical idea, but is 
inferior in intellectual clarity. Philosophy is not to be 
confused with religion. The philosoph~r as a man is part of 
a whole, and his philosophizing also stands from its very 
inception in this context.2 Philosophers are at fault if they 
think they can universalize religion and thus penetrate the 
depths of religion. The objective, measurable, and empirically 
real must be present as valid for everyone, but such a method is 
existentially indifferent in the face of depth experiences as 
suffering, pain, danger, guilt, and death. Jaspers declares: 
What is universally valid for all (like scientific 
and other logically true propositions) is for that 
very reason not absolute, is universally valid for 
all from a specific standpoint and on the basis of 
a definite method, hence under certain conditions 
and not absolutely. This kind of true proposition 
is cogent for all whose intelligence can grasp 
it. But it is relative to the standpoint and 
method by which it is disclosed. It is exis-
tentially indifferent because it is finite, 
1. Jaspers, PSP, 7. 2. Jaspers, PSP, 114,115. 
particular, objectively cogent--no man can or 
should die for it.l 
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Gabriel Marcel, in harmony with the other existentialists, 
distrusts the adequacy of reason to give a coherent account of 
reality. His general tendency has been to enhance difficulties 
found in speculative philosophies and as a result be bas 
developed a distrust of all systems of philosophy. Whatever 
its ultimate meaning, the universe into which man bas come 
cannot satisfy his reason, and man must have the courage to 
admit it once and for a11.2 Even self-knowledge, regarded by 
some thinkers as the starting point, leads to difficulties. 
There is a sense in which the thinker can place himself on the 
stage and cross-examine himself, but this can be done only 
because there is a form of participation which has the reality 
of a subject. There is mystery in cognition for which no 
epistemology can account. 3 
So long as I am concerned with thought itself 
I seem to follow an endless regression. But 
by the very fact of recognizing it as endless 
I transcend it in a certain way: I see that 
this process takes place within an affirmation 
of being--an affirmation which I am rather than 
an affirmation which I utter: by uttering it 
I break it, I divide it, I am on the point of 
betraying it.4 
For some time, Marcel says, be shared the illusion that one 
could overcome confessional differences and establish a religion 
founded on reason which should be acceptable to all thinking men. 
1. Jaspers, PSP, 90,91. 
2. Marcel, PE, 92. 
3. Marcel, PE, 8. 
4. Marcel, PE, 8. 
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There is too much in human experience that calls for cormnit-
ments which~ although good and true~ do not realize their 
purpose. Such tensions between inner commitments and the 
objective ends appear to Marcel as existential in the highest 
degree. 1 
Existential thought, it bas already been said, must 
finally lead to the place where men exper i ence nothingness or 
God. For Marcel existential thought finds its completion in 
the experience of the supra-human, 
an experience which can hardly be ours in a 
genuine and lasting way this side of death, 
but of which the reality is attested by mystics, 
and of which the possibility is warranted by any 
philosophy which refuses to b e immured in the 
postulate of absolute immanence ••• 2 
This experience, says Marcel, is impossible and inconceiv-
able without the hidden impulses of grace. No metaphysical 
research can give a rational account of this. 
With some reservation it is also permissible to enter 
under the philosophy of existentialism the names of such neo-
orthodox thinkers as Barth, Brunner, and Niebuhr. Emil Brunner 
writes favorably about this new philosophy but also warns against 
identifying it with Christian theology. Writing about the 
problem of the subject-object antithesis in thinking, be declares: 
It was left for the newest form of philosophy, 
the existential, to question the validity of the 
antithesis itself. It is no accident that the 
source of this new thinking is to be found in 
the greatest Christian thinker of modern times, 
1. Marcel, PE, 70. 2. Marcel, PE, 65. 
S~ren Kierkegaard. It is therefore particularly 
suggestive for us theologians to attach our-
selves to this philosophy, the entire bent of 
which seems to correspond with ours. Yet we 
must emphasize again that our considerations 
are purely theological, that hence they are 
not dependent upon the correctness or incor-
rectness of that philosophical undertaking 
which seems to run parallel--apparently or 
really--with our own.l 
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In agreement with the Catholic thinkers Gilson and Maritain, 
Brunner makes a contrast between revealed knowledge and rational 
knowledge. It is only in the encounter through revelation that 
we receive saving knowledge of divine reality. Brunner is 
especially concerned with Biblical revelation which be describes 
as 
a way of acquiring knowledge that is absolutely and 
essentially--and not only relatively--opposite to 
the usual method of acquiring knowledge, by means 
of observation, research, and thought.2 
I Ferre calls to our attention three kinds of antiration-
alism. 3 The first kind is logical positi.vism in which reason 
is limited to the finding of necessary relations within 
logical structure. If reason is so limited, ethics, theology., 
and metaphysics can have no authentic basis. In this view faith 
is something completely arbitrary and divorced from reason. 
The second kind of irrationalism makes feeling, decision, 
or action the final test. Barth's view of God's Word as coming 
to man, not by the power of human knowledge, but straight from 
above and in a moment of immediate decision is such an irra-
1. Brunner, DHE, 82. 3. / Ferre, FR, 240,242. 
2. Brunner, RR, 23. 
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tionalism, as is also the pragmatic view that man's actions 
are his faith. 
The last kind of antirationalism is belief in revelation. 1 
' Ferre considers three views of revelation all of which have the 
common tenet that natural reason is by itself incompetent to 
constitute the final authority of religious truth. The first 
view holds that natural reason in religion is misleading and 
that special revelation is not related to the truths of 
reason. Aware of the difficulties involved in general classifi-
cations, Ferre identifies this school with such men as Paul, 
Pascal, Kierkegaard, Barth and others. The reason this 
antirationalism lays itself open to fanaticism 11 is that it 
has no organic relation between revelation and general creation."2 
The second type of revelation is that found in Thomism 
which regards revelation as an extension of reason. The 
criticism given of the first type also holds true here. 
Something otherwise unknowable is simply added without any 
"full organic connection between the disclosures of revelation 
and those of reason. 11 3 
~ The third type of revelation and that which Ferre 
considers as the clue to the solution of the problem of the 
relation between reason and religion is the Augustinian-
Anselmian view, "I believe in order to know." The right 
emphasis, he suggests, is on both parts of the sentence, 
"though the stronger stress must still fall on the first part. rt4 
1. 
2. 
Ferre, FR, 242,243. 
Ferre, FR, 243. 
3. 
4. 
I Ferre, FR, 244. 
Ferre, FR, 245. 
2. Kinds of Rationalism 
The problem. of the relation of faith and reason, reason 
and revelation, or the problem of the competency of reason to 
discern religious knowledge, is often enhanced by the failure 
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to state what is meant by reason. No one will deny that reason 
is a faculty to be used to acquire knowledge and to live a 
life. But what kind of faculty is it? Is it the mind's 
capacity for deductive or inductive thinking; is it the 
intellect, or is it an all inclusive faculty combining intu-
ition, will, feeling, and intellect? Is reason only an instru-
ment for knowing reality, or is it reality itself as expressed 
in Hegel's principle, "the real is the rational and the rational 
is the real"? 
Three kinds of rationalism will be presented beginning 
with the most 'pure' or arbitrary kind and proceeding to the 
most comprehensive kind. The three kinds of reason to be 
discussed are deductive, scientific, and synoptic. 
i. Deductive. 
For Descartes the method of mathematics was the true 
philosophical method. Unlike Bacon, the empiricist, he set 
forth the rules of logic derived from studying mathematics as 
the only certain method for arriving at truth. Reason must 
rule supreme, and reason is a kind of seeing or insight operative 
in mathematical relations. To have certitude one must begin 
witb a set of axioms, with some self-evident truths. Only clear 
and distinct ideas can be accepted as true. Ideas derived by 
39 
deduction from self-evident truths would necessarily be true. 
His well known axiom, Cogito ergo sum, led to the conclusion 
that we can doubt everything except our doubting. But to 
begin with the certainty of the fact of doubting is once again 
only to posit the problem. It is interesting to note that it 
was only after Descartes arrived at the idea of God that be 
was able to establish the trustworthiness of reason. 
Accepting Descartes' principle that truth lies in the clear 
and distinct ideas, Spinoza proceeded to work out and prove his 
pantheistic view of reality. True ideas follow one another 
by logical and geometrical necessity, or at times it appears 
by mechanical compulsion. 
The use of a similar kind of reason as that above is the 
method of the religious apriorists. Influenced by the Aristo-
telian and Kantian view of a priori categories they assert an 
a priori category of religion. The structure of the mind is 
such that man has an innate capacity for religion in the same 
way that be bas capacity for science, ethics, and aesthetics. 
Just as the mental capacities of space and time are necessary 
categories if there is to be scientific knowledge, so religious, 
moral, and aesthetic experiences can only be possible if man has 
these different a priori capacities. The more extreme example 
of the thought of the religious apriorists is Rudolph Otto's 
interpretation of religious experience as a mental state, sui 
generis, always independent of any other t ype of human experience.l 
1. Otto, IH, 7. 
.The experience of the numen is a primary immediate datum of 
consciousness like the experience of the color red. 
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The religious apriorist, Albert C. Knudson, and Borden P. 
Bowne whose view is closely related, assert that man's entire 
nature demands the reality of ideals, the religious ideal being 
one of them and the most dynamic of all. Knudson writes: 
All ideal interests of mankind--science, art, 
morality, and religion,--rest ultimately on faith; 
and faith in one form is logically as good as faith 
in any other form. Religious faith bas in this 
respect nothing to fear. It occupies as impregnable 
a position as does the faith that underlies sciince, 
morality, and art. It stands in its own right. 
ii. Scientific. 
A very popular kind of reason is that which constitutes 
the scientific method. Its primary trait is its analytic 
character. It is an attempt to reduce everything there is to 
its smallest possible part and observe the relations which exist 
among the parts. According to the science of electronics the 
basis of all familiar matter · is the minute invisible particle of 
electricity. Everything in the universe--a tree, the planet 
Jupiter, a pair of shoes, etc., is forme d of an uncomprehensibly 
vast number of electrons whirling around their nuclei. 
The analytic method receives a strong emphasis in the 
philosophy of the nee-realists. They ma:tntain that objects 
can neither be described as mental, nor as physical; Being is 
neutral. This non-mental and non-material existence is 
pluralistic and goes by the name of "neutral entities". 
1. Knudson, DG, 227. 
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Neutral entities are best described in t erms of units, points, 
simples, or instants. The neutral entit i es through various 
relations and compositions aggregate themselves into physical 
objects as well as mental activity. If t h i s view is true then 
all mirages, illusions, and errors of judgment must be assigned 
to a realm of their own, a kind of subsis tence. Such activities, 
as well as consciousness itself, cannot b e surrendered to the 
non-mental. 
A further inadequacy of the analyti c~ method is its failure 
to account for teleological evidence in t he interrelatedness 
of things. The formation of aggregates i n nee-realism appear 
as though they were the product of blind chance. Though many 
scientists regard their method as the truly critical one, it 
is really found to be uncritical and abs t ract, due to its 
exclusion of purpose and value. Whitehead rightly sees in the 
scientific method the same narrowness whi. ch prevailed in 
dogmatic religion: 
a few generations ago the clergy., or to speak 
more accurately, large sections of the clergy, 
were standing examples of obsc .rantism. Today 
their place has been taken by s c i entists.! 
Because every source of evidence ought to be considered, 
the scientific method and speculative thought ought to supplement 
each other. The contribution of the scientific method must be 
recognized. The analytic method is the essential starting point 
of all philosophy. It is necessary because the parts do have 
1. Whitehead, FR, 34,35. 
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characteristics which the whole does not have, but it is 
inadequate because the whole also bas characteristics which the 
parts do not have. 
The scientific method is not limited to laboratory or 
test tube observation. It may well be d .~vided into two forms, 
the analytic and the experimental; the l ~Ltter is the method 
of the pragmatists who can only accept a a true those ideas 
which work, that is, bring practical results. Such a method 
cannot satisfy the quest for truth, especdally religious truth. 
With Hocking, pragmatism can be regarded as a guide in the form 
of a negative test, 1 but its tentative character renders it 
unsatisfactory. It is suspicious of absolute truth and has 
the tendency to equate the test of truth wi th truth itself. 
It cannot deal adequately with the fact of suffering, and it 
is weighted toward happiness as the standard for conduct. 
iii. Synoptic. 
Having found the scientific method Uilsatisfactory because 
it must remain content with abstractions , it is necessary to 
turn to a more inclusive method known as the synoptic method. 
Appearing in various forms, it bas been t he attempted method 
of many philosophers and .has received it s clearest expression 
in the thought of E. s. Brightman2 for wb om it is the criterion 
of religious as well as all other truths . As a philosophic 
1. Hocking, MGHE, XIII. 2. See Brightman, ITP, 39-42; 
POR, 122-129, 189-193. 
method it ttpresupposes that the rational :l. stic, experimental, 
analytic, critical, dialetical, and romantic methods have all 
been tried, and that their results are b efore the mind.nl It 
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attempts to see together the separate fa c:ts of deduction, analysis 
and synthesis, experiment and feeling. I n its most adequate 
expression it becomes the method of coherence, requiring consist-
ency, but more important, demanding relatedness. A datum of 
experience must stick together, bold fas t , be connected to the 
other facts of experience as part of the same whole before it can 
be incorporated as knowledge. Different shades of the synoptic 
method are Plato's, Kant's, and Hegel's use of reason and Bergson's 
use of intuition. This attempt at synopsis was also Hocking's 
'whole idea'--his endeavor to relate all man's feeling and thinking 
with nature. Like Bergson he makes knowl edge of the source of 
religion more dependent upon feeling than intellect, but later 
shows how thought is necessary to relig i on because "idea is 
a~ways accompanied by feeling. tt2 
Although William James asserts that r•e l igious opinions can 
be judged on the basis of our immediate f eeling, he too makes 
a synoptic attempt inasmuch as he writes : "Immediate 
luminousness, in short, philosophical reasonableness, and 
moral helpfulness are the only available criteria."3 
In his encyclopedic work, The Problem of Religious Know-
ledge, D. C. Macintosh writing as an ep i s temological monist 
1. Brightman, ITP, 39. 3. J. ames , VRE, 19 • 
2. Hocking, MGHE, 117. 
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calls his view "critical monistic realism in religion." It is 
the view that: 
Not all that is immediately experienced in sense-
perception is independently real, and not all that 
is independently real is immedia.tely experienced 
by human subjects ••• It is possible to maintain that 
there is a core of existential or numerical identity, 
a partial identity or overlapping of the immediately 
experienced and the independently real. It is this 
partial identity1or overlapping which makes verifi-cation possible. 
We apprehend, intuit, perceive, a divine factor 
causally immanent in the complex of ~alue- ­
producing processes in the uniV!3rse. 
Macintosh warns that intuition is val uable but not 
infallible. There are different kinds of i ntuition: perceptual, 
rational, appreciative, and i-maginary. The last is the most 
fallible and the first is the most adequat e: "It is perceptual 
intuition of reality which has dependable verification value."3 
But be admonishes that perceptual intuition can also be 
hallucinatory or illusory, and in critici:9m of W. E. Lyman's 
position, which he considers as bor~ering t oo closely to 
imaginary intuition, be cites W. P . Montague's warning that, 
the ideas and beliefs which are yielded by 
intuition should neither be dis carded as false 
nor accepted as true, but taken tentatively as 
hypothesis which need to be test ed by f'urther 
experience. 4 
From the preceding statement it can b e seen that D. c. 
Macintosh can also be added to the list of those tending toward 
1. Macintosh, PRK, 6. 
2. Macintosh, PRK, 175. 
3. Ma ~ intosh, PRK, 186. 
4. Mont ague, WK, 64, cited by 
Mac intosh, PRK, 186. 
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a synoptic use of reason. There are others, among whom W. R. 
Sorley stands out as a good example. He says, 
Analysis sunders a thing into i ts elements; 
synthesis puts these elements t ogether again; 
synopsis views the thing as a whole. Synopsis 
is something more as well as something less 
than synthesis. Synthesis giv E's us a whole--
or perhaps only a collection--oach part of 
which is distinguishable and hu.s been 
distinquished; synopsis contemplates a whole 
of which the parts may not be distinct.l 
It is evident that the synoptic ideal bas been the 
endeavor of many phi~osopbers of religio11. It is also clear 
that among them there bas been a variety of approach, some 
emphasizing various faculties of mind more than others. For 
Hocking it was 'whole-idea' with feeling-cognition as primary; 
for James it was immediate feeling which needed the test of 
moral helpfulness; for Sorley, a true ph :tlosophical synopsis 
is inadequate unless it can give an account of the irreducible 
"ought"; for Pattison philosophy must be systematic and 
coherent but systematization of e.xperienc~e is impossible apart 
from some ultimate value judgment which l s human personality 
with its vision of ideals. 
All these faculties of the mind, be they feeling, 
intuition, moral experience, or value-judgment, have in 
common the characteristic of being anti-authoritarian, and in 
claiming man's capacity to know divine r eality. When a neo-
orthodo.x thinker like Emil Brunner denounces the supremacy of 
1. Sorley, MVIG, 252. 
reason with respect to religious truth, be thinks of reason 
not only in terms of the intellect but a s "all the faculties 
of man as sucb."1 Similarly Barth says, 
No knowledge of God can -be bad by a disinterested 
objective, or speculative approach. This is the 
approach of all natural theology and one cannot 
reconcile Reformed theology with natural theology. 
One must choose.2 
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According to David Swenson's interpretation of Kierkegaard 
the latter meant by reason "the self-assurance and self-
assertiveness of man's nature in totality ."3 Considering 
Brunner's earlier writings, one can then say that the 
principle of these three thinkers has been that reason is 
inadequate as an arbiter of religious truth • . 
As the result of a more empirical approach the word reason 
has taken on a broader meaning. Reason bas come to mean the 
synoptic method which includes all of man's faculties for know-
ledge. The synoptic method is "the syst E~m of knowledge which 
includes the widest possible variety of data."4 E. s . Brightman 
defines reason as 11 a logically consistent and coherent method of 
interpreting e.xperience,n 5 and e.xperience is considered as 
synonymous with the field of consciousness. 6 In its broadest 
sense reason is an activity which is more than deductive reason-
ing, or feeling, or intellect, or analys:ts and synthesis; it is 
1. Brunner, TC, 14-15. 
2. Barth, KGSG, 104. 
3. Kierkega~rd, Fragments, 99-100, 
note on Chap. III, 39, cited by 
DeWolf, RAR, 57. 
4. DeWolf, RAR, 197. 
5. Brightman, POR, 536. 
6. Brightman, POR, 164. 
something less inclusive than experience or consciousness. 
It is an attempt to give a coherent account of all data of 
consciousness. It is the comprehensive me~hod of judging 
all experience including revelation-claims. 
Ferre briefly discusses three types of rationalism and 
three types of irrationalism. 1 Rationalism is defined as 
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"the theory that our natural reason constitutes our final 
criterion of truth," and antiratlonalism is "the denial that 
our natural reason constitutes our final criterion of truth."2 
The first kind of rationalism is the view that the mind bas 
in itself the power for truth. Such a view was set forth by 
Plato's doctrine of recollection, Descartes' innate ideas, 
and Kant's necessary and universal forms of consciousness. 
This kind of rationalism, says Ferre, can make no contribution 
to religion because in religion it would be essentially self-
worship. It falls to see that the actual self is basically 
evil and therefore needs to be judged by the highest historical 
revelation and by the Holy Spirit. 
I The second type of rationalism according to Ferre's 
classification, and corresponding to the third type already 
presented, is that which makes coherence the test of truth. 
An able representative of this type of rationalism, declares 
I Ferre, is Brand Blanshard 1 s work, The Nature of Thought, in 
which coherence means the whole of experience accessible to 
1. Ferre, FR, 236-244. 2. Ferre, FR, 236. 
"our immanent and connnon reason."1 For Ferr~ "our immanent 
and common reason" is only our actual reason which bas been 
darkened by sin. The method is inadequate because it equates 
man's reason with God's reason and fails to take a realistic 
account of sin. 2 The coherency of experience of our time and 
world is only a small fraction of the purposive process and 
therefore such a criterion confuses man's time with God's 
time. It is further inadequate because it equates Being 
and Goodness which results in denying the reality of evil or 
making God finite. 3 
Ferre's third kind of rationalism, t he scientific method, 
is presented in much the same way as the second type already 
discussed above, 4 and will receive furth er attention in 
Chapter Three. At present it will be indicated in what manner 
Ferre's view of rationalism differs from t he one preceding. 
He qualifies his definition of rationalisin in the classical 
manner of thinking by speaking of reason as "natural reason", 
and this he e.sserts is important because man 1 s reason is 
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obscured by sin. The definition tends to dichotomize the unity 
of the concept of reason making natural reason a private and 
already marred instrument of man. It has the tendency to think 
of reason as an innate or inherent capacity of mind, and often 
results in speaking of "reason alone" or "reason by itself".5 
1. Blanshard, NT, Vol. II, 519, 
cited by Ferre, FR, 238. 
2. Ferre, FR, 238. 
3. Ferre, FR, 239. 
4. See pp. 40-42. 
5. See DeWolf, RAR, 188-
189 for criticism of 
phrase, "reason alone". 
In experience reason is not independent of feeling, willing, 
and acting; nor according to the theists can it be meta-
physically independent of the divine mind. Natural reason 
is often used in the sense of being unrelated to revelation. 
Such a view is not an adequate interpretation of coherence. 
The method of coherence is not hostile to the theory of 
revelation. According to the synoptic view all revelation-
claims are sub.ject to the test of reason. I For Ferre natural 
reason must be judged by the highest historical revelation. 
~ The problem that remains for Ferre is how does one determine 
what constitutes the highest revelation. 
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The definition of ratio~alism given by Ferre by its very 
nature rules out the inclusiveness of the synoptic type of 
reason presented earlier. It is therefore difficult to see 
bow be was able to classify the method of coherence under such 
a limited definition unless by coherence he means interpreting 
experience by means of "our innnanent and common reason", 
thinking of the latter as excluding the possibility of revelation. 
But reason is both immanent and transcendent. Man is neither 
the source nor the creator of reason. ~or does the method of 
coherence equate man's reason with God's reason. Man's 
faculties cannot be equated with those of the Divine eternal 
consciousness. But if man is to have any knowledge of God 
there must be some affinity between God and man, and the 
thinking, willing and feeling which comprises the divine 
consciousness must have affinity to the similar faculties in 
man, or else God remains the "wholly otber 11 and the wholly 
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unknown. 
It is because of the alleged limitations of the method 
/ 
of coherence that Ferre cannot accept reason as the criterion 
for religious knowledge. However, reason is the adequate 
criterion for philosophical and scientific knowledge and the 
following chapter will bear out Ferre's acceptance of the 
supremacy of reason in the scientific and philosophical field 
as well as the avowed limitation of reason as an ultimate 
criterion for religious truth. 
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CHAPTER I I I 
THE RELATIONS OF SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY, AND 
/ 
RELIGION IN THE THOUGHT OF NELS FERRE 
1. The Proper Spher e of Each 
When Ferre asserts that science, philosophy, and religion 
have proper spheres of their own, he does not intend to imply 
that each bas its private domain which is not to be trespassed 
by the other. The fields are related and interdependent; 
they are not to be equated, nor are they to be made exclusive. 
Ferre's most extensive treatment of these three fields is 
found in his work, Faith and Reason. The first field to be 
considered is that of science. The treatment of science is 
. restricted primarily to physical science. 
Science bas made a contribution to all fields of know-
ledge. If the changes in other fields of knowledge have not 
been for the better, it is not the fault of science; it is due 
to the use of false science or the false use of science. 1 
"Science deals basically with quant i tative sense 
experience",2 but it also employs and investigates hypothesis, 
theories, and laws--all of which are not objects of sense 
~xperience. The method in science is one of exact measurement. 
1. Ferre, FR, 40. (All references 
in this chapter are to Ferre 
unless indicated otherwise.) 
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2. FR, 49. 
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The scientist makes perception, experiments, and mathematics 
central. The highest degree of certainty is to be found in pure 
logic and pure mathematics. nTbe poles of the sphere of science 
are laboratory verification and pure logic."1 
The manifold contributions of science to the whole 
realm of knowledge must be recognized, but this should not 
blind the thinker from also seeing its limitations and 
deceiving influence. The tendency for the scientific method 
to deceive lies in its tentativeness. 2 Such a method fosters 
an inclination to skepticism until full proof is in. Such 
a skepticism, if carried over to the other fields of knowledge, 
has destructive consequences. 
The proper sphere of science is that of description 
rather than prescription. Science can only tell what things 
are and how they function, but it cannot tell bow and why 
things ought to be different. "Then science cannot give us 
whole-truth through whole-response.n3 It is true that a 
doctor bas to give prescriptions but the more the trouble is 
a matter of the mind, the less certain is the prescription. 
To help as much as possible the physician often needs to 
treat spirit, mind, and body. Science is generally limited 
to description, but whole searching for truth cannot stop 
with description.4 
The general tendency in science is to deny freedom. 
1. FR, 97. 3. FR, 61. 
2. FR, 61. 4. FR, 64 • 
• 
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Freedom is not subject to science. Though mechanism is not 
a necessary assumption of science, · it easily turns out to 
be a. logical tendency. Because of this tendency some 
scientists and physicists are reluctant to accept Heisenberg's 
"principle of uncertainty"'· 
Another limitation of science is its incapacity to deal 
with motivation. 1 This is not the fault of science; it is 
the fault of those who fail to relate science to the whole 
of life and kn~wledge. Science is also limited because it 
is purely objective. "Yet the most vital part of life is 
always the subject, the person investigating the object."2 
The method of natural science cannot deal with the 
problem of the ultimate. The problem of the ultimate is a 
philosophic, metaphysical, and religious problem.3 The fear 
of death or the escape into death are not problems for science, 
nor are the meaning of life and the problem of evil. 
Other significant limitations of science are its disregard 
for value and its tendency to make us think in relativistic 
terms. The general principle bas been put thus: ";that we 
observe only ' relations between physical entities".4 Here 
Ferre can agree with W. H. Werkmeister that the physicist 
can no longer speak of electrons, protons, and neutrons as 
physical entities, as having distinctive individuality, but 
1. FR, 70. 
2. FR, 72. 
3. FR., 79. 
4. Eddingto~, PPS, 35, cited 
by Ferre, FR, 84. 
only as focal points of specific and measurable relation. 
nThese 'entities' are no longer distinct and self-identical 
'things 1 ••• " 1 
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The tendency to relativism and deter~inism in the scienti-
fic method has been a temptation to set up a false ideal for 
the social sciences. Ferre believes there is an absolute, and 
that this absolute can be known. "Naturally it can be known 
only in relative terms else we were omniscient."2 
The limitations of the method of natural science have 
been competently presented by Ferre, and one wishes tbat he 
might have said more concerning the method of the social 
sciences. He restricted himself largely to the physical 
sciences and unless the psychologist and sociologist bear 
in mind this restriction, tbey would have valid reason to 
reject his assertion that science has excluded purpose from 
its method3 and that its sphere is one of description rather 
than prescription. 
Turning to compare the field of philosophy with the 
field of religion, Ferre affirms that they are identical. 
He adds that to be more accurate one should use the term 
"!theology" rather than "religion". Hitherto he has used the 
term religion to keep up the connnon usage of science, 
philosophy, and religion and to avoid the ambiguity of 
1. Werkmeister, BSK, 339. 3. FR, 77. 
2. FR, 87. 
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different tbeologies. 1 This change of terms entails serious 
difficulties. In the first place there are different religions 
and therefore the problem of ambiguity is not solved, and in 
the second place religion and theology are not the same. The 
I problem that arises because of Ferre's failure to distinguish 
adequately between religion and theology will be dealt with in 
Chapter IX. 
For Ferre both philosophy and theology interpret the 
whole of human knowledge. 
Philosophy is the interpretation of the whole of 
experience centering in the here and now; theology 
is the interpretation of religion, that is, of the 
whole of experience, centering in the complete 
combination, obviously only partially here and now, 
of the most important and the most rea1.2 
In making the interpretation of religion equivalent 
to the interpretation of the whole of experience Ferr' is 
rendering impossible a distinction between religious experience 
and any other type of value experience. Under such an 
inclusive meaning of religion the moral, intellectual, aesthetic, 
and work values are subsumed under religious values. However, 
there are persons who appreciate and cultivate several or all 
of' those values without being religious. 
The three main standards for philosophy are inclusiveness, 
coherence, and objectivity. 3 The sphere of philosophy is the 
sphere of inclusiveness because it deals with the whole of 
1. FR, 109. 3. FR, 119. 
2. FR, 109. 
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experience. 
It deals with science, with history, with religion, 
with inner reactions and reflect ions, with outward 
behavior, with the description and with standards 
of conduct, with actuality, with possibility, with 
reality--in short with all that can be known.l 
For this reason a philosophy of religion deals with all 
religions and with what is true of the whole subject of 
religion. Any special field of knowledge treated by philosophy 
must be examined in the light of all that can be known. 
Coherence is the second standard of philosophy. The whole 
must be systematically interpreted. Coherence seeks to know 
the necessary relations among the parts. 
It tries to understand and to fit together the 
parts as they cohere, stick, cleave, or coexist 
one with the other and with the entire sum and 
substance of things.2 
In this respect coherence means more than formal 
consistency. There must be a positive relation among the 
parts of the whole. This does not eliminate the recognition 
of the incoherent: "for instance the fact of evil when viewed 
from a perfect rational perspective of good."3 From this 
point of view philosophy also faces the problem of fitting 
into a coherent interpretation such views as ttbecoming" and 
"creationtt. I It is because of these problems, says Ferre, 
that an adequate philosophy points toward religion; nthat 
religion seeks its completion in faith."4 
, 
Here, Ferre can 
1. FR, 115-116. 3. FR, 117. 
2. FR, 116. 4. FR, 117. 
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agree with Charles Hartshorne who claims "metaphysics evaporates 
into thin air, or it leads us to religion."1 
Objectivity is the third standard of philosophic knowledge. 
In this approach, according to Ferre, reason is freed from the 
drives of the emotions and from the demands of immediate action. 
Existential philosophy is a contradiction in 
terms. Religion is existential. Yet religion 
cannot be equated with existential philosophy 
or claim an existential logic without ••• 
forfeiting its true nature as religion by 
becoming rational knowledge in content.2 
At the same time existential philosophy cannot be true 
to the nature of philosophy. "Subjectivist philosophy is a 
misnomern for it has a tendency to degenerate into mere 
opinion or personal preference. However "existential philosophy" 
is aware of the inherent limitations in the philosophic method. 
Philosophy points to religion. Philosophy when "true to its 
proper task is definitely not theology."3 
On the basis of Ferre's affirmation t hat both philosophy 
and theology must seek to give a coherent account of the 
whole of experience it is difficult to accept his alleged 
demarcation between them. The fact of philosophical theology 
renders such a separation invalid. Ferre rightly asserts 
that the philosophical theologian's task is to "unearth the 
philosophical implications of faith, 114 but faith is essential 
to both philosophy and theology. Though philosophy and 
1. Hartshorne, MVG, 346, cited 
by Ferre, FR, 117. 
2. FR, 118. 
3. FR, 119. 
4. CUG, 6. 
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theology are not to be equated, neither can one be independent 
of' the other. 
2. How Science, Philosophy, and Religion are 
Related in the Common Task of Knowledge 
Today science is especially open to self-examination 
because of two main reasons: the practical and theoretical 
problems which it faces. 1 If it faces these problems 
honestly, it can help to show us what is most important and 
most real. We should not fear science because of itself'; 
science is in the service of man, but what we need to fear 
is that man is far too much in the service of evil. 2 
Though science has become a popular idol, it must be 
understood that even in science no certainty is to be bad. 
"Thus even in science proper there is this tension between 
exact measurement and adequate whole-explanation."3 The 
I 
question we need to ask ourselves about science is not: will 
the scientific method find truth, but can this kind of scien-
tific method serve as the only road to the full truth?4 
Science, philosophy, and religion have in common the 
whole f'ield of human problems, interests, and knowledge. But, 
as already stated, the scientific principle of "tentativeness" 
when applied to morals and religion, "except in terms of a 
humble and teachable positiveness ••• is a matter of stabbing 
1. FR, 41-44. 3. FR, 52. 
2. FR, 45. 4. FR, 55-56. 
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the good in the back by treachery." 1 The fact is life demands 
action and decision all the time. "Tentativeness must have a 
primary place in science; in life it must be subordinated.n2 
Agreeing with Ferre that "tentativeness" is a necessary 
principle for science and that it can be a destructive 
principle in human relations, the writer, nevertheless, would 
assert that even in life it has its legitimate function or 
else no experiment would ever be performed. 
Unless Ferre is speaking strictly of the natural sciences, 
he is unfair to the gestalt psychologist by making science 
pluralistic and therefore unable to interpret whole response. 
If he is confining himself to the natural sciences, he is 
right in declaring that the general tendency of the scientific 
method is to reduce the content of truth to fit the method. 
In the last analysis the truth must be r -educed to mathematical 
terms or to the laboratory test. 
Consequently the spiritual tends to be reduced 
to the psychological; the psychological tends 
to be reduced to the biological; the biological 
tends to be reduced to the chemical; the chemical 
tends to be reduced to physics; physics, many 
say, tends toward the mathematical; and then in 
some instances the whole tends to evaporate into 
some vague mysticism.3 
This analytic and reductionistic method with its disregard 
for value and purpose is inadequate as final method for full 
truth. It contributes to knowledge but all knowledge must be 
1. FR, 57. 3. FR, 93. 
2. FR, 59. 
related to whole truth. 
Some scientists have developed the feeling of contempt 
for the philosophic method, often because of a very super-
ficial knowledge of it. Fortunately not all scientists take 
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this point of view. Many scientists remain humble and open-
minded even though they cannot follow the philosopher's inter-
pretations. Some scientists have entered the field of philosophy 
to find more ultimate answers to their questions. But in general, 
at least more recently, the great tradition of 
philosophy as the rationally competent interpretation 
of reality as a whole bas been basically questioned 
.by the rank and file of scientists .1 
Ferre believes that even as science bas been hostile to 
philosophy s·o philosophy on the whole has been more hostile 
than friendly to vital religion in the present time. It may 
be difficult for Ferre to. substantiate this judgment inasmuch 
as scholastics, personalists, and a large number of other 
theists have been favorable to vital religion in stemming 
the tide of positivism and humanism. It is true that some 
modern philosophy has been half-truth, superficial, and 
destructive of the moral life, but this is due to a false 
use of philosophy and to the la.ck of philosophical coherence. 
, 
Ferre, however, would agree that more serious than a false 
philosophy is the attempt on the part of some religious leaders 
to undermine all philosophy. 
1. FR, 101. 
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There is no justification for the existence of hostility 
among the fields of science, philosophy, and religion. 
By being vigorously self-critical each field 
can discover its own natural approach including 
both its inherent strength and its inherent 
weakness.l 
No field of knowledge bas the right to draw a circumference 
around itself to the extent that it contains a private area 
of knowledge not open to investigation by outsiders. 
Although no exclusive circumference can be drawn around 
/ 
these fields, Ferre declares that they differ in the common 
task of knowledge. Science differs from philosophy in that 
it does not consider the problems of adequate authority for 
faith and life, nor the problem of freedom and the adequate 
motivation for tbe right use of personal freedom. Nor does 
it consider the unitive factors in life. 2 
In general, then, we can say that the field and 
function of science are pluralistic while philos-
ophy deals with the whole of reality. Science 
particularizes while philosophy generalizes.3 
Philosophy tries to systematize all that man knows so 
that be may understand the relation of parts to the whole. 
Philosophy thus takes the whole field of experience for its 
object. Science and philosophy need to supplement each other. 
Physics does well to use philosophy and philosophers have to 
listen carefully to what the physicists have to say. Philosophy 
1. FR, 100. 3. FR, 106. 
2. FR, 99. 
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and gestalt psychology with its view that perception of the 
whole precedes perception of the parts can especially carry 
on a co-operative search for knowledge. 
Science does not evaluate the experience of value, 
ideals, freedom, purpose, etc. Philosophy evaluates all 
these because it deals with all experience. 
Science is more centered on its task to describe 
while philosophy bas for its chief undertaking 
to relate ••• From another angle science analyzes 
while philosophy explains. Science finds the 
nature of the object white philosophy concerns 
itself with its meaning. 
Philosophy and religion have the same field, the 
interpretation of the whole of experience, but they differ 
as to their function. 
As far as the difference in function goes , 
philosophy is knowledge for its own sake 
regardless of its uses and implications ••• 
Theology is the interpretation of whole 
response. It can never take the place of 
science and philosophy. It needs them. 
They supply it with knowledge. They, in 
turn, need theology, at least indirectly, 
as we shall see, for total direction, for 
the authority of the truth which is based 
on the full combination of faith and 
rational knowledge, and for the motivation 
that will keep civilization orderly and 
creative.2 
/ The functional difference made by Ferre between 
philosophy and theology raises serious difficulties which 
will now be enumerated, but will be considered more fully in 
other chapters. In speaking of philosophy as knowledge for 
1. FR, 107-108. 2. FR, 110. 
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I 
its own sake regardless of its uses, Ferre limits philosophy 
to a 'critique of pure reason' and renders it inadequate 
with respect to the evaluating of ideals, practical reason, 
or practice. The latter seemingly are beyond the pale of the 
circle of philosophy. Another problem is the broad definition 
of theology in which it is difficult to recognize a difference 
between theology as the interpretation of whole-response and 
philosophy as the interpretation of the whole of experience. 
This is especially true if experience is thought of in terms 
of consciousness. The result is that theology is made to do 
the work of philosophy and philosophy takes on an atmosphere 
of positivism. 
Ferre declares that there is also a difference betw-een 
the standards of philosophy and theology. "Philosophy is 
inclusive, coherent, and objective; religious interpretation 
is inclusive, coherent, and subjective;"l Ferre does: .. not 
mean to imply that theology can dispense with objective 
knowledge. It must gather knowledge and wisdom from every 
method. It must learn all it can from philosophy and science 
and be able to present a coherent account of such knowledge. 
Yet theology is always subjective in that it 
is whole-response, the interpretation of actual 
whole-response. It is ever a matter of critical, 
personal decision. It is the recording of the . 
thought in our inescapable reaction to the ultimate.2 
1. FR, 121. 2. FR, 130-131. 
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The peculiar relation between t he objective and subjective, 
showing the problem involved in making the former a standard 
of philosophy and the latter a standard of theology, will be 
dealt with in Chapter VII. Ferre is doubtless right in making 
objectivity the primary characteristic and standard of philosophy, 
but because philosophy must consider the inner life and values, 
and since coherence as a standard for both philosophy and theology 
demands the coherence of the subjective and objective, it is not 
without difficulty that he can set up the subjective as a standard 
of theology and the objective as a standard of philosophy. 
For Ferre philosophy is .Part-thinking and theology 
is whole-thinking. Part-thinking is t be kind of thinking 
which comes to dominant conclusions intellectually, but is 
indifferent to dominant living. When a t h inker whole-heartedly 
commits himself to the truth be sees, or even dominantly lives 
contrary to what he sees, he becomes a theologian. 
When a man as disinterestedly as possible decides 
what ought to be done, or half-gropingly comes to 
see it through whatever ways or means, and then 
acts differently out of basic indifference or 
basic selfishness, he does the first as ~ philos-
opher and the second as a religious man. 
The above difference between the philosopher and the theologian 
not only confuses theology and religion, but also makes the 
philosopher the detached, disinterested spectator of life. 
1. FR, 131. 
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If this were true, then all philosophers would belong to the 
age of the Sophists. 
Ferre holds that both philosophy and theology demand 
coherence, but the content of their coherence differs. He 
presents a theory of theological coherence which he regards 
as going beyond Brightman's theory of coherence or any other 
philosophical coherence, and which culminates in the realm 
of personal decision and commitment. 
Philosophy is the coherence of the actual ••• 
But what is not yet actual is only possible, 
or at the most probable, from the perspective 
of rational knowledge ••• From the point of view 
of rational knowledge God is finite. The 
reality of evil is a fact which cannot be side-
stepped.! 
Religious interpretation is also coherent but its content 
of coherence extends beyond what is now actual. 
Religious thought is coherent, not with what is 
here and now actual, but with the highest selective 
actual within the process, pointing beyond itself 
to what is more real than itself as an aggregative 
whole, to what is here only partially real, and 
therefore not yet realized in fullness.2 
The difference is a difference between the completion 
of the coherence of the fully best, and t he standard of 
coherence which is rooted in the process that we now know. 
"The difference lies between ideal coherence anticipatorily 
attained and partial coherence as exhibited by rational 
knowledge." 3 I The manner in which Ferre distinguishes between 
1. FR, 122. 3. FR, 123. 
2. FR, 123. 
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philosophical coherence and theological coherence gives further 
evidence of the limitations that be would place on philosophy. 
Any philosophy that does not omit values and ideals must pass 
beyond the coherence of the actual. One of the persistent 
motivations of philosophy, especially strong in the thought 
of Plato, is the attempt to give a coherent account of the 
experience of ideals. Any philosophy of time and eternity 
seeks a coherence that extends beyond what is now actual. 
/ Ferre affirms that knowledge based on present process 
falls short of the religious standard of coherence, and there-
fore faith must complete the coherence of truth. Thus the 
incoherent which must be recognized along with the coherent 
can be explained as the free and willed purpose of the 
Perfect in harmony with a perfect purpose for them. 1 The 
facts are not yet all in and therefore philosophy cannot 
interpret the whole response. 
/ It basalready been said that for Ferre philosophy and 
theology differ as to the standard of inclusiveness. 
Philosophy is inclusive with the coherence of 
the actual as the center of its inclusiveness ••• 
Theology is inclusive in the different sense 
that the most high, the highest actual, is the 
center of its system of inclusiveness.2 
The world of rational knowledge is too small a fragment 
of the mysteries of ultimate reality to act as a center of 
inclusiveness. Theology must point to an indefinitely distant 
center to be as inclusive as possible. Philosophy also points 
1. FR, 125. 2. FR, 127. 
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beyond its present process but it cannot deal with the future 
as more real than the present and the actual. 
The difference that Ferre would make between philosophical 
and theological inclusiveness severs axiology from philosophy. 
, 
The standard of inclusiveness that Ferre attributes to tbeolpgy 
is the same standard required for an adequate axiology. In its 
center of inclusiveness an axiology must embrace the most high, 
the highest actual as well as the ideal • 
.. According to Ferre there is no clash between philosophy 
and theology so long as philosophy adheres to rational knowledge. 
They only clash when rational knowledge is made the content of 
the existential ultimate, or the intellectual content of 
religion. 1 Philosophy points beyond itself. To what it points 
and bow the "beyond" can be known will be taken up ·in the 
next chapter, the chapter on Faith, in wh i ch will be presented 
, 
Ferre's view of other religious standards. T.h ese standards 
are the selective ideal, the sel~ctive actual, the existential 
ultimate, the reflexive superspective, and dynamic self-verifi-
cation. 
3. Reason as Description and Interpretation 
of the Actual 
, 
Reason, for Ferre, is essentially man's capacity to 
recognize, to interpret, and to describe the actual. Reason 
1. FR, 126. 
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is but part of man's response to reality and therefore reason 
is not the whole-response. The emotions and the will are also 
part of the whole-response. The self is a unity which always 
responds as an organic whole. The self must not be identified 
with any single aspect of the self. There are times when the 
self is dominated by emotions at the expense of reason. Some-
times reason is the guide, but it can be a guide without 
cormmitment or desire and therefore it would not be the action 
of a unitary self. Sometimes neither emotions nor reason are 
in the foreground but rather the conscience trying to be true 
to some ideal or purpose. The ideal whole-response is one in 
which emotions, reason, and will co-operate ideally. 1 In 
making reason less than the attempt at ideal whole-response, 
I Ferre is restricting reason to something less than coherence. 
His use of reason thus takes on an intellectual and formal 
meaning and reason becomes equivalent to the intellect in a 
consciousness comprised of intellect, will, and emotion. I Ferre 
rightly recognizes that there is never a complete separation of 
any of these aspects of the self. 
It is not the will which wills but man, it is 
not the emotions which feel but man. Man himself, 
the person, the spirit, is deeper than all these 
·aspects in his depth decisions.2 
He accepts faith in preference to reason as the more appropriate 
term to express the combined activity of the various aspects of 
the self. This intricate relation and the problems which it 
1. FR, 7. 2. FR, 8. 
introduces will be discussed in the next chapter. 
This interpretation of the self with its capacity for 
I 
whole-response is closely related to Ferre's definition of 
religion. Right religion is defined 
as our fully positive whole-response to the 
complete combination of what is most important 
and most real.l 
Such a whole-response includes both faith and reason. 
Reason is not the same as the will or the emotions, and 
therefore it is not to be accepted as the whole-response, 
or as the most high and most real. 
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For Ferre reason, in its most inclusive sense, means more 
than capacity for logical thinking. In the broadest sense 
reason is "any and all interpretations of our reactions."2 
Since reason is any interpretation of our whole-response and 
faith is part of that whole-response, faith in this sense must 
be included under reason. He adds that it should however be 
noted that what we can state and what we can experience are 
two different things. 3 
The final standard of truth cannot be reason. Such 
a standard "ends with some system of reason or self a bit 
enlarged and enriched but basically spun out of its own web. 11 4 
The self, being more than reason, is a better standard for 
truth than reason is. "Personalism is bigger and better than 
1. FR., 4. 3. FR, 17. 
2. FR, 14. 4. FR, 21. 
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rationalism."! But both self and reason are on this side of 
our response situation and are therefore not an adequate 
standard for truth. The self is the reactor but there is 
also that which acts on the self. 
The function of reason is to interpret and to relate what 
actually is and what is possible in terms of that actuality. 2 
The function of reason as expressed here is in harmony with 
I Ferre's definition of reason. He defines right reason 
as the fullest and most consistent explanation 
of what is now arid here actual based on the most 
thorough description of it and such reasoning 
beyond it as may be warranted by the facts found 
within what is here and now aetual.3 
In addition to seeing what actually is, reason also always 
points beyond itself. The actual today will not be identical 
with the actual tomorrow.4 Reason's capacity to point beyond 
itself makes it akin to faith in the sense that both point 
beyond the actual. But this mutual function has its limits. 
Reason as sight sees what actually is and what 
seems possible in that light. Faith as a 
commitment to the highest ideal known, as 
most real and true, is absurd to reason to . 
whatever extent it goes peyond available 5 evidence in the realm of what actually is. 
Reason always remains rooted in actuality whereas faith 
is grounded in the ideal. Faith and reason need each other. 
There is no conflict unless one tries to usurp the runction 
of the other. Their distinctive natures, functions, and fields 
1. FR, 21. 4. FR, 22. 
2. FR, 218. 5. FR, 225. 
3. FR, 22. 
are not to be confused. Ferre can agree with Remsberg that 
"faith tells us more about God than reason can. Reason tells 
us more about the world than revelation. nl 
Reason must not deny the challenge of faith to trust a 
reality which cannot be proved by the actual. Faith must 
abide by reason's demand that the ideals remain relevant to 
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the actual and that they are capable of transforming the actua1. 2 
Ferre is right in affirming that faith and reason need 
each other and must work together. However; he needs to go 
farther in stressing faith and reason as natural allies and 
therefore inseparable. This means that the more evidence 
there is the stronger and greater is one's faith; the less 
evidence there is the weaker becomes one's faith. To make 
faith absurd to reason to whatever extent it gpes beyond 
available evidence is an attempt to break the created union 
in which they exist. 
1. Remsberg, "The Relation of Faith and Knowledge in Luther 
and Aqui nas," in The Lutheran Church Quarterly, Jan., 
1942, 14, cited by Ferre, FR, 226-227. 
2. FR, 230. 
CHAPTER IV 
FAITH: A 'LIVING' AFFIRMATION THAT THE IDEAL 
IS MORE REAL THAN THE ACTUAL 
1. The Distinctive Natures, Functions, and Fields 
of Faith and Reason 
In the writings of Ferre there is a peculiar intermixture 
of the existential and the rational. Because the lines of 
distinction are often obscurely drawn, it is difficult to 
extract the meaning implied. There is a persistent attempt to 
give reason its full power as the arbiter of religious truth, 
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and at the same time the reader is invited to see the limitations 
of reason to the extent tbat reason is inadequate as a criterion 
of religious truth. 
There is, however, much evidence in Ferre's thought that 
be regards reason as both competent and necessary in ascertain-
ing religious truth. He speaks as a champion of reason when 
be asserts that "we Christians have in our gospel, not some 
incomprehensible secret, but an open message which can be 
tested by reason."1 He is in sympathy with some of the tenets 
of the nee-orthodox thinkers but comes to the defense of reason 
as they deny the "rational and experiential verification of 
religion."2 Both religion and faith, for Ferre, are charac-
terized suitably by his popular term "whole-response", and 
when he writes that "reason is all we have in the interpretation 
1. Ferre, CFE, 5'7. (All references in 
this chapter are to Ferre unless 
otherwise noted.) 
2. CFE, 42. 
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of whole-response, 111 he speaks as a friend and not as a foe 
of the rational approach. His belief in the rational justifi-
cation of religious truth also becomes evident as he declares: 
This faith, too, is both metaphysically grounded 
and also rationally and experientially verifiable. 2 
If, on the other hand, with reasonableness, is 
meant that religion is not reve aled apart from the 
function of reason in its interpreting and testing 
of experience, then !e hold religion to be without 
question reasonable. 
Vriting in this strain of empiricism and rationalism, 
Ferre can agree with A. E. Murphy that the heart may have its 
more than rational reasons 11but unless they are genuinely 
reasons as they claim to be, and reasonably defensible in a 
community of shared purpose and understanding, they will have 
little spiritual sustenance for a growing mind. 114 
The stress on the theoretical aspect of faith sets Ferr~ 
apart from the Lundensian theologians, Anders Nygren and Bring, 
who have attempted to establish "that faith and thought belong 
to separate areas of experience, and signify two different 
points of vlew. 11 5 For the Lundensians faith, as an object of 
theological analysis, is not one of the phenomena of the soul, 
but a unique religious individuality. Faith is an independent 
and unique category. Faith as a medium of knowledge, according 
to Lundensians, 11 is being gripped by God, the passive acceptance 
of revelation. 116 They reject all rationality in the realm of 
1. FR, 28. 
2. CFE, 69. 
3. CFE, 101. 
4. Murphy, UR, 314. 
5 • S CivlT , 6 9 • 
6. SCMT, 96. 
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faith; revelation itself creates faith and thus faith is God's 
own work. 
I Ferre rejects the view that faith is a unique gift or 
work of God, a category quite different from human activity. 
Faith and reason are both human interpretations and responses. 1 
It is his claim that "Christian faith has an ascertainable 
basis in history while it is at the same time verifiable both 
by reason and e:xperience.n2 An adequate faith is not without 
rational · justification. If faith is something be.yond all 
experience and reason, one can know nothing about it. Faith 
itself is a '*'selective reason which uses the ideal as a 
distinct perspective or principle of e:xplanation."3 
The above statements present, in part, Ferre's interpreta-
tion of the theoretical aspect of the nature of faith. He bas 
rightly indicated that a competent methodology for religious 
knowledge cannot afford to forsake reason as part of the total 
instrument and guide. This part of his treatment of the 
problem of faith and reason brings out most clearly the 
rationalism in his theological method. But Ferre maintains that 
the theoretical aspect does not say the most important thing 
about faith. He cannot accept the Lundensian differentiation 
between reason and faith as the difference between thinking and 
something passively received, but the assignment of separate 
fields, functions, and capacities to faith and reason appeal 
1. ECF, 168. 3. FR, 227. 
2. CFE, 47. 
to him. 
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Undoubtedly the dominance in Sweden of LUndensian 
thought indicates an emotional deepening of religion. 
But this system also appeals to the mind, for it 
possesses a definite, strong, plausible methodology. 
Reason and faith have distinct fields, functions 
and capacities.l 
It is the existential aspect of faith that describes most 
adequately tbe nature of faith. Faith is primarily a 'living' 
decision, and living is here used by Ferre in the sense of a 
critical and deep personal concern and trust. The basic difference 
between reason and faith, he holds to be a living decision on the 
part of faith. Faith "is not speculative, but personal. It is 
not theoretical, but existential. 112 The most problematic phase 
of Ferr''s interpretation of faith is the claim that a "gulf" 
or "gap~ exists between faith and reason which necessitates a 
"leap" in man's fullest response to reality. 
To whatever extent reason is rooted in what is, 
and can be proved by it, while faith is what is 
largely not yet, and cannot therefore be proved 
in terms of what is, there is a clear-cut exis-
tential gulf between faith and reason.3 
Reason can never without the compulsive power of 
faith leap to the ideal which provides religion 
with social and personal adequacy.4 
Faith is an adventurous existential leap ••• across 
from actuality to the land of ideals by means of 
an unfinished theoretical scaffo1ding.5 
Inasmuch as process and purpose is far from fulfilled, 
and because we have only partial evidence that it will be 
1. SCMT, 24. 4. SCMT, 230. · 
2. FR, 220. 5. FR, 230. 
3. FR, 225. 
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fulfilled "there is an arbitrary, even if not absurd, element 
in faith. 111 Confronted by the problem of evil, by the vast 
amount of seemingly hopeless suffering of which we know, and 
also of which we do not know, confronted by the actual 
suffering of the innocent, by the fact of the idiot, and by 
animal suffering, man has no right to believe in a perfect 
God on the basis of present process. Man must choose--"either 
a staggering faith beyond our wildest imagination, centered 
in God, or else the darkness of description, explaining 
nothing."2 As already stated in an earlier chapter, this is 
the parting of the way for the Christian and atheistic 
existentialists. Man must choose either a "staggering faith 
beyond our wildest imagination" or an "'encounter with nothing-
ness." 
At its deepest faith must always be "intuitive, innate, 
almost instinctive. Reasoned experience is secondary; experience 
is primary."3 Faith and reason, Ferre maintains, contradict 
each other as well as complement each other.4 
There is much in Ferre's description of the existential 
aspect of faith that appears to erase what was said of its 
theoretical nature. To affirm the unity of the knowing process, 
the complementary relation of faith and reason, and at the same 
time to speak of faith and reason as contradicting each other 
leads the reader into the strange land of paradox. It may be 
1. ECF, 167. 3. PF, 108. 
2. FR, 192. 4. ECF; 168. 
maintained that the described relation is only an apparent 
paradox enabling him to say that "faith, on the other hand, 
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bas no organ and no content except reason."1 In a footnote 
added to his book, Faith and Reason 1 (p. 230), Ferre shows that 
be bas come to see that the discrepancy between the actual and 
the ideal is not so much an ''unfinished theoretical scaffolding 11 
as it is an unfinished "·practical scaffolding". The exis-
tential and the theoretical are evidently not meant to be 
contradictory. Believing there is an existential gulf between 
faith and reason, he, nevertheless, regards it a mistake "'to 
fix an absolute theoretical gulf between them."2 One would 
know how it is possible for Ferr6 to maintain that no absolute 
theoretical gulf exists between faith and reason and at the 
same time assert that they are contradictory. Rather than 
have faith and reason arrive at an abyss over which faith 
I bas to go alone, Ferre needs to indicate that a "leap", in 
the sense of lack of certainty, is necessary in any objective 
belief. 
To establish a contradiction and an "·existential gulf" 
between faith and reason, to think of faith as innate, almost 
instinctive, as sheer believing, as bordering on the absurd, 
as not s peculative or theoretical, is to lend too much encour-
agement to the irrationalists whom Ferre himself would like to 
correct. The emphasis made in this respect is akin to that 
1. FR, 226. 2. FR, 226. 
which was to be avoided in Lundensian thought, and to the 
thought of Brunner who declares: 
This act which is something quite different from 
thinking, is the decision of faith. In thinking 
there is no decision. It is only where thinking 
stops that I can decide.l 
As already indicated the basis upon which Ferre attempts 
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to draw a clear distinction, even to the point of contradiction, 
is especially found in his thinking of the relation of the ideal 
and the actual. This is evident in the suggested working 
definition of faith. 
Faith is essentially the affirmat ion that some 
ideal (ideals) is ultimately more real than our 
average actual world of experience and has the 
power to transform it.2 
The frequent occurence of this thought can be taken as 
an indication of the importance it is meant to bear. For 
Ferre faith is the vision of the ideal, but more than that, 
it is the living decision that the ideal bas the power to 
transform the actual. The actual is that which has been 
realized in experience; it is especially what is here and now 
experienced, but a broader interpretation of it is applied as 
Ferre declares "that the actual includes all the ideals that 
we know, whether they are actualized or only true potentials 
or possibilities."3 The ideal is that which is regarded as 
possible, or probable, and desirable from the viewpoint of the 
highest actual. In the definition "more real" is used in the 
1. Brunner, GM, 64. 3. FR, 170. 
2. FR, 218. 
sense of ultimate reality. Because the ideal bas only been 
fragmentarily realized, it is maintained that only an act 
7r9' 
of faith can establish the ideal as ultimate. It is the 
disparity between "what is" and "what ought to be" that 
necessitates faith's existential- leap to the land of ideals. 
"Faith is always a 'creative adventure' because it can never 
be tested by what is already actual."1 The function of faith 
is basically to give the feeling of certainty where rational 
verification is impossible. The function of reason is to 
interpret and systematize man's historic and present experience. 
There are especially two criticisms which can be made with 
respect to Ferre's distinction between the natures, functions, 
and fields of faith and reason. The first pertains to his 
tendency toward positivism in his view of the relation of 
the ideal and the actual, and in his affirmation of an 
existential chasm between faith and reason. The second is 
the overcoming of positivism by a theological method in which 
the task of philosophy is usurped by theology. There are 
indications that Ferre with the Lundensians falls prey to 
tbe Kantian transcendental method in which philosophy is 
regarded as competent only when it knows that its field of 
investigation is limited to the sphere of phenomenal experience. 
Philosophy must disown the problem of objective reality and 
confine itself to the problem of objective validity, which 
1. FR, 221. 
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alone is its sphere of competence. 
Such a limitation of philosophy is evidenced when the 
function of reason is set forth as the interpretation of what 
is here and now actual, but not of what is only possible or 
probable. To _restrict philosophy to the interpretation of 
what is now actual is to freeze it in present process and to 
render it incompetent to consider ideals, purpose, or process. 
That philosophy cannot deal adequately with purpose appears 
to be Ferre's view as be declares: 
In the meantime it is well to keep in mind our 
general distinction that philosophic interpretation 
starts at the center of the actual whereas theolog-
ical interpretation stems from the center of a 
Purpose of which all our prefent process and our 
whole process are but parts. 
The problem of becoming or process is considered also 
largely a problem for religious faith. To limit philosophy 
in the above manner is to make theologians out of a long line 
of philosophers beginning with Plato and Aristotle. Aristotle 
was a strong defender of purpose, and this be was able to do 
without establishing a cleft between the actual and the ideal. 
For Aristotle the ideal was potential being and actuality and 
potentiality were dynamically related. The actual possessed 
not merely the positive form but also pot entiality, its 
contrary form by privation. He recognized in nature an 
unconscious striving towards ends, i.e., unconscious purpose. 
Actuality, he believed, could only be understood as the end 
1. FR, 130. 
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of that which a thing (or man) is potentially. 
However, in the discussion of inclusiveness as a standard 
of philosophy, Ferre does make philosophy responsible for 
considering the possible and the id'eal, but philosophy cannot 
give the assurance that is needed. 
Philosophy is not limited, to be sure, to the here 
and now, even including the past of our cosmic 
process telescoped within it. It can deal with the 
future and the possible, but not as rral as and more 
~ than the present and the actual. 
If philosoppy cannot deal with the possible or ideal as 
more real than the actual, then Plato's philosophical faith in 
the reality of Forms would have to be called a theological 
faith. And yet it was Plato's speculative method, his 
observations of the cobbler using a pattern for the ·shoe, 
his sensitiveness to people who were aiming at the good, the 
beautiful, and the right way, that convinced him that these 
normative judgments are in relation to the absolute. 
The intention of Ferre, however, is far from positivism. 
What philosophy is una~le to know with respect to ideals, 
purpose, and process, theology is able to s~pply. 
If the dialectics of becoming, beyond the have-
become and may-become is included in coherence, 
the definition has gone beyond the realm of 
rational knowledge in the sense of self-consistent 
inclusiveness and continuity. The problems 
accepted, in that case, explode the basic function 
of philosophy and eventuate either in rationalization, 
we shall see, or in religious faith.2 
~ However, even from Ferre's own exposition it is difficult 
1. FR, 128. 2. FR, 117. 
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to see why reason should be alleged as incompetent to provide 
tbe vision of tbe ideal. He acknowledges that man's highest 
ideals and the most bigb have come into history and that 11 faith 
has some reasonable right to claim that they bad an adequate 
source beyond it. 111 If tbe most high has come into history, 
and if reason is the appraisal of man's historic experience 
and tbe coherence of tbe actual in tbe light of the most high, 
then reason is competent to affirm tbe objectivity of ideals 
without making them a unique object of knowledge for faith. 
"The ideal is precisely tbe most real thing in the world." 2 
Ferre repeatedly asserts that the ideals need to be tested 
in relation to concrete situations. Tbe "selective ideal", a 
standard of religion, soon to be examined, must be a standard 
which bas been actualized in history. "The selective ideal will 
have to be taken from, and as a matter of fact, found among 
the actuals of process. 113 
Faith's claim that the ideal is more real than the actual 
"can be substantiated only if the ideal is so relevantly related 
to the actual as to be able to transform it. 114 
Ferre believes there is also a functionally irreducible 
difference between faith and reason. This difference, he holds, 
is in terms of a living decision. Faith is commitment to that 
which goes beyond available evide.nce from the viewpoint of what 
is now actual. / In this sense, Ferre believes, it is absurd to 
1. FR, 229. 3. FR, 148. 
2. Pringle-Pattison, IGRP, 252. 4. CFA, 56. 
reason. An agnostic and pragmatic strain in Ferre's thought is 
recognized as he declares: nThere is no court of final appeal 
to settle the claims of faith versus reason and vice versa, 
except the future."l 
The function of faith, he believes, is to be conceived 
primarily in its volitional aspect. It is a commitment or 
whole-surrender to the significantly possible. The function 
of reason is to interpret all that which now actually is and 
which can be possible in the light of the actual. "Faith, 
consequently, is primarily grounded in the ideal while reason 
is primarily grounded in the actual."2 Faith and reason need 
each other for "without faith reason fails in courage and 
social concern, while without reason faith fails in vision 
and application~"3 
2. The Coherence of the Actual is Inadequate 
as a Criterion for Religious Knowledge 
In comparing the standards of knowledge which philosophy 
shares with theology, Ferre maintains that the standard of 
coherence is common to both, but the contents of their coherence 
differ.4 Philosophy is the attempt to give a coherent account 
of the totality of our temporal process; it is the coherence 
of the actual. Its basis is the present stage of process and 
its content is the here and now. From the perspective of 
present process or rational knowledge there is no knowing that 
1. FR, 225. 3. FR, 218. 
2. FR, 218. 4. FR, 122-127. 
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tbe ideal shall be real!zed, and due to the reality of evil 
God would have to be considered as finite. From tbe point of 
view of the coherence of the here and now actual religion bas 
no right to combine completely goodness and power. Religion 
may hope, and have even some grounds for believing that power 
and goodness will coincide, but if it can have no more, it is 
religion which cannot satisfy. 
Religious interpretation is also coherent, but it is the 
coherence, not of tbe here and now actual, but of tbe finished 
process which can be seen from the perspective of the highest 
selective actual within present process. The greater the 
difference between what ought to be and wbat is, the more 
clearly can be seen the difference between tbe coherence of 
tbe actual and the coherence of the full combination of the 
most high and most real. 
To make a difference between philosophical coherence and 
" theological coherence as Ferre does on tbe basis that the former 
is "ideal coherence anticipatorily attained" while the latter is 
11 partial coberence"1 is to fail to see that the method of 
coherence for philosophy is also always an ideal and that it 
includes the practical. It is not a closed system, but one 
which constantly invites new facts and new experiences to be 
examined and criticized and accepted or rejected as part of 
the truth. In giving theological coherence a greater or more 
1. FR, 123. 
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r inclusive coherence than philosophical coherence Ferre makes 
theology more rational than philosophy. 
, 
The significant question for Ferre is finding what content 
of experience most adequately constitutes the criterion for what 
is ultimately most real. All knowledge comes through experience 
but experience can also be a deceitful criterion of truth. 
At a recent meeting of outstanding liberal leaders, 
editors, publishers, professors and ministers, 
reference was continually made to experience as 
the final criterion of truth, without seemingly 
any consciousness of the color experience bas 
received through the ages or of the complex 
relation between previous belief and the nature 
of the experience itself and its subsequent 
interpretations.l 
The use of reason and the stress on men's 
experience as the criterion for truth made for 
a certain light and freedom, but at what cost?2 
The coherence we seek must be a coherence beyond rational 
knowledge, and therefore he claims to use a content of experience 
which is to indicate the nature of reality. This content of 
experience which constitutes the criterion for our existential 
ultimate is the selective actual. Not all experience can pass 
as the criterion of truth. It must be selective experience. 
The selective actual is characterized by "our most creative 
and redeeming insights, the best man in history, the highest 
truth, the best whole-response made."3 It is the selective 
actual witbin:- ~xperHmce which , best indicates what process 
can become. The full process is . reflected in the selective 
1. Art.(l939),4. 
2. CFE, 116. 
3. FR, 124. 
actual but can, at the present, not be e~pressed in terms o~ 
rational coherence because o~ the fact of evil. 
If this world is God's best work, in any case, we 
definitely have no right to conclude that God is 
the good tree, the master-builder, the perfect · 
Father. Such a God can be believed in only when 
we follow the evidence dynamically and fulfill 
knowledge by the necessary and appropriate act o~ 
l'aith.l 
Because the selective actual reveals what is only frag-
mentarily realized in experience, it is faith that completes 
the coherence of process. It is faith that says the "yes". 
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By going over from philosophical coherence of the actual 
to theological coherence with the most high as the center, 
/ Ferre considers it a passing over from the present process 
with its possibilities and probabilities to subjective assurance 
and certainty. This however, is not so much a difference 
between philosophy and theology as it is between philosophy 
and religion or theology and religion. 
The problem of the criterion for trut h is not satisfactorily 
answered. How can the selective actual stand as the criterion 
of experience until the validity of the selective actual itself 
bas been established by the test of coher ent experience? That 
is, what criterion do we have to call certain experiences our 
most creative and redeeming insights, history's most high, the 
highest truth, the best whole-response, other than an appeal 
to coherently ordered experience? 
1. FR, 191. 
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3. The Standards of Religious Knowledge 
In the last chapter it was stated that the standards for 
, 
philosophy, according to Ferre, are inclusiveness, coherence, 
and objectivity, and that the standards fo r theology are 
inclusiveness, coherence, and subjectivity. The hazards 
involved in this procedure have already been indicated. In 
designating objectivity as a standard for philosophy and 
/ 
subjectivity as a standard for theology it was noted that Ferre 
is being unfair to both. This problem will be pursued in 
Chapter VII where the relation o~ the subjective and the 
objective in his thcught will be examined. 
Other standards of religion, some of which have already 
been referred to, and which are alleged to be unique to religion 
are: selective ideal, selective actual, existential ultimate, 
re~lexive superspective, and dynamic self-verification. 
i. The Selective Ideal. 
By selective ideal is meant "that religious . truth is to be 
understood in terms of the highest instance of the good within 
actuality.nl It is also referred to as the most high, another 
term often encountered and best understood in terms of value 
or valuation. The selective ideal is thus partly to be under-
stood as an ideal and partly as a value for it is the highest 
instance of good actualized. It is the best indication of 
1. FR, 145. 
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what reality is; it is the best pointer to truth, and the 
criterion of our existential ultimate. 1 Since the whole as a 
whole cannot be accepted as the best guide to truth, it is 
necessary to select the highest ideal as the criterion of truth. 
The selective ideal must fulfill man's deepest needs. It 
must be the interpreting factor in man's whole response, and 
at the same time , it must afford a fuller intellectual explanation 
of the entire process than any other selective or aggregative 
experience. The selective ideal must also be the best answer 
to our individual and social problems. It must be more true 
than the aggregative whole and have the power to transform it. 
"The needs of the whole test the standard but the whole is not 
therefore the standard. 11 2 Holding true to the empirical method, 
Ferre states that the whole establishes and tests the selective 
ideal, and to this no objection can be made if by whole he means 
coherent experience and its capacity to establish ideals which 
act both as a judgment upon present process and a goal for its 
further realization. But this method is not peculiar to 
religion for philosophy from its very beginning bas acknowl-
edged the ideal. 
It can be agreed that the ripest part of the fruit indicates 
best what the ripe fruit will be like, that the best man, rather 
than the average man, indicates better the essential nature of 
man, that the best moment, insight~ and action of tbe best man's 
1. FR, 145. 2. FR, 14'7. 
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life indicates better the nature of truth than does the average 
similar activity of the best man, but this only posits the 
problem of finding a criterion for the "r i pest part of the 
fruit, 11' the best man, or the best moment or action of the best 
man. It is only through a coherent ordering of all experience 
that alleged ideals should be accepted as true ideals. 
ii. The Selective Actual. 
The selective actual is set forth as the second standard 
of religious truth. The selective actual is essentially the 
same as the selective ideal except that the former points out 
that the latter must not be thought of in terms of "mere theory, 
abstract ideal, or rational persua.siveness. 111 The selective 
actual therefore stands for the fact that the selective ideal 
must be found among the actuals of process. The regulating 
pattern of theology is always the concrete event, the 
actualization of the ultimate; it is to be remembered "that 
the selective ideal is at the same time also the definitely 
actual.n2 Ferr~'s use of the selective ideal and selective 
actual is understood most clearly in relation to his interpre-
tation of the person of Christ. The selective ideal as the 
selective actual, and the selective actual as the actualization 
of the ultimate is Jesus Christ, the Word become flesh. 
The very center of the ·perspective, of course, 
must be that selective actual and ideal, namely, 
1. FR, 148. 2. FR, 149. 
Jesus Christ, as the revealer and effector in 
human bistoly' decisively, of God's Agape-
fellowship. 
Most important of all, as we have stressed 
throughout, Agape is defined as Jesus Christ. 
He is our selective actual, history's most bigb. 2 
A fuller discussion of the selective actual as the 
incarnation of Agape in Jesus Christ will be given in the 
chapter "The Christian Faith as Man's Ultimate Religion. 11 
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Here it needs to be emphasized that, for Ferre, not experience 
as a whole, but a special content of experience, made up o~ 
history's most high and most creative and redeeming insights, 
' comprises the selective actual and best constitutes the 
criterion for the existential ultimate. 
iii. The Existential Ultima.te. 
The meaning which Ferre gives to the existential ultimate 
as a standard of religious truth is best expressed in two 
dif~erent aspects. By existential, as already indicated, be 
means the individual, unavoidable, deeply inward and personal 
whole-response, and in this sense the existential ultimate is 
the content of our reaction or whole-response. It is the whole 
man reacting dynamically. · But there also must be that to which 
be reacts. Man reacts whole-heartedly to what he considers 
most important and most real. The ultimate is therefore that 
value and power which. holds the universe together and to which 
we must unavoidably react. / Ferre here speaks of the ultimate 
1. ECF, 133. 2. ECF, 161. 
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as "that which is necessarily out there, no matter what, 
whether in being or value,"1 in much the same way that William 
James writes of the religious object: 
It is as if there were in human consciousness a 
sense of real ity, a feeling of objective presence, 
a perception of what we may call 'something there', 
more deep and more general than any of the special 
. and particular senses.2 , 
I Ferre is not ready to say with Rudolph Otto that "this 
'feeling of reality', the feeling of a 'numinous' object 
objectively given must be posited as a primary immediate 
datum of consciousness."3 Instead, it is man's whole response 
to something which, even · after using all the information and 
objective knowledge available, both past and present, cannot 
be rationally defined, but which demands decision and commit-
ment. 11 Theology and philosophy clash unavoidably when rational 
knowledge is made the content of our existential ultimate.n4 
Our existential ultimate is our total response to that which 
acts upon us. "It is the god we actually worship ••• We may 
interpret wrongly, ignorantly worship or willingly serve 
idols. But they are in fact our real gods."5 
/ It is not Ferre's intent to convey the idea that the 
existential ultimate is some existential construction without 
any theoretical basis in experience. It must be a selective 
actual fully as much as is necessary for t be selective ideal. 
This characteristic is fulfilled in Jesus Christ. "Jesus is 
1. FR, 149. 4. FR, 126. 
2. James, VRE, 58. 5. FR, 150. 
3. Otto, IH, 11. 
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our existential ultimate, or the content of history and 
experience which most adequately indicates what is most 
important ·and most real .nl 
iv. The Reflexive Superspective. 
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The fourth standard peculiar to religious truth, according 
I . 
to Ferre, is the reflexive superspective. "The superspectiv.e is 
the perspective from the most high. 11 2 This however, leads to 
circular reasoning as one reads that "the mos t high must be 
, 
basically known tbrrugh the reflexive superspective. n3 Ferre 
describes the reflexive superspective as the "regulative patternn 
and "all-shaping principle" of interpretation. Tche superspective 
is not only superspective, but it is reflexively superspective. 
In the end the process must completely conform to it. It is the 
seeing, even if but darkly, what the final process is to be like. 
The reflexive superspective mus t be competent to account 
for any apparent deficiencies in reality. By means of the 
reflexive superspective the selective ideal and selective actual 
are freed from the tendency to proclaim themselves ultimate. 
The reflexive superspective is that center of coherence around 
which the present stage of process and those stages yet to come 
will be coherently realized. It is seeing reflexively the 
present disrupted process from the vision of redeemed fellowship. 
It transcends process and is yet selectively actual within it. It 
is the light of eternity having dawned within an historic event. 
1. ECF, 162. 3. FR, 200. 
2. FR, 151. 
The reflexive superspective with which we work 
is God in Christ as the embodiment in history 
of the divine Agape. He is the "clarified 
anticipation~ of what we are to become and 
therefore even n~w, although not actually yet, 
essentially are. 
The reflexive superspective is the Christian 
God.2 
A summary statement of Ferre's view of the reflexive 
superspective should be made in terms of the progressive 
stages of his standards of religious truth. The reflexive 
superspective means first of all that through the selective 
ideal, man's experience of ideals, and the selective actual, 
man's hignest experience of value, the supreme ideal is 
found in Christ, who is the existential ultimate and best 
indication of the ~tcome of process, and of the nature of 
reality, for be is the incarnation of God's agape. Ferre 
maintains that through Christ as agape man can know the 
reflexive superspective, the Christian God, and reflexively 
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from God's agape incarnated and actualized in Christ, man can 
see reality in its true perspective, and the incoherent as 
part of a coherent process. 
Edward T. Ramsdell in his book, The Christian Perspective, 
considers the problem of perspectives and concludes with a 
/ 
view similar to that of Ferre. It is maintained that a man's 
perspective is determined by what is most meaningful to him, 
and that every perspective, whether scientific, positivistic, 
1. ECF, 19. 2. ECF, 106. 
· ' · 
94 
or philosophic, is accepted as most adequate to give a coherent 
account of reality. The perspective, says Ramsdell, is thus 
not established by coherence but by "'whatever a man worships 
as supremely important."1 He accepts the Christian perspective 
as most adequate for interpreting the whole of experience. 
Jesus Christ, the Incarnation and the Cross are the most 
significant facts in the whole of experience. I Ferre, presenting 
essentially the same view, sets his perspective, the standards 
of religion in a more philosophical pattern. 
v. Dynamic Self-Verification. 
The last standard of religious truth is dynamic self-
verification. The final court of appeal must be the inner 
spirit. 11 The spirit is self-authenticating."2 By describing 
the standard as dynamic, it is meant that religion must be 
progressively self-verifying. Regardless of its objective and 
universal nature religious truth must be a living decision and 
commitment of the individual. Here Ferre can agree with R. T. 
Flewelling that "the profoundest truths are realized not by 
demonstration but by faith; that the profoundest ethical and 
spiritual interests are capable of demonstr~ion to the 
individual alone. 113 The central thought of dynamic self-
verification as a standard of religious truth is that religious 
truth must ever be more than a matter of theory. It cannot 
.1. Ramsdell, CP, 32-33. 
2. FR, 152. 
3. Flewelling, RIF, 29-30. 
satisfy man's whole-response if it is only an ideal beyond 
history and unrelated to present process. There must already 
have been an instance of its actualization and even at present 
it must be organically capable of actualization, or else it 
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remains an ideal of wishful thinking which cannot challenge man. 
The emphasis on religious truth as self-verifying is in 
no way regarded as inconsistent with "religious knowledge as 
a social act. 111 The social source of knowledge is man's 
historic experience. Such religious knowledge as man bas is 
never a completely "new creation". Historic beliefs and 
historic religious experience : are some of the richest sources 
for man's interpretation of religion. Yet one must not arrest 
process, the possibility of new emergence and new revelation. 
Religious knowledge as a social act cannot establish the 
validity of religion. At its best it is the test of the 
adequacy of religion, which although related to validity, is 
not the same thing. To explain knowledge as a social act is 
not a description of the nature or origin of knowledge. 
To suppose that by explaining knowledge as a social 
act we have also accounted for its origin is to 
have committed the genetic fallacy; it is falla-
ciously to have identified product with process.2 
Religious truth becomes truth for the individual only as 
the individual is conscious of a greater reality beyond himself 
and his world, and whole-heartedly commits himself to it. The 
social act may give ample evidence for r ·eligious truth, but 
I 
1. Chapter title in Ferre, CFE, 1-31. 2. CFE, 27. 
only the individual act will do. 
Because all kinds of knowledge, scientific, philosophic 
as well as religious, must pass through the human media and 
receive the final sanction of the individual before it can 
I become truth for him, Ferre rightly emphasizes the need for 
self-verification. This however is not uni que with respect 
to religious knowledge. It is only the description of the 
psychological process of all kinds of knowing. External 
authority is to be avoided in any field of knowledge. S~ren 
Kierkegaard has pointedly illustrated this by saying: 
If I know that Caesar was a great man, I know wba·t 
greatness is, and it is on this knowledge that I 
base my judgment of Caesar; otherwise I do not 
know that Caesar was great ••• To believe an ideality 
on the word of another is like laughing at a joke 
because someone bas satd it was funny, not because 
one bas understood it. 
There is no objection to the conclusion that final 
authority must come from within rather than without, from the 
witness of the spirit rather than external authority. This, 
however, does not make the standard of religion subjective 
over against the objective standard of philosophy. Religion 
is neither purely subjective nor purely objective. Because 
it depends upon objective conditions, the careful examination 
and coherent ordering of the whole of religious experiences 
and beliefs, it stands in need of an objective standard. 
Inasmuch as it demands worship, devotion, and commitment to 
1. CUP, 289. 
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what is considered the ultimate source and sustainer of value, 
it is subjectively realized. 
4. Summary and Evaluation 
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For Ferre faith is the living decision that the ideal is 
more real than the actual and bas the power to transform it. 
From a more analytic point of view faith is dynamic whole-
response, and whole-response is the ideal co-operation of will, 
emotions, and right reason. Reason is not identical with 
feeling and will, and since all three constitute the unitary 
process of knowing and judging, be believes, the whole process 
is more correctly designated as whole-response and best expresses 
the nature of faith. 
Similar to faith, religion is defined as the inevitable 
whole-response to what is considered most important and most 
real and "instead of saying that reason must become religious 
because it must interpret whole-response, we can say that all 
whole-responses to truth include emotion and action and are 
therefore better called faith. 111 Preferring to retain the 
distinction between feeling, acting and reason, Ferre speaks 
of the whole-response as faith, and in this respect reason is 
an aspect of faith's total inquiry. As already indicated be 
also recognizes a context in which reason is a more inclusive 
activity than faith. "From the point of view of reason as any 
1. FR, 24. 
interpretation of whole-response faith must be included under 
reason. 111 Reason is more inclusive than faith inasmuch as 
there is a theoretical aspect of faith which demands justifi-
cation by reason and experience. 
9& 
Due to the fact that the ideal bas been only fragmentarily 
realized, that the ledger and books of process have not been 
balanced and closed, that man experiences the incoherent with 
respect to evil--these facts, Ferre declares, demand an 
existential faith in which decision and trust become primary. 
They demand commitment beyond rational knowledge. "Unto us 
frail creatures of time is given the privilege and the great 
honor of choice ••• tbis choice is not tbebretical."2 
In various contexts Ferre speaks of faith as: basically 
the will to believe, an existential judgment, dynamic whole-
response, affirmation that the ideal is more real than the 
actual, existential leap, selective reasan, vision of the new 
and high order, sheer believing, human interpretation and 
response, intuitive, innate, almost instinctive, reasoning 
rightly, known by its fruits, decision, and simply active and 
transforming trust. 
Reason operating in its broader application must interpret 
both revelation and faith since they are part of that to which 
we respond. Ferre accepts reason as right when it is ideally 
integrated with the other aspects of ~be self • . The unitary 
1. FR, 14,15. 2. FR, 215,216. 
response of all aspects of the self is whole-response and man 
interprets reality through whole-response, but "reason is 
certainly not the same as wbole-response."1 The careful 
/ distinction made by Ferre is not consistently carried out. 
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Elsewhere be declares that "reason is the whole man tbinking," 2 
and "whole thinking" is "existential thinking"3 which requires 
the deepest passions, as well as intellect and will, and is 
therefore what be means by whole-response. The assertion that 
reason is the whole man thinking leads to further difficulty 
when be affirms that "theology is ever the tharu.ght of the whole 
man thinking"4 and is existential through and through. 
/ There can be no criticism of Ferre's use of such terms 
as whole-thinking, whole-response, and depth-thinking except 
in so far as he equates them with existential thinking over 
against theoretical or speculative thinking. Whole-response, 
whole-thinking can properly be regarded as descriptive of the 
already discussed synoptic method culminating in coherence. It 
is in effect the appeal to experience, to all data of conscious-
ness. Whole-response as a philosophical method is not hostile 
to faith. 
It would be folly to claim that we can dispense 
with faith or that "reason alone" can remedy our 
spiritual ills. Indeed, as we shall see it, it 
is a distinguishing characteristic of reason 
when it is about its appropriate business that it 
never works alone, but has its function in the 
1. FR, 11. 3. FR, 205. 
2. cs' 9. 4. FR, 131. 
criticism, coordination, and redirection of 
impulses, emotions and beliefs which, apart from 
their contribution to or conflict with the order 
it produces, are neither rational nor irrational 
in cbaracter.l 
100 
For A. E. Murphy the function of reason is the inter-
pretation, criticism, and direction of all mental faculties. 
, 
Ferre can agree that it is tbe task of reason to interpret 
all our reactions to reality, but also affirms that "the 
sense of love and the sense of right are more elemental than 
reason," and 11 that life relates itself to reality more through 
the sense of right and through the sense of love than through 
reason. 112 In reply it can be said that love and hate alike 
are more elemental than reason. More important, it is diffi-
cult to think of the sense of love or sense of right without 
idea or reason to interpret and to direct. 
Among many thinkers who have labored with t .he problem of 
faith and reason there is general agreement as to the unitary 
process of the act of knowing in which the various aspects of 
the self do not act independent of each other. With penetrating 
understanding Ferre rightly shows that since man can reflect 
upon the various mental capacities, the self, man as spirit, 
is deeper and greater than all these independent aspects of the 
self. The defenders of reason have sometimes been too hasty in 
making the intellect the exclusive faculty. Inasmuch as they 
have done this, they have been untrue to the synoptic method 
1. Murphy, UR, 10. 2. cs, 122-123. 
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which includes all aspects of the self. 
The different approaches to the problem of faith and reason 
are often not as far removed from each otber as they appear to 
be. Because feeling, loving, willing , and action are not the 
I 
same as reason, Ferre selects faith as the most adequate name 
for the total affirmation, recogni z ing at the same time tb~ 
reason needs to interpret whole-response. Similarly ,. recognizing 
that one aspect of the self is not to be identified with any 
other, those who make reason the criterion for religious truth 
think of the unitary act of knowing as reason because there is no 
feeling, willing, and acting without idea. 
It is important to see t hat one can neither speak of 
"'reason alone" nor "faith alone". The supreme principle of the 
knowing process is wholeness, completeness, and individuality. 
The wholeness and individuality in the act of knowing cannot 
be in contradiction. Whereas rat i onalists have sometimes 
failed to stress the individuality and uniqueness in the 
I different aspects of the knowing self, Ferre bas violated the 
principle of unity by declaring that a contradiction exists 
between faith and reason. Faith and reason have been joined 
by tbe creative act of God. 1 Man's responsibility is to keep 
t h is pair from becoming ill wed. When Ferre speaks of a 
contradiction between faith and reason be invites an annulment 
of this union on the ground of incompatability. 
1. DeWolf, RAR, 203. 
Reason is best characterized by tbe cognitive aspect of 
"whole-thinking" or whole-response. Faith is best charac-
terized by the volitional aspect of whole-response. Faith 
is both a precondition of the act of knowing and the state of 
trust and commitment which is necessary, due to the lack of 
certainty, even after the fullest searching. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE CHRISTIAN FAITH AS MAN'S ULTI1ffiTE RELIGION 
1. Agape as the Determinative and Distinctive 
Motif in Christianity 
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The adherents of every religion generally consider their 
religion as ultimate. The failure to do so, they believe, 
indicates a lack of whole surrender or commitment to what 
ought to be one's highest loyalty. However, not all religions, 
according to their sacred scriptures, set forth the hope of 
becoming a universal religion. The religions in which this 
hope is clearly expressed are Jainism, Judaism, Zoroastrian-
ism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Muhammadanism. In the .first 
three such a hope bas been gradually lost.l 
The claim that Christianity is both the universal and man's 
ultimate religion finds support in Ferre's interpretation of 
religion. All religions have dominant features by means of 
which they can be characterized and compared to each other. 
John Dewey enumerates the "unseen powers" of the different 
religions as the 
vague and undefined Mana of the Melanesians, the 
Kami of primitive Shintoism; the ultimate and 
impersonal principle of Buddhism; the unmoved 
mover of Greek tbought ••• the personal and loving 
Providence o.f Christianity; the arbitrary Will of 
Moslemism; the supreme legislator and judge of deism. 2 
Since there are many points of similarity and dissimilarity, 
1. Hume, WLR, 269. 2. Dewey, CF, 4. 
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it is necessary to look for the dominant motif which distin-
gu.ishes one religion from another. A careful study of this kind 
was made by Anders Nygren who came to the conclusion that agape, 
the New Testament idea of love, is the determinative motif of 
the Christian faith. 1 In agreement with Nygren, but not without 
some points of difference to be considered later, Ferre accepts 
agape as the distinctive motif in Christianity, the content of 
which qualifies the Christian faith as ·man's religious ultimate. 
In his judgment the various attempts to express the unity 
and continuity of the Christian faith, including such views 
as Roman Catholicism, Fundamentalism, Liberalism, and Dialec-
tical Theology, have proven inadequate. A new movement is 
under way which, he believes, interprets the unity and conti-
nuity of the Christian faith much more accurately. 
Although this view claims to. make Christ central, 
he is so not through any specific act or teaching, 
but through the kind of fellowship that he founded.2 
The different views of the person of Christ were motivated 
by this kind of a fellowship and came to be formnlated as a 
result of a fellowship which must be considered primary. 
This view does not hesitate to call the Christian 
faith both unique and absolute, but the uniqueness 
and absoluteness of the faith is the Christian 
community itself as a di~tinct organism chosen by 
God for man's salvation. 
The strength of the position is its being historically 
grounded while at the same time it can be verified by reason 
1. See Nygren, AE. 3. CFE, 43-44. 
2. CFE, 43. (All references in this chapter are to Ferre 
unless otherwise noted.) 
and experience. Its ascertainable basis in history must not 
restrict God's revelat i on or the work of the Holy Sp irit to 
the past. Its strength, unless fully understood and closely 
guarded, can become a danger--the danger of making the New 
Testament kind of fellowship a cumulative and conventional 
creation, a refusal to recognize an order of reality b~yond 
conventions and social interaction. This danger is overcome 
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in considering agape fellowship as man's highest ideal and at 
the same time as historically grounded. 
It seems an undeniable fact of history that through 
Jesus there came into full historical awareness the 
idea of Christian love, the love which seeketh not 
its owni the love wh i ch has its source and standard 
in God. 
i. The nature of agape. 
Agape is basically New Testament love; it is love which 
transcends the worth of its object, love which creates fellow-
ship not on the basis of merit, but on the basis of complete 
concern; it is this absolute concern even for enemies. Agape 
is not to be understood as man's highest ethical ideal apart 
from its divine dimension. To sever it from the divine 
dimension is to bring it to the human level. The stress on 
the eternal dimension of agape does not make men otherworldly 
in the sense that they lose responsibility toward present 
problems. If otherworldliness is rightly understood, the more 
otherworldly in source Christianity becomes the more responsibly 
l. CFE, 48. 
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concerned will it be with the world as it is and ought to be. 1 
This kind of love Ferr~ believes to be "the ultimate 
principle of explanation in the light of which all doctrines 
are to be defined and by means of which they are most adequately 
understood." 2 
Ferre is aware that not all New Testament writers portray 
the same picture of Jesus and one cannot maintain that all the 
books of the Bible measure up to the standard of agape, but the 
idea of God as redemptive love is always the central theme of 
the New Testament. 
A more difficult problem than establishing agape as the 
determinative element in Christianity is the affirmation that 
it is peculiar to the Christian faith. Neither Nygren nor 
I Ferre is aware of any non-Christian literature where the full 
idea of God's agape appears. To be sure, religions which have 
bad contact with Christian literature may partially reflect the 
notion of agape, and such religions as Hinduism, Buddhism, and 
Judaism can cite instances where they approach Christian agape, 
but the full doctrine of agape as the ultimate principle of 
explanation is lacking. Recognizing that the term "Father" is 
also used by other religions, Robert Hume lists as a distinctive 
ma.rk of the Christian faith 11 the character of God as a loving 
heavenly Father."3 
1. RC, 32. 3. Hume, ~VLR, 272. 
2. CFE, 48. 
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I The content and meaning that Ferre gives to agape can 
best be derived from his various attempts to define it. 1 Agape 
is a synthesis of meaning and mystery. It is not a theoretical 
construction. To think that we can comprehend agape is to 
forget that God is agape. It is primarily divine, not human 
love. "Agape is the final being, nature, purpose, and function 
of God. ••2 Ferre prefers to think of agape primarily in terms 
of Divine Person, but also uses the word impersonally to make 
meaningful bow divine love works and relates itself to men and 
the world. One must always be on guard not to separate process 
from its source. Because process is God's love in action, 
Ferre accepts agape as "our f'inal principle of explanation." 
Everything that is not God or of God must ultimately owe its 
existence to Him. All processes and problems of processes 
such as being and becoming, good and evil, find their most 
adequate solution in an approach in which the Creator is 
characterized as love and the creation is the continuous 
expression of love, making agape the ultimate explanation. 
"Agape is holy."3 Holiness is its very nature. It is 
holy in the sense that it is always pure, never inconsistent~ 
or mixed with evil. For man this means separation f'rom God 
except on God's own basis, His forgiveness. God wills to give 
agape to man and man can receive it if be repents of' his 
rebellion against God. Agape as holiness does not abrogate law 
1. ECF, 147-165. 3. ECF, 149. 
2. ECF, 149. 
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and justice; it is the fulfillment of both. 
,I A further indication of Ferre's use of agape as capable of 
becoming man's possession is his emphasis that "agape is active 
love ••• it is faith completed by works." Agape is both God and 
man at work in this world. 
Agape is also perfect wisdom and perfect power. As perfect 
wisdom "it is God's truth, or God as truth, at work.nl As 
perfect power agape is all the power there is. This includes 
the power to control and condition everything. However, as 
perfect power it does not determine everything. It does not 
make the freedom which it has created an illusion. Freedom 
is not a limitation of agape. It is the medium through which 
eros can express its function. "Eros is part of the pedagogical 
purpose of God.n2 The more man realizes agape the more he 
experiences true freedom. Only God as full agape is perfectly 
free. 
Agape is the source of all that is good. Agape as God is 
generous, unconditional, outgoing love. Agape as man is the 
response to generous love with responsive love; it is responsible 
concern rooted in response to God's love. 
Agape is also perfect beauty. Art, literature, and music 
are at their best when they rerlect God's own self. Art for 
art's sake is not true art. Great art reflects the movement of 
God in the mddst of time. It is a symbol that signifies the 
1. ECF, 153. 2. ECF, 154. 
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ideal. "Art is great when it catches the depths of life in the 
realms of the greatest significance and focuses attention on 
some truth, hidden in the obvious and commonplace."1 In this 
sense it is existential for it invites the observer to experi-
ences which cannot fully be expressed in speculative communi-
cation. Art deals with form and motion, but it deals only with 
partial form and limited motion and therefore by itself it 
cannot satisfy the deeper needs of man. Only living realities 
and living harmony as seen through God's agape will satisfy. 
Agape is perfect beauty and only that art, music, and literature 
is true which elevates the spirit to a perspective that 
harmoniously combines form and content. 
Agape is fellowship-making. This is set forth with 
penetrating insight by Augustine when he defines agape as God's 
love for every person as if he cared for that person alone and 
"so for all as if they were but one."2 Through the Holy Spirit 
man can express this agape by serving and working for others 
on the basis that God Himself is concerned and works for all. 
Most important of all, however, Ferre defines agape as 
Jesus Christ: 
He is the creative emergence which as the historic 
exception where agape first became central in life 
and thought, made it known as central in cosmos 
and conduct, and thus made agape the exemplificat!on 
of our essential being, of our potential destiny. 
1. ECF, 157. 3. ECF, 161. 
2. Augustine, "Confessions," The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, 
Vol. I, 67; cited by Ferre, ECF, l60. 
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God as agape is the ultimate principle of explanation. It 
is seeing from the viewpoint of God. "We nmst look at it from 
1 the content of the Absolute, which is agape." But man as man 
cannot explain from the perspective of God. This difficulty, 
Ferre declares, is overcome in the person of Christ. He is the 
incarnation of the divine agape, and therefore is our living 
truth, actualized history, and the person who best serves as a 
cosmic principle. He indicates what is ultimately most important 
and most real. Truth to be truth for us must be personal and 
concrete and such an embodiment of truth is found in Christ. 
"Here is no secondary philosophical system ••• here is a person 
who is our truth."2 
ii. Reason and agape. 
/ Ferre rejects Nygren's complete separation of agape and 
eros in which agape is described .as God's way to man and eros 
as man's way to God, that is, man's effort to seek the highest 
good and to realize his best self. Ferre would not agree with 
Niebuhr that there is an "ultimate contradiction between the 
self-assertion of the human life and the divine agape. ''3 To 
make agape exclusively God's way tt:> man on the basis of the 
New Testament is to fail to take account of the varied 
approaches Jesus used in teaching his disciples of the Fatherhood 
of God, seemingly even going to the extent of motivating them 
1. cs, 10. 3. Niebuhr, NDM, II, 90. 
2. ECF, 161. 
by promise of reward in tbe kingdom. Jesus' frequent use of 
illustrations from tbe natural and human realm to give content 
to tbe idea of God, hardly justific~s tbe claim that according 
to the New Testament only through G·od can God be known. 
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Nygren's view, Ferre remarks, also makes for an artificial 
theology in which the humanity of ~fesus is neglected. It is 
further maintained that his view of God as victorious love is 
inconsistent with the affirmation of an eternal hell. Nor can 
agape exist in a constant tension withVO~o~ or law, because 
vo~ o, must ever be in the service of agape. 
The relation of agape to reason is a problem which Nygren 
admits needs much further study. This problem is taken up by 
Ferre who holds that agape as the determinative motif o"f 
Christianity, if it is to be adequate, must be organically 
related to the whole of man, the whole of history, and the 
whole of nature. In the introduction to his book, Christianity 
and Society, Ferre writes: "The applicability of agape to our 
concrete problems is the total thesis of this volume which is 
to be developed, illustrated and incidentally verified."l 
Reinhold Niebuhr cannot share the optimism of the view that 
agape can be applied to and can transform society and history. 
Because the Christian doctrine of creation does not set the 
eternal and divine into an absolute contradiction with the 
temporal and historical, he maintains that there are some 
1. cs, 4. 
"validations of agape in actual history in so far as concern 
for the other actually elicits a reciprocal response,"1 but 
"!the final justification for the way of agape in the New 
Testament is never found in history." 2 
Agape ••• has its primary justification in an 
"essential reality" which transcends the 
realities of history, namely, the character 
of God.3 
There are indeed moments of prayer and, perhaps 
ecstatic achievements of a~ape in which men are 
caught up in the "seventh eaven"; but these 
moments are merely an "earnest" of the fulfillment 
of life and must not be claimed as a possession.4 
I Contrary to Niebuhr, Ferre believes that man's response 
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to and appropriation of God's agape is fully real,5 but the 
right relation of agape and reason is not to be fcund by a 
vague rationalistic method dependent on a rational description 
of' actuality. nReligions are historical developments, not 
rational creations. Faith, to be adequate, must find its 
sum and substance in a historic rel:tgion."6 Ferre differs from 
Nygren in affirming that reason is competent to compare motifs, 
and that~ in man's nature is related to and can be in the 
service of agape. Writing favorably of Augustine's synthesis 
of' agape and~ into caritas, Ferre believes that man's 
natural self-centered drive for satisfaction can find its 
release only in that love of God and neighbor for which it is 
1. Niebuhr, NDM, II, 96. 4. Niebuhr, NDM, II, 204. 
2. Niebuhr, NDM, II, 88. 5. ECF, 140. 
3. Niebuhr, NDM, II, 96. 6. CFE, 104. 
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meant."l There is a functional unity between~ and agape. 
Eros was created to make persons real. "Eros must precede 
agape as the dominant drive in man in order that a fellowship 
of real persons might be created."2 Eros is not destroyed, but 
rather transformed. Agape is not an arbitrary gift from God, 
but the gradual growth in unselfish fellowship under the power 
of the Holy Spirit. Vfbatever is of the nature of unselfish 
love in other religions is thereby part of the Christian faith. 
The Christian idea of love is inclusive enough to embrace all 
forms of concerned fellowship and communal life. 
Agape is essentially divine love, but it is also a love 
which is available to men. Whereas faith and reason are human 
interpretations and activity, agape is basically the activity 
of God. Inasmuch as eros can be in the service of agape, agape 
is the seeing of God from the viewpoint of God's own nature. 
11 God ••• is the outgoing love who shares His being and beauty."3 
/ 
Agape, Ferre declare.s, is not a rational construction; it can 
be received only through faith. 
Only as by faith we accept God's agape can we 
become holy, be made whole, be restored to fellow-
ship, escape our separation from God.4 
iii. An evaluation of Ferre's use of agape. 
The writings of Anders Nygren and Nels Ferre are making an 
important contribution to the revitalizing of the Christian faith 
1. CFE, 106. 3. cs, 10. 
2. RC, 25. 4. ECF, 150. 
114 
by their emphasis on agape fellowship as central to such a faith. 
In doing so they are building on the basis of the early Christian 
faith wh ich arose as the result of a kind of -fellowship rather 
than a book religion or set of dogmas. They emphatically express 
the truth that fellowship is primary and doctrine is secondary, 
that the early Christian fellowship, centered around Jesus, 
produced the books of the New Testament. 
Because the full idea of agape, or God's sacrificial love for 
all men, is not found in any non-Christian literature prior to 
the New Testament accounts, no objection can be made to the 
assertion that agape is the determinative motif in Christianity. 
A penetrating summary of the meaning of Christmas, Good Friday, 
and Easter is made by Alexander Purdy when he declares: 
The Christian faith is that God comes into human 
life, into the whole range and reality of it; that 
be deals with human life in its most desperate and 
despairing moments; and that his love is victorious.l 
Agape as God's outgoing and victorious love and concern for all 
mankind and man's dedicated response to such love can readily be 
acc epted as the foundation stones of the Christian faith. How-
ever, it should be noted that in the New Testament agape does not 
always have the exalted meaning that Ferre ascribes to it. This 
is evident in comparing divine love with agape as used in such 
passages as Luke 6:32, 11:43; John 3:19, 12:43; and II Peter, 2:15. 
/ It is as Ferre defines agape, without reservation, as the 
final principle of explanation, as perfect wisdom~ perfect 
1. Purdy, JFKH, 94. 
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power, and perfect beauty, that agape becomes the all inclusive 
principle reaching beyond its proper jurisdiction. Agape is not 
to be equated with the total personality of God, and man can 
appropriate both the divine love and divine reason. Agape, as 
New Testament love, most adequately expresses the moral character 
of God. To use it as the ultimate explanation of all there is, is 
to use it beyond its function. Agape should not be equated with 
perfect wisdom, beauty, and power. God is the source and ground 
of all values such as beauty, knowledge, power, and morals, but 
why make agape, New Testament love, the criterion of all value? 
Divine love is itself an ideal which can only be accepted as a 
true ideal if it can be brought into a harmonious relation with 
the experience of other ideals. Vfuy make Divine love a more ulti-
mate criterion than Divine reason? God's love and reason must 
have been together from eternity, else there was a time when God 
was outgoing love but irrational, or not love but rational. 
Although Ferre generally avoids the Lundensian manner of 
speaking of unconditional love, nevertheless, in defining agape, 
as the source of all, he also writes of it as "unconditional 
love".l From all that can be known from experience no kind of 
responsible love, not even divine love, can be unconditional or 
unmotivated. Here it is well to make a difference between 
unmerited love and unconditional love. The latter can only be 
interpreted as love without reason, without motives and therefore 
indifferent, but unmerited love can yet have its grounds or 
1. ECF, 155. 
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reasons. Man as a creature and sinner always stands as debtor 
before God. He does not merit the fullness of divine love; 
nevertheless, be must he a person somehow worthy of being loved. 
If through outgoing unmerited love toward wayward mankind, God 
establishes a potential fellowship, then the potential fellowship 
is the ground or condition upon which God forgives and gives 
freely of his love. 
It would be nothing to the credit of God's wisdom 
or character if he loved man either because of man's 
sin or for no reason at all. Tbe love of God who 
is both wise and Good, for man who is neither, must 
be because of man's potential value, and in spite 
of his present sin and relative worthlessness.l 
The emphasis on Divine love as an ultimate principle of 
explanation neglects a similar needed emphasis on Divine reason 
as a complementary principle of explanation. It can be agreed 
that Christ revealed divine love more than the divine reason, 
but the divine love made manifest in Christ was not without 
Christ's striving and use of reason. 
~nether one speaks of divine reason or divine love the 
understanding of both bas to come through human media. Man's 
reason or love is not to be equated with divine reason and 
divine love. Ferre rightly recognizes that ~ and agape are 
not in contradiction; there is a functional unit¥ between them. 
Using his terminology it would be more correct to say that 
agape, like all experience, must be tested by whole-response. 
Agape, in the sense of absolute concern and co-operation 
1. Macintosh, PRK, 351. 
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with all men in all their inner problems and external relations, 
is man's highest ideal, but only through reason can this concern 
be applied to concrete situations. Agape is relational, and 
in relation to mother, wife, child, as well as society and God, 
it requires the discriminating use of reason. 
For man the highest criterion of truth is the ideal relation 
between thinking, feeling, and willing. It is difficult to see 
why be would make divine love ultimate over divine willing and 
thinking. Neither in the experience of human consciousness nor 
divine consciousness can reason or love be emphasized at the 
expense of the other. In any kind of constructive or co-operative 
~ 
action the two belong together. The two greatest problems, Ferre 
does well to point out, are the problems of authority and motiva-
tion. In his judgment agape is the answer to both, making agape 
inclusive of perfect love, wisdom, and power. But because agape 
basically means divine love, and since love and reason can neither 
be equated nor separated, it would be more correct to regard love 
as the answer to the problem of motivation and reason as the 
answer to the problem of authority. 
If there is fear that those who set up reason as a final 
judge and authority will impose their judgments upon others and 
thus lead to totalitarianism, fanaticism, or dogmatism, it can 
be said that this could happen only through a false use of 
reason. Here certainty would be substituted for reason and 
thereby falsify it. What would be needed would be more light 
and more love. What unlovely things have been done in the name 
of' love~ And what unreasonable action bas been taken in the 
name of' reason! But reason and love working together can 
never lead to dogmatism or fanaticism. / Ferre would be ready 
to attest to the necessity of' such a union, but he needs to 
be more explicit in his treatment of' the agape principle • . 
2. Christ as Selective Principle 
i. Christ as incarnation of' God's agape. 
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In the pref'ace of' his book, The Christian Faith, Ferre 
writes: "This book has been written because . by some alchemy of' 
mind and soul, be it the grace of' God, the intellectual validity 
of' the Christian f'aith bas been borne in upon me with peculiar 
vividness during the past months."1 In the pages that f'ollow 
Ferre attempts to give reason its f'ull power and scope in 
establishing the intellectual validity of' Christian f'aith. 
He is convinced that "Christianity is man's ultimate religion 
because it is God's supreme revelation."2 Christ is the content 
of' revelation and the center of' Christianity. "To me increas-
· ingly Christianity stands or f'alls according to its basic 
understanding of the Incarnation."3 
The traditional doctrines, Ferre holds, contain much truth 
or at least can continue to stand for certain restated f'acts 
or truths. The book is especially written f'or those "literalists 
who seek a positive Christian theology and f'ail to f'ind it in 
1. CFA, i:x. 3. CFA, :xiii. 
2. CFA, i:x. 
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current liberalisms, and for these liberals who are on a similar 
quest but cannot retreat to literalistic fundamentalism. 11 1 Thus 
in his treatment of the pre-existence of Christ, Virgin Birth, 
miracles, Person and Work of Christ, he uses a new approach to 
the historical doctrines. In agreement with traditional doctrines 
be strongly affirms that Christ's coming into history marks a 
special discontinuity entering the continuity of history. The 
discussion of the validity of such an affirmation will be post-
poned until the last chapter. For Ferre the doctrine of the 
Virgin Birth, regardless of the biological issue, stands for the 
fact of discontinuity. 2 The unity and continuity of the Christian 
faith is held to be the working of agape through history, but this 
continuity, he maintains, came by the way of a discontinuity. 
Thus in spite of the deep and binding continuity between 
Judaism and Christianity agape is the conclusive dis-
continuity which makes Christfanity what it is.3 
One cannot read far in the writings of Ferre without soon 
becoming aware how important his interpretation of Christ is in 
relation to his theological methodology. Christ as the center of 
Christianity is 11 God 1 s special, final revelation and His special, 
conclusive redemption. 114 Christ is the final revelat i on in the 
sense that love is the ultimate category of being and becoming; 
all relations can be transformed by it and all there is and will 
be must finally conform to it. He is also the center of history 
"and all else before and after will eventually be seen, judged, and 
1 • CF A, x i i i . 
2. CFA, xii. 
3. ECF, 141. 
4. CFA, xii. 
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transformed in, through, and because of bim."l Christ is the 
center of history because be precedes and transcends history. 
Ferre recognizes that the doctrine of the Trinity in its 
tritbeistic tendency arose as an endeavor of the church to 
explain the unique revelation of God in Christ, but believes 
that the doctrine of the pre-existence of Christ can be main-
tained without being inconsistent with monotheism and without 
losing the deepest meaning of the doctrine of the Trinity. 
To avoid tritheism Christ must be thought of as a pre-
existent aspect of God rather than pre-existent personality. 
Let us think of the form of God as personality 
and the content of God as ~e, or Christian 
love. This makes it clear~wrcy~wbile God is love, 
love is not God. In God personality and agape, 
of course, cannot be separated. But they can 
be in creation. Man is a child of God by his 
very creation.2 
Man made in God's image means that man is a created 
personality. Thus in form all men, including Jesus, share 
the divinity of nature. 
But Jesus differs in the content of his nature. 
In Jesus, God's ~ which is His very nature 
visited man in mB.tCliless fullness. Jesus is God's 
first full · revelation of what He really is and 
wills. It was this agape which pre-existed from 
all eternity. This was, indeed, 11begotten not 
made", "very God of very God. "'3 
Ferre considers it a heresy to deny that the fullness of 
God was in Jesus. This must not be understood to mean that the 
1. CFA., 119. 3. CFA, 101. 
2. CFA, 100. 
12il: 
totality of God's being, the personality of God was in Jesus, 
"but the very substance of God, when this refers to the quality 
of God ' s nature • " 1 
God differs from all men, including Jesus, in that 
his personality alone is eternal and the Creator 
of all other personalities. God differs from all 
men, except Jesus, in that no one by himself has 
God's a~ape ••• Jesus and God are one in the sense 
that Go gave in Jesus His very nature, His agape. 
Thus the very content of Jesus' life and work came 
from God.2 
' / In the light of this interpretation Ferre can accept the 
traditional doctrine of Christ as the God-man. According to 
his judgment we must "remain content with the historic doctrine 
that Jesus was both God and man."3 The most basic thought of 
the Christian religion is "that the eternal itself becomes 
historical, that the perfect enters the imperfect, that the 
spiritual becomes one without confusion with the natural, that 
the sinless suffers with and for sin."4 This interpretation, 
it is maintained, can keep "the all-important truth that God 
was truly in Jesus and yet Jesus was truly human. It will guard 
the truth of the Incarnation that the eternal and fully divine 
entered the changeable and fully human."5 11 It is God Himself, 
the divine agape which took on flesh in a decisive manner for 
all times." 6 
The dQCtrine of the Virgin Birth stands for a vital truth 
1. CFA, 101. 4. CFE, 139. 
2. CFA, 1.02. 5. CFA, 103. 
3. CFE, 92. 6. ECF, 163. 
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in the Christian faith. Vfuetber God worked with or without 
a human is not the primary importance. The crucial truth of 
the Virgin Birth doctrine is that "Jesus, the Savior, the 
Revealer, and the Redeemer, was truly conceived by the Holy 
Spirit ••• what was born was primarily of God and not of man. 11 1 
In harmony with historical doctrine Ferre can say that the Son 
of God was "begotten not made". The truth of the Incarnation 
is that the content of Jesus' personality was truly "very God 
of very God" enabling him to become the very standard of truth 
for mankind. God became incarnated in all His fullness, not 
quantitatively, but qualitatively. The love which filled Jesus 
was God's own eternal agape. I This is no more mysterious, Ferre 
holds, than the truth that God gives all of us personalities 
in the first place. Vfuy be does not give to all men his very 
content is to question the wisdom of creation, necessity of 
redemption and the reality of history. 
/ For Ferre Christ is the selective principle with which one 
can most adequately interpret all reality. "He is the revelation 
in life and in teaching, in being and message, of tbe ultimate 
principle of all e.xplanation."2 Theological methodology stands 
or falls with respect to one's interpretation of Christ. Christ 
is the embodiment of Divine agape and agape is defined as 
holiness, active love, perfect wisdom, power, freedom, and 
beauty. But most important agape is defined as Jesus Christ. 
1. CFA, 109. 2. CFE, 51. 
As the enactment of the very content of God he is the selective 
actual, history's most high, truest index of ultimate reality, 
peak point of process, creative emergence, our existential 
ultimate, most important and most real, most true and most 
higb. 1 But Ferre adds that "the life of Jesus, being history's 
most high, is not essentially explainable in terms of past 
history. It is essentially a ndracle. It is essentially a 
mystery ••• In the deepest and fullest sense of the word our 
ultimate perspective is supernatural."2 
ii. Evaluation. 
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The existentialism in Ferre's interpretation of the person 
of Christ becomes evident in his restating of the historic 
doctrine that the " ~ Word became flesh." It was God's love 
that became incarnated in Christ and therefore according to 
his view it would be more correct to say "agape became flesh." 
This was possible only through God's own activity, and although 
the doctrine of incarnation lends itself to rational description, 
be maintains it can only be resolved in existential thinking 
and in faith. 
He is the decisive instance in history for or 
against whom we must decide. Without this decision, 
this ultimate decision, this absolute decision, he 
cannot be truly knownfrom within and confirmed by 
experience to be the Son of God.3 
The rational description of the person of Christ given by 
1. ECF, 161. 3. ECF, 162. 
2. ECF, 164-165. 
Ferre suffers from an inadequately empirical approach. This 
is especially true as Ferre emphasizes the "given content" 
in Christ. 
Jesus and God are one in the sense that God gave 
in Jesus his very nature, His agape. Thus the 
very content of Jesus' life and work come from 
God.l 
The content of Jesus' personality ••• was indeed 
"very God of very God." The love which filled 
Jesus was God's own eternal, personal love.2 
Jesus differs from us all in the given content 
of his personality.3 
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That personality rather than substance must be the final 
principle of interpretation can readily be accepted, however, 
when Ferre declares that ntbe fundamental principle of inter-
pretation is not substance nor thought, but personality, tt4 be 
brings disunity into the concept of personality by separating 
thought from personality. Empirically one cannot know of a 
given content of personality. Consciousness is given but 
personality is developed in freedom. Any personality other 
than our own must come to us through the medium of thought. 
There is no objection to accepting personality as the ultimate 
/ principle of interpretation, but Ferre's view is in need of 
a more voluntaristic and dynamic approach. 
/ Ferre aims to avoid the fa1la,ey of those traditional 
doctrines of Christ in which .the person of Christ was thought 
1. CFA, 102. 3. CFA, ll5.- . 
2. CFA, 110-111. 4. CFE , 175-176. 
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or in terms or a substance philosophy. They created an 
artificial clert between the nature of God and man. Nor would 
be be able to agree with Brunner's view that 
we must either have rational clarity and simplicity 
or paradox~ The logical absurdities of the doctrine 
of the two natures and or the Trinity express the 
inconceivable miracle of revelation.l 
Although Ferre accepts the two-nature theory, the full divinity 
and humanity of Jesus, as essential to the Christian faith, 
be cannot agree that it expresses the fundamental paradox that 
God became man, nor that the doctrine is absurd and contra-
dictory. 
Ferre is able to correct Brunner at this point inasmuch 
as God is not the "wholly other", but the love which Jesus 
embodied, proclaimed and lived, and through faith made available 
to men. " However, when Ferre writes that the content of Jesus' 
personality was "very God_of very God", that "the love which 
filled Jesus was God Himself," and at the same time emphasizes 
the true humanity of Jesus, he introduces a mystical-metaphysical 
dualism into the personality of Jesus. Such a view does violence 
to the unity of Jesus' personality. "He does not speak at one 
time 'as man', and at aJ;lother time as 1 God'."2 
, 
Ferre, however, 
emphati~ally affirms that Jesust nature was no artificial creation. 
This assertion of God's special givenness in Jesus 
Christ is not intended ' to mean, furthermore, that 
Jesus bad no human inclination to a fellowship-
1. Brunner, MED, 278. 2. Knudson, DR, 300. 
denying self-affirmation. Jesus' human nature 
was real.l 
The specially given in Jesus Christ does not 
rob him of his full humanity. Jesus' nature 
was not artificial.2 
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The "giveri11 in Jesus, Ferre believes, does not impair the 
validity of his humanity because no man lives without some 
endowment from God or without his constant grace. That no man 
can live unto himself is quickly granted, and to this should 
be added that all sense experience as well as consciousness is 
God's gift to man. But true personality can only be understood 
in terms of indeterminism and unity. If Christ is to stand as 
man's selective actual and selectiv-e ideal, his divinity, the 
divine love which he embodied and revealed must have been 
attained through his living, searching, striving, and praying 
in complete co-operation and surrender to God, rather than by 
a given content from God. "God did not interfere with Jesus' 
freedom of choice. If he had, then at every point of 
interference Jesus' apparent goodness would have been a sham."3 
Ethics for Ferre is basically the application of agape 
to concrete situations, and "spiritual and ethical autonomy 
is a necessary stage to true selfhood. n4 But if ."Jesus and 
God are one in the sense that God gave in Jesus His very nature, 
His agape,"5 it is difficult to see. bow Jesus could retain his 
true selfbood in ethical choices. Although contrary to his 
1. CFA, 117. 4. ECF, 33. 
2. CFA, 118. 5. CFA, 102. 
3. DeWolf, Outline of Systematic Theology I, 33. 
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intentions when Ferre writes that "by means of this 'givenness' 
Jesus differs from us all,"1 be tends to make an automaton of 
the freedom and selfhood of Jesus. No completely satisfying 
explanation ~f the person of Christ can be given until all the 
secrets of personality and consciousness are known, but if 
Christ is to be the ultimate ideal to challenge and save mankind, 
the mystery of his person must ulti~Ately be resolved in the 
mystery of the will rather than the mystery of 11 givenness". 
iii. The atonement. 
Seeking a satisfactory mediating position between the 
conservatives and the liberals, Ferre, in a penetrating 
synthesis, draws from what be regards as the truth in both 
approaches. The moral influence (or example) theory of 
liberalism is set aside as inadequate. Whereas Nygren rejects 
/ ' it as entirely false, Ferre considers it as not fully Christian. 
It is true inasmuch as Christianity cannot be entirely from 
God to man, or else man is robbed of his responsibility. And 
the truth that Jesus lived and died as an example is an 
important aid in the process of salvation, but to reduce the 
atonement to the moral influence theory comes too near to the 
false idea of "salvation by character".2 Without God's 
redemptive grace man is lost in his trespasses and sins. 
The subjective doctrine of the atonement is not 
wrong; it is incomplete. Jesus died for us both 
1. CFA, 116. 2. CFA, 156. 
, 128 
as man and as God. His humanity without ~istinction 
and confusion co-operated with his deity. 
In the cross men can most clearly see that God is 
unreservedly agape. Christ's suffering as agape is God Himself 
suffering to save a sinful world. ''God suffered uniquely on 
Calvary because His spirit was uniquely present in the life of 
Jesus."2 The Christian faith, Ferre asserts, stands or falls 
in accordance with its faith in a God-sent Saviour. 
/ In harmony with the nee-orthodox thinkers Ferre considers 
the doctrine of atonement incomplete apart from its substi-
tutionary aspect.3 Those who hold this view as false or even 
unethical are unrealistic. They fail to see that 11 in a social 
world both good and evil deeds affect other people within the 
whole circle of relevance ••• Both grace and sin are social 
" realities which work in social channels."4 Ferre further 
attempts to show the truth implied in the substitutionary 
idea by pointing out that men do not fare according to their 
desert, that we have caused others to suffer unjustly and that 
we have similarly suffered in our attempt to uphold truth. 
In such an application of the substitutionary idea Ferre is 
far removed from the traditional view in which ttsubst1tutionary11 
meant forgiveness only on the basis of something which must 
precede. .I There are, however, indications where Ferre is much 
nearer to the traditional emphasis of the substitutionary idea: 
1. CFA, 158. 3. CFA, 163. 
2. CFA, 161. 4. CFA, 164. 
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He let Jesus suffer for our sake in order that 
through him we might find salvation and everlasting 
life. I 
It is Jesus who as God incarnate paid for man's 
sin ••• 2 
The source of full redemption lies in God's special 
incarnation in history to suffer that we might be 
saved from the power of sin.3 
Ferre recognizes that be is nearer to the conservatives 
than to most of the liberals in maintaining that the atonement 
objectively satisfied the holiness of .G6d, without which God 
I 
cannot forgive sin. Here Ferre admonishes that one must be on 
guard against the crude idea that the Father, being sternly 
holy, can forgive man only because the Son by his suffering 
satisfied the Father's demand for holiness. The point made is 
that atonement is necessary not so much because of the nature 
of God's will but tbe nature of holiness. God's holiness rejects 
everything that falls short of its intrinsic purity. Man is 
essentially bent toward self-e.ffirmation which distorts genuine 
fellowship and rebels against God. "Man has a 'fallen' nature 
in that his basic self-assertion, when yielded to, denies God's 
purpose for him ••• It is necessary therefore .for man to become 
converted."4 God's holiness demands atonement but since man 
is unable to effect agape fellowship by himself, "because of 
both his creatureliness and his sinfulness, God sent His ovm 
Son, let His own agape be born in human form, and even let it 
1. CFE, 122. 3. CFA, 167-168. 
2. CFA, 34. 4. CFA, 170. 
130 
die that man might see and trust God's way of salvation."l 
/ It is evident from the above interpretation that Ferre 
wishes to save the emphasis on the objective phase of the 
atonement. In the preface of his book, The Christian Faith, 
be also writes: 
The objective aspects of the atonement, furthermore, 
were nearly meaningless to me until the signifi-
cance of their central truth for Christian faith 
burst in upon me.2 
Thus Ferre also affirms that the "redemptive Incarnation of God 
in Jesus Christ is a distinct discontinuity imposed on the 
continuity of God's general revelation and creative activity."3 
One would know more about the nature of the discontinuity. 
Is it the discontinuity of the legal order of merit and justice, 
or is it a discontinuity in the operation of divine love? In 
emphasizing the substitutionary idea and love's demand for 
atonement on the basis of Divine holiness, Ferre is not 
altogether free from Anselm's theory in which the violation 
of the order of merit and justice becomes unthinkable. Certainly 
for the most part his view of the atonement is that of the classic 
type4 in which the work of atonement is accomplished by God 
Himself in Christ, but inasmuch as there must be a satisfaction 
of God's holiness, Ferr~ combines the classical and the Latin 
type, the latter demanding that the order of justice must remain 
unbroken. 
1. CFA, 172. 
2. CFA, xiii-xiv. 
3. CFA, 124. 
~. See Aulen's analysis of 
the three types of atone-
ment in Chris_tus Victor. 
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By his emphasis on the "substitutionary idea" Ferre weakens 
his agape doctrine. If, as be bas maintained, God's agape is 
perfect power, perfect justice, and perfect holiness, and if 
it is supreme and unconditional, why must God's holiness be 
satisfied'? Ferr~'s assertion that "the atonement is S":lpremely 
an objective act in history, but always conditioned by the 
subjective acceptance of man" 1 can be accepted, but the 
objective aspect must be thought of in a more voluntaristic 
and personal-ethical manner. The agape symbolized on the cross 
is the kind of love which man can believe constitutes the 
nature of God. It is the unmerited love which God has for man 
in spite of man's sin, rebellion, and ignorance. It is the 
kind of love which goes out to meet the prodigal and accepts 
the prodigal on the basis of repentance. This sacrificial 
love exemplified by the life and death of Jesus mirrors the 
love and forgiveness of God and renders the idea of atonement 
unnecessary. 
For Ferre guilt before the Holiness of God is too great 
to be removed by outright forgiveness. Something else must 
happen before this can take place. He pointedly writes that 
"The holiness of . God is the arm that pushes away all that is 
sinful, but the love of God is the farther reaching arm."2 It 
should be added, since be believes that "agape is perfect 
power",3 that the farther reaching arm eliminates the need of 
1. CFA, 175. 3. ECF, 153. 
2. CFA, 174. 
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any substitutionary atonement. 
The substitutionary idea always carries with it the idea 
of man's little standards of justice and thus makes the 
sacrificial love of God less effectual. It bas the tendency 
to place man's most meaningful relation to God on an impersonal-
metaphysical level rather than in a dynamic personal-ethical 
relation. It implies that God's love is neither inclusive 
enough, nor does it have the power to forgive sin unless in 
someway recompense precedes. 
3. Christianity as the Ultimate World Faith 
The ultimate world faith must be a faith that satisfies 
man's deepest needs. It must be relevant to concrete situations 
or else it cannot provide the power needed for daily living. 
Ferre believes that Christianity qualifies as the ultimate 
world faith because of its inclusive character. It fulfills 
man's needs inasmuch as it is the human, historical, progres-
sive, and religious ultimate. 
No society can long endure without some self-giving and 
concern for others. 
This self-giving love creative of fellowship is 
the human ultimate. But this is also Christianity ••• 
Even on the human level no other religion is better 
for man, for no other ideal so deeply and effec-
tively answers man's deepest needs. Christianity, 
therefore is at least good humanism.l 
The Christian faith is also considered as the historic 
1. CFA, 26. 
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ultimate because it constructively fulfills all other religions, 
taking from them all that contributes toward a concerned 
fellowship and providing for them a supreme person who bas 
complete personal concern for every other person, and . wbose very 
content of love was incarnated in an historic person. In Ferre's 
judgment Ernest Hocking does not solve the problem by saying 
that "in all religions there is some truth and that the final 
world religion will be greater than any of them."1 He regards 
the above view as containing important truth, but, nevertheless, 
inadequate because it fails to define its principle of inclusion. 
The Christian faith is final and its principle of inclusion is: 
All things cultural, intellectual, moral, and 
spiritual which are consistent with a God-centered, 
sacrificial, creative good will as first fully 
revealed and made effective in Jesus Christ may be 
freely admitted into the Christian religion.2 
One may question, however, whether Hocking's use of "whole idea" 
or Christianity as "clarified anticipationtt does not embrace the 
above principle of inclusion. 
The truth of liberalism, Ferre writes, is its belief that a 
reasoned comparison of religions is possible and that the religion 
wh ich meets human need most adequately is ultimate. The truth of 
the conservatives is their defense of the uniqueness and absolute-
ness of Christianity as revealed through Christ, and the religious 
radicals rightly express the truth that religions are historical 
and cannot be severed from their historic continuity. Accepting 
the religio-bistoric method as a necessary tool in interpreting 
1. CFA, 46. 2. CFA, 47-48. 
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religion, Ferre, nevertheless, rejects it as an explanation of 
religion. Here be would agree with George Galloway that great 
religious personalities, and especially the personality of Christ, 
can never be fully explained on these lines. "We seem here 
compelled to admit the entrance of new creative forces into 
the historic life."l 
The Christian faith is also the progressive ultimate. 
But the God of the Christian faith must not be judged in terms 
of present facts--process and becoming must be interpreted in 
terms of God. The Christian God is both Creator and Redeemer. 
An analysis of history brings out both tbe creative and redemptive 
levels that work to create fellowship. God's push of progress 
works in harmony with his pull of purpose. Christianity is the 
progressive ultimate because it is the purpose of God for man 
without which the push of progress contributes to a technological 
advance that becomes perverted from its divine possibility and 
turns into a strong weapon of demonic power politics. 
Ferre considers democracy as the most adequate form of 
government. The sense of responsible democratic living, be 
believes, had its origin in the Jewish-Christian interpretation 
of history and goals beyond history. 2 The correct attitude 
or approach to any problem is the co-operative spirit which 
recognizes every partial approach to truth and every construe-
tive action. This same attitude characterizes the relation 
l. Galloway, FRR, 127. 2. See Art.(l942) 1 • 
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or Christianity to other religions. Too often non-Christians 
as well as Christians have ezcluded Christianity because it 
bas not come to mean complete goodwill and realistic concern. 
The historic question as to what eztent Jesus 
taught and enacted this love, is a secondary 
question which must be settled, as far as it 
can be, with rigorous honesty on all sides. The 
question also as to what eztent Judaism, Hinduism, 
or Buddhism, for ezamples, as some or my Christian 
and non-Christian friends contend, actually contain 
the life and teaching of agape1must again be settled critically and openly. 
Christendom as well as non-Christians are brought to 
judgment under the demand of agape fellowship. Ferre would 
not quarrel about names if mankind could only unite with 
respect to the ultimate realities. 
The point for us all is to become united, under 
whatever name or names, within a common faith in 
God Vfuo loves each and all equally, because 
completely, and who works to effect a universal 
freedom and faithfulness ' in fellowship.2 
The Christian faith as the human·, historic, and progressive 
ultimate is essentially the entering into a co-operative and 
creative community. This fulfills the requirement - for a 
world faith. "The basic task of a religion for one world is 
to make real the truth of the inclusive and co-operative 
consciousness. 11 3 Ferre recognizes that Christianity bas no 
monopoly of motives for this kind of fellowship. The basis 
on which religions of the world ought to be willing to unite 
1. 
2. 
1 Art.(l942) 1 , 666. Art.(l942) , 666. 
3. Art.(l948), 237. 
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in creating such a community is both theoretical and historical. 
, 
At least thus far it can be said that Ferre lays the foundation 
for a world religion on a rational ground. It is as Ferre 
presents the Christian faith as the religious ultimate that 
be finds it necessary to exercise a more existential use of 
reason. His treatment of the agape doctrine, Christ as 
selective principle, .and the atonement bear this out. 
The agape of Jesus, says Ferre, is the given content of 
God's agape. Though be bas stated that "the historic question 
as to what extent Jesus taught and enacted this love, is a 
secondary question," be, nevertheless, makes it central 
existentially when he makes Christian faith stand or fall 
with the truth of the incarnation. Christian faith is thus a 
religion of revelation--God's special and final revelation in 
Christ. 
For Ferre the truths of incarnation, atonement, sin, and 
forgiveness cannot be understood on the basis of rational 
coherence. The fullest use of reason still leaves man shrouded 
in mystery. 
Christianity is essentially a mystery, the mystery 
of the cross.l 
Christianity is essentially a religion of grace 
wherein the natural order of this world seems 
interrupted ~y the supernatural order of divine 
forgiveness. 
1. CFE, 136. 2. CFE, 177. 
A world religion, to be adequately religious, must be 
grounded in faith. "A religion for one world can never be 
constructed by reason; it must grow out of our new situation, 
developing its own appropriate language."1 Galloway expresses 
Ferr~'s view in declaring: "If we hold there is an absolute 
element in the religion of Christ our assurance will depend 
'' 2 upon an act of faith rather than on the exercise of reason. 
Both. Galloway and Ferre rightly stress that there is no 
presuppositionless thinking, nor can there be any objection 
to the assertion that in Christ God is uniquely revealed. 
Through the religious experience motivated by the life and 
teachings of Jesus man receives a picture of the moral nature 
of God as be does nowhere else. There are, however, different 
approaches to making Christ the channel through which the 
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uniqueness and absoluteness of Christian faith can be affirmed. 
It is interesting that two thinkers as different in method and 
conclusion as Hegel and Kierkegaard can accept Christianity as 
the absolute religion, and both do so in attributing uniqueness 
to Christ. For Kierkegaard it was the supreme paradox that God 
became man in Christ; for Hegel the absolute in Christianity is 
the speculative principle of the union of God and man, the 
culmination of which took place in Jesus, the God-man. 
, 
Ferre avoids the irrational and paradoxical interpretation 
of the nature of revelation in Christ as express~d by the 
1. Art.(l948~233. 2. Galloway, FRR, 130. 
nee-orthodox thinkers by making Christ the agape of God, but 
- / in stressing the given content of his personality, Ferre's 
view stands in need of a more empirical and rational approach. 
Christ as given revelation still needs to be interpreted 
through human media. This does not eliminate the possibility 
of finding in him the principle which is the moral and 
religious ideal, and which acts as a judge upon men. The 
alleged "given" agape must yet be interpreted by reason to 
distinguish it from a false kind of love. Love is always 
relational, and therefore cannot be accepted as an apriori 
category without submitting to the danger of irrational 
action. 
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CHAPTER VI 
REASON AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 
According to the author of the book of Job ttman that is 
born of womanis of few days and full of trouble" (Job 14:1). 
The only comforting thought in this comment on man is that 
man is of few days. Contrary to this view Ferre approaches 
the problem of evil with confident optimism. The Christian 
faith, he believes, ''solves the problem of evil with amazing 
adequacy ••• It solves evil in thought; it solves evil in life. 111 
From the premises of the agape doctrine in w.hich agape is set 
fortb as perfect wisdom, perfect power, and perfect love it 
can be predicted that his handling of the problem could be in 
an essentially optimistic manner. 
Ferr' rejects the theory that the problem of evil can 
be solved on the level of historic fact. This problem especially 
d.emands thinking from the viewpoint of an organically related 
whole. History itself is related to the ~~ole and is being 
conditioned and transformed by the Whole. The problem of evil 
cannot be solved on the level of fact, not even personal fact, 
because facts do not stand still. "Mere fact a.t an instant is 
a fiction of the intelligence. Mere fact is a false freeze. 11 2 
With regard to the problem of evil and suffering the significance 
of process, change, and becoming is especially important. 
1. ECF, ix. (All references in this 
chapter are to Ferre, unless 
otherwise noted.) 
2. ECF, 6. 
The second level of approach to be rejected is the 
aesthetic level. On this level life is seen as the perfect 
symphony in spite of certain discords and atonalities. But 
only the composer, not the individual player, can catch the 
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full harmony of the symphony. The individual player must be 
content to bear the discords and disharmony, knowing that they 
are part of the perfect symphony. This view is basically the 
, 
believe that evil is incomplete good, and Ferre rejects it as 
inadequate because it makes the Whole enjoy Himself at the 
expense of the parts. 
The most satisfactory approach to the problem is from the 
personal-spiritual l ove. Since the past bas no reality as 
such, and because experience can be transmuted and enriched by 
past failure and suffering, a partial solution on this level 
is possible. Furthermore, says Ferre, it is from the personal-
spiritual perspective that evil can be known as necessary to 
the perfecting of the process. It is also on this level that 
the hedonistic approach loses its force. The deepest and most 
meaningful things in life have always been purchased at a cost. 
Pleasure cannot, for example, 11 account for the novel emergences 
like consciousness and redemptive love, which often thwart, 
interrupt, or even sacrifice pleasure to duty, or higher, to 
responsible concern. 111 
1. ECF, 22. 
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1. Evil and the Nature of Man 
On the personal-spiritual level man experiences freedom 
I 
and freedom, Ferre declares, is the key to the problem of both 
moral and natural evil. 
With regard to natural evil we shall see this is 
true both in nature's bearing on life and as an 
evolutionary background of life, through the 
animal world, fulfilled only on the level of 
personal-spiritual life.l 
There are those for whom freedom cannot be the master key 
which unlocks the doors of all problems of suffering, but with 
respect to moral evil Ferre is right in stressing the fact of 
freedom. Man is a moral being who experiences freedom of 
choice. Morality loses its meaning and worth unless moral 
action arises out of indeterminism. Ferre would be willing to 
say with F. R. Tennant that 
we cannot imagine a living world, in which truly 
ethical values are to be actualized, save as an 
evolutionary cosmos in which free agents live and 
learn, make choices and build character. 2 · 
Freedom is necessary for moral growth, but this intr.oduces 
a precarious condition into the life of man. The possibility 
to do right bas as its counterpart the freedom to do wrong. 
Where there are no vices to allure man there is no virtue to 
be won. "There cannot be moral goodness in a creature such 
as man without the possibility of sinning."3 
On the fundamental relation between freedom and moral life 
1. ECF, 33. 3. Tennant, PT, Vol. II, 188. 
2. Tennant, PT, Vol. II, 185. 
I I Tennant and Ferre can agree but Ferre differs in making 
rebellion a necessary condition of true selfhood. Man must 
assume the authority and power to decide for himself what is 
right, and in this sense be rebels against all external 
authority, either collective or individual. 
To become free we must act in rebellion against 
others.l 
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All have to rebel against God, at least in temptation, 
in order to become free, to become real selves, to 
become willing sons who know why tbey have chosen 
to be adopted with the family of God.2 
This also includes Jesus. His rebellion came in form of 
temptation; as to wbetber be defied God's will at any time one 
cannot know. The necessity of man's rebellion against God 
and man Ferre would Vindicate by a rationale. Rebellion is only 
the beginning of true selfbood. "God bas so made us that we all 
must pass through this stage of attempted self-sufficiency, 
through self-despair, to God's security and therein to true 
freedom." 3 
Much evil, therefore, is due to the necessity of man's 
rebellion. Man wants freedom, and to be a person be must have 
freedom. Man's freedom in its primary stages expresses itself 
in acts of self-assertion and revolt. But this is the necessary 
condition for that bitter experience which will teach the 
prodigal his error and turn him back home. / Thus Ferre writes 
concerning moral evil: 
1. ECF, 33. 3. ECF, 35-36. 
2. ECF, 34. 
\_ 
Evil is the barbs on the fences as we climb away 
from the good which God in his mercy bas prepared 
for us. What ye call evil is thus a good means 
in God's hand. 
Evil is, nevertheless, real, and it is to be avoided and 
eliwinated, but from the explanatory perspective it bas a 
functional aspect and is ultimately ;f'or our good. 11Evil is 
a fact real to us but also good for us, good as a means but 
not as an end."2 
The construction of a rationale in carrying out the 
/ 
alleged necessity of evil is further attested to by Ferre's 
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interpretation of evil and sin. Although his handling of the 
problem of evil is basically optimistic, his view of the nature 
of man is less so. Man is not totally depraved, and even by 
himself be can do some good; nevertheless, he is weighted 
toward tbe self, toward egoism rather than toward real concern 
for others. This state of condition is the occasion for sin 
and it is common to all. Sin is letting ourselves be pulled 
/ down by the we.igbt of our desire, but Ferre adds that it is 
a weight given to us by God ••• witb the intent to 
be free for ourselves in order to be ourselves, when 
something else within and without tells us more 
basically that we cannot be free as ourselves until 
we let ourselves by the power of God be freed within 
God's fellowsbip.3 
The functional aspect of sin is also evident in the demands 
of the law. / According to Ferre God makes the law impossible 
but nevertheless makes man responsible for the keeping of the 
1. ECF, 36. 3. ECF, 44. 
2. ECF, 37. 
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whole law so that man may see that be cannot fulfill it, and 
thereby be delivered from his false attempt at self-sufficiency. 
Existentially man ought not to let sin reign in his life 
for it is restlessness and separates man from God, but "from 
the point of view of the fuller explanation of God's purpose 
to create fellowship we can see and own its function."l 
Although God creates man with an inclination toward estrangement 
and self-seeking, and although be bas placed him in a precarious 
enviro~ent, this is the best possible world to effect Christian 
fellowship. 
Unless God purposed this kind of world, including 
man's rebellion, the Cross of Christ becomes 
accidental as a full principle of explanation, 
devotion, purpose, and power ••• This means that 
He foresaw and intended this kind of world as the 
perfect means for the perfect end of Agape ·fellow-
sbip.2 
In his attempt to place the necessity of evil and sin into 
/ 
a rational setting Ferre concedes too much to the view of 
theological determinism. He is right in declaring that God 
foresaw the possibility of evil, sin, and human rebellion; 
however, when he writes about the necessity of evil, sin, and 
rebellion, and God's acceptance of human rebellion as a good 
means to the perfecting of process and true fellowship, he 
brings confusion into the idea of freedom and moral worth. 
There is an important difference between saying that evil and 
sin are necessary for effecting an agape fellowship and saying 
1. ECF, 48. 2. ECF, 49. 
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that the possibility of evil and sin is necessary. The former 
makes God responsible for sin rather than responsible for the 
possibility of sin, and it bas the tendency to make man a 
sinner through an act of God rather than a truly free moral 
agent. On this point F. R. Tennant writes more carefully 
avoiding the fallacy of determinism. 
For the possibility of moral evil entering into this 
moral order, God, who foreknew it, is responsible: 
He permits, so to say, the evil in order that there 
may be the good. But for the actual emergence of 
man's moral evil we cannot say that He is responsible: 
our sin, when 'sin' is strictly and correctly defined, 
is not God's act but the product of our volition, or 
devolved freedom.l 
I The freedom of man is impaired as Ferre writes that God 
gave man "purposefully a freedom weighted to~ard the self."2 
The Cross of Christ, be maintains, was also purposed and thus 
both the Cross and sin became a theological necessity. 
Furthermore there is obscurity in the thought that evil 
is all that "thwarts God's purpose for Christian fellowsbip, 113 
.. 
and that at the same time evil is necessary for the perfect·ing 
of this fellowship. It would be more correct to say that God 
foresaw that increase in value could only be brought about by 
means of other persons because value can only be realized in 
persons. Personality, however, implies freedom because freedom 
is the precondition of both value and disvalue. God's purpose 
is the increase of value, not human rebellion. Nor can He 
1. Tennant, PT, Vol. II, 189. 3. ECF, 34. 
2. ECF, 49. 
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accept human rebellion as a good means; He accepts human freedom 
as a good means for the purpose of co-operation and fellowship, 
and man's rebellion is the result of the precarious condition 
necessary for the existence and growth of persons. 
2. Evil and Nature 
Suffering due to evil in nature remains one of the most 
challenging and perplexing phases of the problem of theodicy. 
Some who have worked with this problem sincerely and patiently 
have surrendered their religious faith because they believe 
there are facts of dysteleology which cannot be reconciled 
to tbe idea of the goodness, justice and power of God. 
No full solution to the problem can be ours according to 
Ferre. Here whole-response in faith and whole-reason cannot 
go together. Although the problem cannot be wholly solved in 
theory, it can be solved through a living faith. The optimism 
with which Ferre faces tbe problem of natural evil again remains 
consistent with his view of agape as perfect power and perfect 
love. What he means by "perfect" will be considered more fully 
at the close of this section. 
Natural laws, Ferre maintains, are not our final category 
of interpretation; regularities and irregularities alime are 
subject to the highest purpose that man knows. Even as the 
moral nature with its selfish bent is the right medium in which 
man's false self-sufficiency and insecurity must be turned to 
security in God and right fellowship, so 
nature is the right medium ••• with its predictability 
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and unpredictability, to foster in us at the same 
time initiative, responsibility, and creative insirbt, 
and also common dependence on something beyond us. 
Instability in nature, including the different possibilities 
of death, is God's heavy band on man's attempt at self-sufficiency. 
For Ferre all evil, including suffering at the animal level, 
must be interpreted in the light of supreme purpose. For a long 
time animal suffering bas been one of the most difficult aspects 
of the problem of suffering for him. There are others who have 
worked with this problem. Francis J. McConnell writes: 
We concede, a.s at the beginning--that some of the 
mystery is utterly beyond us. The presence and 
extent of animal pain, for example, is utterly 
blank and black to our understanding.2 
Ferre asserts that a partial answer to the problem of 
animal suffering can be found in the fact of the universal 
vicariousness of suffering. 
Life lives on life and by means of life. Up to 
the level of Christian self-sacrifice, or of self-
sacrifice on any level from the bird mother for its 
young, the individual for the herd, the member for 
the tribe, the soldier for the country, the Christ 
for all humanity, there is mostly involuntary or 
ungrasped vicariousness.3 
The problem of animal suffering can be viewed only from a 
partial perspective. It is purely speculative. Ferre is led 
\ 
to believe that "God works with animals fulfilling their lives 
not only justly but creatively and redemptively in some such wal 
as we have suggested it."4 
1. ECF, 63. 
2. McConnell, Art.(l940), 119. 3. ECF, 63. 4. ECF, 65. 
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Ferre writes very little about specific kinds of natural 
evil such as earthquakes, irrational waste in evolutionary 
process, insanity, the different kinds of feeblemindedness, or 
1 
"surd evil", as alleged by Edgar s. Brightman. However, 
from the context of Ferre's writings it can be known that be 
cannot accept the view that surd evil exists. For him all 
natural evil is regarded as having an indispensable function 
in the wisdom of God. All events are parts of an organic 
whole made possible by God and therefore "we cannot point 
to animal pain, to an idiot ••• as examples of purposeless 
suffering. " 2 From the above it appears that Ferre would 
define surd evil as purposeless suffering. This, however, is 
not the point that Brightman makes, for be defines surd evil 
as any experience lacking intrinsic value, even though it may 
be of some instrumental value. 3 
/ . 
Because Ferre recognizes evil as real, and as in no way 
illusory, and at the same time asserts that evil bas a function 
or is necessary, be is confronted with the problem of justifying 
God in using evil means for a good end. He is aware of this 
difficulty but be does not regard it as a serious one. He 
believes "that means can be judged truly only by relation to the 
ends. 114 To give force to bis view he points out that a painful 
1. Brightman, POR, 245-246. 
2. ECF, 126. 
3. Brightman, lTP , 256. 
4. ECF, 68. 
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surgical operation is often necessary to restore health. This 
approach is not wholly satisfactory. If natural evil is God's 
disciplinary means to create agape fellowship, then there is 
evidence that often God's means prove inadequate. There is 
too much experience of suffering and evil that leads to 
cynicism, bitterness, agnosticism, despair and other results 
which thwart God's purpose. Often those who need to be 
disciplined most are confronted with a minimum experience of 
evil. 
Furthermore, unless the means are consistent with the end, 
the distinction between evil means and good means tends to break 
down. Many may accept as good the somewhat similar economic 
ends to be achieved by socialism and communism, but not ail 
those could justify the different means through which the ends 
are to be realized. It can be agreed that God approves of the 
world as a good means to effect fellowship and co-operation 
of persons, but it does not follow that all natural evil is to 
be accepted as a means to a perfect end. Not all pain or 
particular evils are to be regarded as ful f illing a specific 
providential purpose. F. R. Tennant rightly emphasizes that 
it is not necessary to suppose that every specific 
form of suffering that man undergoes--e.g. the agony 
of tetanus or of cancer--is antecedently willed by 
God as a means to some particular end.l . 
Ferre pursues the pull of purpose so eagerly and forcefully 
that it tends to become deterministic. He needs to say more 
1. Tennant, PT, Vol. II, 202-203. 
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about that ruthless aspect of nature which is so indifferent to 
human value. D. C. Macintosh admonishes: 
If all cosmic process and the general course of 
history be interpreted as the product of God's 
purposive creativity equally with what we find 
in the self-sacrificing love of the Man of 
Nazareth, and in all that makes for human 
betterment, we are in religious trouble indeed.l 
Ferre's approach to the problem of evil is essentially 
from the view of agape as perfect power and perfect love. 
Writing of agape as perfect power, he declares, "Agape is all 
the power there is."2 In making God as agape all the power 
there is he necessarily must make God responsible for all 
that happens. Charles Hartshorne correctly distinguishes 
between the greatest possible power and all the power that 
exists. 3 God is the greatest possible power and in that sense 
is al~o perfect power. The limitations which He faces are 
self-imposed--both with respect to natural evil and moral evil. 
Whether creation be thought of as God's present conscious or 
nonconscious energizing, whether God be thought of as absolute 
or finite, He must have known beforehand the possibility of 
evil that would hamper his creation or else He was an indiscreet 
Creator who gambled in the work of creative activity. 
Thus God is indirectly responsible for natural evil. But 
remembering that this is a world in process and that "its 
structures and processes are pliable in the hands of the 
1. Macintosh, PID(, 110. 3. Hartshorne, MVG, 30. 
2. ECF, 153. 
creative God, and in some measure, in the bands of His 
creatures,"1 one can rightly maintain that this is the best 
possible world and best possible means to create fellowship. 
151 
In the writer's judgment it is important to maintain some 
difference between the world as best possible means and as 
perfect means inasmuch as the former reckons more adequately 
wi'l;;b the resistant forces at work. Perfect implies the absence 
of resistance and the f'ulfill:ment of purpose in every event. To 
speak of all natural evil in terms of purpose and perfect means 
confuses the difference between purposing an event and permitting 
an event to come to pass. No person would purpose the birth of 
an idiot but all would approve such pliability of experience 
that would afford the possibility of growing value experience 
out of what appears as an intrinsic evil. It is important then 
that one speak of perfectibility or dynamic perfection rather 
than static perfection. 
3. Evil and History 
History, experience, and nature are God's means to effect 
fellowship and to fulfill his purpose. Tbls wider perspective 
must be f'irmly established, Ferre maintains, if evil is to be 
understood in its right relation to it. The customary approach 
.has been to speak of' two kinds of evil; moral evil and natural 
evil. Moral evil is due to man's misuse of his freedom, and 
1. Williams, GGMH, 147. 
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in actual experience it constitutes the greater problem of the 
two kinds of evil. "our abuse of nature is far worse than 
nature's abuse of us. rtl 
The precariousness arising out of the nature of freedom 
and the precariousness of nature are both necessary conditions 
f 
of growing persons. Ferre wauld make this precariousness the 
necessary condition under which men are driven from self-
security, through despair, to God's security. With some 
theistic and non-theistic existentialists he can agree that 
suffering and despair is a necessary stage in the growth of 
one who truly comes to grips with the realities of life. 
High religion is comforted despair.2 
Suffering is our participation in the costly decision 
of life without which, whether self-chosen or imposed, 
we never come to the critical self-despair which can 
lead us out of our individualism to fellowship, and 
out of personal self-sufficiency to worship.3-
Man can and must be driven into the lowlands of 
despair, driven by his own foolishness and fears, 
but any time he can let himself be drawn once there, 
up to the land of faith, up into the f~eedom and 
security of a God-grounded fellowship. 
Contrary to the atheistic existentialists, Ferre finds a 
power to assuage despair. Despair is mitigated by God's agape 
which can be partially appropriated by man here and now. Thus 
/ Ferre also differs from some nee-orthodox existentialists who 
make God the stern transcendent judge whose love is not avail-
able through religious experience. 
1. ECF, 97. 3. FR, 133. 
2. FR, 135. 4. ECF, 103. 
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In studying the history of Christian experience 'One can 
observe that many of those men who cried unto God out of the 
depths of despair became the great prophets who have given man 
new knowledge of the character of God. No one can deny that 
out of suffering and despair can come deeper meaning and under-
standing of God, but neither ought despair and suffering be 
made a necessary condition for the experience of God. To 
maintain that the experience of despair must precede a true 
experience of God is contrary to many of the religiously devoted 
saints of the church who in serenity and steady determination 
gave their lives to the service of mankind. The truth of 
various, yet adequate, types of religious experience must be 
recognized. If the Apostle Paul can be called the w~m of 
conflict, then the author of the Fourth Gospel can be known as 
the man of concord. As the story of the Vine and the Branches 
(John 15:lff.) suggests, for the author of the Fourth Gospel 
the spiritual life, life with God, was not an existential 
relationship in which man was put under a constant strain under-
neath the fluctuating manifestation of the love of God and the 
wrath of God; it was a continuous abiding in t he divine life, it 
was a quality of life which brought peace and serenity of mind • 
. The fact of death, says Ferre, is an important factor . 
in the problem of evil. No one can escape the fact of death 
and for many death is the most disturbing and final valley 
of despair. It is nature's cold hand which reaches out for 
everyone. J. S. Mill writes: 
Killing, the most criminal act recognized by 
human laws, nature does once to every being 
that lives .1 
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But death is the unavoidable valley of despair only for those 
who have not found their God-security. For those who can trust 
the God who revealed Himself in the life of Jesus, the God of 
perfect love and power, death becomes a friend rather than an 
enemy. The problem of tbeodicy becomes more acute when man is 
confronted with the bow and the when of death. But regardless 
of the how and when, death need not evoke doubt about the 
goodness of God. 
Our son may die more directly because of man's 
sinfulness or more indirectly because of the 
working of God's general providence, but this 
kind of world is for our own good and such death 
severs not from God.2 
Life after death is completely in God's hands. Man can 
trust witb all certainty that perfect love will perfect that 
wbicb He has begun bere. 11 He wants all to be saved, and His 
wants are never vain. 113 H. Wbeele~ Robinson believes 11 it is 
better not to speculate about ' Everlasting Punishment' or 
'Universal Restoration' or 1 Conditional Immortality', 114 but 
Ferre finds it necessary to go further. 
Without the ultimate salvation of all creatures, 
men ·and, we t b ink, animals, in God's time and way, 
it is easy to see that there can be no full solution 
of the problem of evil.5 
1. Mill, TER, 28. 4. Robinson , SHD, 80. 
2. ECF, 107. 5. ECF, 117. 
3. E CF, 117. 
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, 
That is why we have said elsewhere that heaven can 
be heaven only when it bas emptied bell.l 
Ferre regards the suffering of God as the most difficult 
aspect of the problem of suffering. If God is eternally 
creating does it not follow that He must suffer always? Would 
I 
He then not always have a creation with which to suffer? Ferre 
answers in the negative. God creates, not because He must, 
but because of His out-going and overflowing love which ultimately 
will be victorious. At this point one can question if agape, the 
overflowing and out-going love of God, must not find expression, 
or else lose its character as true agape. Even if God's creative 
activity is thought of more in terms of the expression of agape 
than the expression of reason, there is a sense in which one 
can rightly affirm that God must creah; namely, the moral 
sense. Ferre maintains that perfection lacks nothing and that 
the divine fellowship can be eternally rich and full within 
itself. But God with the world and with other selves is 
greater than without them, inasmuch as there i s an increase 
in value. It also follows that the divine fe l lowship is 
thereby richer and fuller because of the creation, and that 
perfectibility expresses the divine nature better than does 
perfection. 
I 
Ferre accepts the view that God suffers in history only. 
"Although the sufferingof God is real in history, it is 
nevertheless only temporary and incidental."2 He tends toward 
1. ECF, 119. 2. ECF, 75. 
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the position that God suffers as Son but not as Father. After 
his emphasis on the one God, it is not without difficulty that 
' 
be ·. can declare God suffering as Son but not as Father. 
, 
In thinking of the nature of God's suffering Ferre believes 
it significant that God's glory, joy, and power are always 
greater than His suffering. 
God bas no suffering from an imperfect wisdom, 
from a doubtful mind, from defensive fear, 
from anxiety ••• God 1 s suffering is completely 
out-going, through and through redemptive.l 
Ultimately the sufferings of both God and man will cease. 
Even in historic existence man's sufferings with relation to God 
cease in so far as he permits God's love to triumph. But even 
if his temptations from within cease, "yet his sufferings from 
the flesh and from others remain. They can be ended only by 
the cessation of historic e~perience."2 Thus in God's own way 
and time beyond history suffering will have fulfilled its 
purpose; it will cease to exist for both God and man, and the 
suffering in history will be but as a drop in the great ocean 
of glory which awaits man. 
4. Evil and The Existential and Rational 
Perspective 
Of the different problems that confront the theologian 
and the philosopher, the problem of evil is especially one that 
demands existential thinking. In thinking about evil and 
1. ECF, 74. 2. ECF, 87. 
suffering one is dealing with man's central problem both in 
thought and in life. . ' I Here, says Ferre, only a living truth 
will satisfy. Speculation may throw light on the problem 
but it cannot grapple with it in the same manner as a living 
decision. When suffering, pain, and evil are seen in retro-
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spect, it must be remembered that it is done so, in part, as 
an abstraction from the concrete experience. "Detachment here 
is death to trutb."l 
The writer can agree that with respect to the solution of 
the problem of evil ultimately experience alone affords the 
insight and adds the grace of clinching conviction2 but rather 
than make detachment death to truth, be would maintain that 
complete detachment is impossible and that a certain degree 
of detachment is desir~able. No interpretation can escape 
involving . some degree of detachment. Certain detachment is 
desirtable because feeling and intuition, important as they 
are, cannot stand alone as the criterion of truth. Nor must 
the detachment which reason requires be thought of in terms 
of indifference. 
Rational objectivity is not a lack of concern 
but rather a disciplined control of emotional 
factors such as, to a greater gr lesser degree, 
are almost invariably present. 
Ferre believes that the fullest use of reason or rational 
interpretation is a discipline which must be applied to the 
1. ECF, 1. 3. DeWolf, RAR, 108. 
2. ECF, 2. 
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problem of evil as to all others, but that it falls short of 
giving man the necessary equipment to face the problem of 
disvalue. 
God's ultimate victory, the identification of 
God the Creator with God the Redeemer and with 
God the Conqueror of evil, is, of course, a 
_bold venture of faith. Surely it cannot be 
arrived at thlough a rational interpretation 
of actuality. 
I For Ferre the most adequate approach to the problem of 
evil is the combined approach from the explanatory and 
existential perspective. Man needs some explanation, some 
speculative theory about the nature of evil because no action, 
commitment, or decision should take place without some rational 
justification. But no abstract knowledge can give the final 
answer to man's encounter with evil for it is a deeply personal 
encounter, and must therefore find its solution in whole-
thinking and whole-response. At its most critical point the 
problem of evil is not even a philosophical one, because 
philosophizing seeks a theoretical answer which abstracts from 
the practical and concrete situation. "The solution can be had 
only in the sanctuary of the surrendered life struggling with 
and under God against evil."2 A. C. Knudson similarly writes: 
"The renunciation of a theoretical solution of the problem of 
evil, however, does not preclude a practical solution of it."3 
1. CFE, 96. 3. Knudson, DR, 220. 
2. ECF, 125. 
The explanatory and existential perspectives require and 
supplement each other. Neither the one or the other can be 
made primary. Both are essential parts of one event which is 
I 
whole-response. Ferre declares; 
The solution lies in the living synthesis of the 
explanatory and the existential perspective made 
effectual only through deepened c.oncern and trust 
within the family fellowship of God.l 
From the explanatory perspective one is able to see that 
there is no purposeless suffering "in the sense that freedom 
and the continual disciplining of our experience, individual 
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and social, are altogether necessary to effect the final 
fellowship. 11 2 Ferre agrees that purposeless suffering is indeed 
evil, but affirms that one cannot fully know what purpos.eless 
suffering is. An evil e.y:ent is but one word of a whole story, 
and He who writes the story knows its position and relation, 
but a finite being does not know the whole process. What is 
in process has been made possible by God, and all events of 
the past, present, and future must be organically related to 
His final and full purpose. Animal pain, an idiot, or the 
extravagance of the creative process are no exceptions. 
Suffering becomes purposeless oniy for those who view it in 
too low a perspective. 
From the existential perspective there is evident, however, 
much needless suffering. Wherever man causes suffering by 
careless action, or refuses to resist such forces as 9PP~ession 
1. ECF, 125. 2. ECF, 127. 
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or ignorance, ~e multiplies the world 1 s needless suffering. 
The synthesis between the ezistential and ezplanatory 
perspective is the dynamic synthesis between life and thought. 
I Concerning this synthesis Ferre writes favorably of Kierkegaard 
inasmuch as the latter stressed the primacy of life, acts, and 
decisions, and then insisted upon deep thought and reflection 
to steady and direct life and decision. 1 Mere reflection or 
speculation corrupts and thus "the explanatory perspective 
gives way to the existential. Yet the ezistential, critical 
as it is, must ever be superarched by the explanatory.n2 
To experience the fruits of the Cross and the warmth of 
fellowship tempered by the trials and afflictions of life 
is to solve the problem ezistentially, and to understand that 
God cannot produce the fruits of the Cross without it, and 
that character can only be built in the stream of life, amidst 
trials and buffeting, is to solve the problem from the 
ezplanatory perspective. 
No adequate solution to the problem of evil can be had 
apart from an understanding of the meaning of the Cross. "The 
compossible must be solidly defined in terms of the highest, 
most conclusive, and most inclusive symbol, the life, teachings, 
and Cross of Christ."3 It is the love symbolized on the Cross 
that makes experience through and through transmutable. 
Ferre's approach to the problem of evil from the existential 
and explanatory perspective is one of the most realistic and 
1. ECF, 128. 3. ECF, 132. 
2. ECF, 128. 
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challenging attempts to solve the problem in both life and 
thought. By existential perspective be means essentially 
thinking that grows out of intense personal living, decisions 
arising out of first band experience with suffering, and deep 
personal concern for one's fellow men. In existential thinking 
these depth experiences of man must be seen in relation to 
God's agape, the life, teaching, and work of Christ culminating 
in the victory over the Cross. 
By explanatory perspective be means thinking that grows 
out of the reflective or speculative approach. Here be means 
essentially armchair philosophy. Both perspectives require 
each other; the existential solves the problem in living and 
doing, and the explanatory solves it in thought and speculation. 
1 
"Without knowing we cannot do; without doing we cannot know." 
Through his ex i stential use of reason, Ferre seems to 
have caught the deep underlying pathos of human existence 
' 
whi ch often escapes the more rationalistic or speculative 
approach. Not only bas be shown himself sensitive to the 
suffering of mankind, but also pointed to a living faith and 
courageous trust in the goodness of God through whom suffering 
can be trans.formed and used for the creating of fellowship. 
Through the experience o.f pain, guilt, or suffering, mental 
· or physical, man can come before the presence of God as 
nowhere else. This does not mean that man must first experience 
1. ECF, 128. 
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despair or be miserable before be can know God, but it does mean 
that the depth of suffering can be transformed into the height 
of divine e~perience. It also means that the e~planatory 
perspective cannot always do justice to the fact of inwardness 
because religious experience has within it the aspect of 
uniqueness as well as universality. 
/ One of the shortcomings of Ferre's method is his tendency 
to think of the philosopher as the calm and cold calculator 
who disregards the significance of the e~istential. He declares, 
Some are interested in knowing for its own sake. 
These are philosophers. They speiulate and try 
to solve the problem objectively. 
Thus Ferre is unfair to philosophy in failing to give due 
recognition to the . e~ istential import that is present in the 
religious thought of many philosophers. 
Another shortcoming of Ferre's method with respect to the 
problem of evil is his use of the e~planatory and e~istential 
perspective beyond their proper scope. It is because of bis 
extreme use of the speculative perspective that it becomes 
necessary to overemphasize the existential. This is evident as 
he imputes necessity to sin, and purpose to all suffering. He 
writes: "Rebellion against God is necessary at some point in 
our lives if we are to become free sons. 1'2 
He maintains that God weights the self toward selfishness, 
makes the law impossible, and surrounds man with a precarious 
1. ECF, 123. 2. ECF, 33. 
163 
environment so that man will rebel but have tbe freedom to 
return to his Father. Both natural evil and sin thus have a 
function in God's purpose to create fellowship, and suffering, 
rightly understood, can become a gift from God. 
The question, therefore, whether God is responsible for 
sin must be answered by both yes and no. This extreme 
speculative interpretation must have as its counter-part the 
existentialist emphasis. Sin and evil are necessary but 
existentially it is wrong that man allows sin to reign. Sin, 
suffering, and evil from the explanatory perspective are the 
1 
will of God, and suffering can be accepted as a gift of God, 
but existentially all men ought to be committed to eliminate 
evil and suffering in their life and in the lives of others. 
It appears that such a view attempts to explain too much. 
It does harm to the meaning of sin, freedom, and the differen-
tiation between good and evil. R. A. Tsanoff writes: 11Evil 
is not 'somehow good', more than sinking is somehow rising."2 
If all evil is good in God's hand, then evil is an instrumental 
good and man is confronted with the problem if any value is 
really good. 
1. ECF, 10'7. 2. Tsanoff, NOE, 397. 
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CHAPTER VII 
TRUTH: A 'LIVING' SYNTHESIS OF KNOWLEDGE 
AND FAITH 
Science, Ferre adequately shows, cannot say anything 
conclusive about the ultimate nature of reality. At best it 
can only describe the physical-historical world. The great 
hope of science, Ferre rightly indicates, is t he recognition 
by many scientists that their limited method is in danger of 
becoming a limited dogma, and "that the equation of scientific 
method with a naturalistic metaphysics is not in itself 
scientific. 111 
Neither theoretically nor practically can science be the 
answer to our most difficult problems. Scientific knowledge 
and technological progress cannot bring in the day of brother-
hood. Science and technology are instruments in man's hands to 
· be used for good or ill. It was hoped that they might usher in 
the order of world fellowship, but man has experienced 
that the tools in his hands could be used by demons 
to destroy his material achievement, to let loose 
floods of hate and division, and to t urn him back 
toward t he moral jungle. Never was civilization so 
broadly and deeply threatened as in the brightest 
day of scientific achievement.2 
If science cannot show man the sovereign way to truth, then 
to what more competent alternative can he turn? In his setting 
1. RC, 3. (All references in this 
chapter are to Ferre, unless 
otherwise noted.) 
2. RC, 4. 
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forth of the limitations of science Ferre writes: "Never have 
men bad the chance to see so clearly that apart from moral 
1 purpose reason can be prostituted for the lowest ends." One 
may then ask, Is it not the task of philosophy to consider the 
universe and the moral purpose in it, to determine what is 
wisdom in conduct, and thereby make philosophy the significant 
way to truth? Ferre invites science and philosophy to contribute 
as much understanding and light as possible, yet because 
philosophy cannot supply tbe transforming power needed, and 
since "truth probably is as much of a verb as a noun, an acting 
as a being, at least some combination of the two," 2 the more 
excellent way to truth is through religion, or through theology 
which is the interpretation of religion. Metaphysics is the 
most disciplined attempt to give a rational account of reality, 
but metaphysics must lead to religion or falsify itself. 
In the above definition in which truth is as much a verb 
as a noun, an acting as a being, it is evident that here Ferre 
is more interested in the nature of truth than the criterion 
of truth. His primary concern is the ethical-religious meaning 
of truth rather than the logical-ep~temological meaning of truth. 
He is interested not so much with truth defined as the correspond-
ence of idea with its object, or as the right relation of belief 
to other facts 3 but as dynamic and critical whole-response in 
which the spirit of man finds harmony in reality. This is 
1. RC, 4. 3. Russell, HKSL, 148. 
2. FR, 10-11. 
essentially what be means by truth as a 'living ' synthesis of 
faith and reason,l of form and fact. 2 
1. Tbe Objective and Subjective Aspects of Truth 
The problem of the 'objective' and 'subjective' is one 
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of the perennial problems of philosophy and theology. Tbe term 
subjective bas traditionally been thought of in relation to 
philosophy whereas subjectivity bas generally been applied to 
religion. The main difference that Ferre would make between 
philosophy and theology appears to be with respect to the 
subjective factor. It is not that philosophy does not consider 
the subjective. "We have said, after all, that the subjective 
yields no knowledge which philosophy cannot have. 11 3 But it is 
the manner in which philosophy must deal with tbe subjective 
that constitutes the crux of the problem. 
Ferre believes the running controversy between the 
subjectivists and objectivists will be intensified in the 
future, but there is a third approach which can show us the 
way out. It is the understanding of a proper relation between 
the theoretical and existential perspectives. Over-emphasis 
on either objectivity or subjectivity bas its peculiar pitfall. 
Thus Ferre seeks a mediating position. "Adequate knowledge 
must be a careful blend and balance of subjective and objective. n4 
i. The Fallacy of Pure Subjectivity and Pure Existentialism. 
Ferre warns about following too closely Kierkegaard's view 
1. FR, 201. 3. FR, 121. 
2. FR, 195. 4. FR, 74. 
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that "truth is subjectivity,"l or Berdyaev 1 s similar assertion 
that 11 the mystery of reality is not solved by concentrating on 
the object, but by reflecting on the action of the subject." 2 
, 
For Ferre philosophy is essentially the balcony view of 
life, and this theoretical approach is necessary for the 
understanding of religion. "Those who mean to strengthen 
religion by destroying philosophy know not what they do."3 
Subjectivism which contradicts objective thinking cannot be 
considered as knowledge. William James made too much of our 
emotions and passions when he held that they .fix our beliefs 
beforehand.4 Neither philosopher nor theologian can escape 
from using his own experience, but such private experience 
must always be checked by its systematic and coherent relation 
to the whole of public knowledge. 
Pure existentialism like the Kierkegaardian type seeks 
refuge within the immediacy of experience. It cuts the Christian 
faith from the level of intellectual inquiry and makes it a 
passionate personal surrender which is absurd to human reason. 
Such an extreme existentialism wounds and falsifies religion. 
Ferre can agree with the main emphasis made in Emil 
Brunner's interpretation of revelation. He can accept the theme 
developed by Brunner that revelation is primary, that if one 
starts with natural reason, revelation appears absurd, while to 
begin with revelation sets reason free to do its full work. 
1. Kierkegaard, CUP, 187. 
2. Berdyaev, SR, 4, cited by 
Ferre, FR, 74. 
3. FR, 118. 
4. FR, 13. 
168 
But there is too much obscurity in Brunner's definition and use 
o£ reason in his development o£ the I-Tbou relationship. 
Brunner's stress on direct encounter has passed 
beyond its intrinsic truth to a falsely full and 
therefore misleading perspective. A pure existen-
tialism1simply cannot deal at all adequately with 
reason. 
It may be asked in what respect · Ferre's use of "existen-
tialn differs from his view of the subjective aspect of truth. 
Subjectivity has the tendency to make either emotions, action, 
or will the decisive instruments for truth. Truth must be 
"truth for me." Subjectivity becomes irrational when it 
regards the use of reason as a rationalization and weakening 
of faith. Existentialism recognizes emotions, actions, and 
will as constituting necessary aspects o£ a living truth, but 
it is aware that they are false guides when taken independently. 
It seeks an ideal relation between passion, will, and reason. 
Ferre's existential thinking is thus a rejection of both extreme 
Hegelianism and Kierkegaard's extreme subjectivity, as well as 
much that goes by the name of nee-orthodoxy. 
ii. The Truth in Subjectivity. 
Ferre admonishes that the necessity of the reflective and 
objective approach must not blind thinkers to the significance 
of the subjective in their thinking. The emphasis be makes on 
a proper blend between the objective and subjective is well 
taken and worthy of further consideration and development. It 
1. Rev.(l946),25. 
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is basically an attempt to render proper recognition of all 
our faculties for experience. Ferre is right in showing that 
the various faculties work togetber, that reason without emotion 
and will results in a dry intellectualism which tends to 
separate truth from life. 
Truth is of the "inward parts" ••• Trutb is an active 
right relation of whole-response. When we make too 
much of reason to the negle.ct of the emotions or the 
will we invite a dry, academic attitude which is both 
artificial and false to the main areas of knowledge. 
Intellectualism is the absence of living trutb.·l 
Some practical illustrations can be offered which, it is 
believed, support Ferre's analysis. A husband, for example 
may know every good reason why be should love his wife, be 
devoted to her, and enrich her life and his in a creative 
fellowship. He may be a recognized authority on marriage 
harmony and family counseling. If, however, in his own 
marriage relation be refuses or is unable to give his reasons 
expression, he cannot know the full truth of harmony in marriage. 
Truth as whole-response rightly takes into account the correla-
tion that exists between knowing and doing. Never having 
experienced the color red or never having experienced a tooth-
ache, who could be taught by any group of men, no matter bow 
learned, the truth of either? The pangs of mental pain and 
suffering caused by an accidental shooting of one's brother, 
father, or mother can be fully known only by those who experience 
such a tragedy. If there is a personal God who cares completely 
1. FR, 12-13. 
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and beyond our imagination for every person whbm he creates, 
who is ready to measure the depth of religious experience which 
could come out of such a struggle with catastrophe? Such 
thinking is willing to recognize the truth that can exist in 
subjectivity. 
Just as action for its own sake is activism so emotion 
without reason is emotionalism, a power without direction. 
But if reason is to be regarded as the criterion of truth, 
it must always be within whole-response. "Reason must be the 
whole man thinking."l To equate reason with formal clarity 
would be to s_urrender to the temptation of objectivism and it 
would result in a failure to give full recognition to "the 
richness of experience which refuses to be coined into words. 112 
There are sections of life which can never be shared, "not 
only the way we can never experience tbe qualitative givenness 
of any sensation or situation of anyone else, but in the further 
sense that there is no public object for others to see."3 
Because such experiences c~nnot be shared, they cannot be 
adequately evaluated by philosophy for philosophy is "the sum 
and substance of rational knowledge."4 . Nor can knowledge be 
equated with truth. "Knowledge, being dynamic and from within 
a stage' of process, points toward faith; but truth cannot be 
fully known, for to us it is not yet fully here."5 It appears 
1. FR, 14. 4. FR, 122. 
2. FR, 16. 5. FR, 122. 
3. FR, 73. 
171 
I that Ferre would make this observation peculiar to religious 
truth. However, this is also true of philosophical and scienti-
fic truth, as is also his affirmation that truth is a synthesis 
of faith and knowledge. 
The importance of the subjective aspect of truth becomes 
evident with respect to self-knowledge. Paul E. Johnson 
competently classifies three views of psychological investiga-
tion: the subjective view which studies mind from within, the 
objective view which studies mind from without, the synoptic 
view, which finding neither subjective introspection nor 
objective measurement adequate alone, employs the truths of 
both. 1 
There are difficulties that arise from the atomistic and 
static aspects of the older school of structural psychology but 
these have been eliminated by Gestalt psychology in its emphasis 
on dynamic wholes. One cannot abandon introspection for the 
objectivism of behaviorism and extreme functionalism. Intro-
spection is the firsthand data of consciousness necessary to 
the understanding of other persons. "To comprehend the motives 
and feelings of others, one must infer from his own." 2 Self-
knowledge is not a popular form of knowledge because it is a 
painful and uncomfortable investigation. It is basically 
subjective, introspective, an inner searching which uncovers 
man's rationalizations. 
1. Johnson, POR, 20-23. 2. Johnson, POR, 21. 
Ferre speaks favorably of the theme of John A. Mackay's 
book, Preface to Christian Theology, which he interprets as 
expressing the idea that 
truth can be found, not on the balcony view with 
its detachment, but on the very road of spiritual 
struggle. Faith is a necessary medium of that 
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fuller kn£wledge which can come only from existential 
thinking. 
iii. Is Ferre an Epistemological Monist or Dualist? 
The problem of the objective and subjective aspects of 
truth cannot be adequately dealt with apart from epistemology. 
The epistemological monist with the exception of the panobjec-
tivists will be inclined to lay greater stress on the subjective 
aspect of truth. For example, Hocking's case for the origin and 
authority of religion in feeling rather than intellect. It is 
true that after establishing his case for feeling as opposed to 
intellectualism, be then proceeds to show bow "feeling bas need 
of idea"2 and bow it is fulfilled in "whole-idea", but his 
strong stress on the subjective aspect of truth is evident as 
be declares: 
The real substance of that subject is something 
other than intellect ••• Tbat which in human nature 
is fundamental, intimate, genuine, private, and 
wholly owned is feeling: in feeling we substantially 
exist.3 
Religion is a matter of feeling ••• a name for whatever 
in consciousness, deeper than explicit thought, is 
able to give a bent to conduct. Feeling is not, 
1. Rev. (1941), 218. 3. Hocking, MGHE, 44. 
2. Hocking, MGHE, 77. 
as we sometimes think it, a wholly vague and 
uncertain principle: it is capable of bearing 
much responsibility in tbe direction of practical 
living.l 
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On tbe other band tbe epistemological dualist will tend to 
give pre-eminence to tbe objective factor. To date Ferre bas 
not published any full treatment on tbe subject of epistemology 
and any approach to his epistemological position would bave to 
be gathered from various sources. There is some evidence of 
epistemological monism in his writing, yet it would bave to be 
qualified as a critical monism of the D. C. Macintosh type.2 
Ferre is not in sympathy with those wbo bold that God and 
other selves are known only by method of inference, or tbat 
God cannot be experienced directly. Ferre writes: 
As far as the struggle between the iw~ediate and tbe 
mediate knowledge of God is concerned, tbe issue is 
not so sharp as it seems. All reality, before it 
can become knowledge, must at some time be directly 
experienced. Wben it is so experienced, some 
interpretation arises at once. Any developed degree 
of knowledge, consequently, bas a background of 
personal and social interpretation in terms of larger 
experience. It thus contains a mediate aspect. But 
no matter wbetber this interpretation clarifies or 
distorts tbe reality, tbe reality itself is still 
directly experienced. In this way the interpretation 
can be corrected and developed. As far as religious 
experience goes we must insist both on tbe reality of 
immediate experience, and also on tbe intervening 
interpretation.3 
Ferre can agree with J. M. Moore that immediate experience 
is conditioned by previous experience, but he cogently observes 
that "to explain religious ideas in immediate experience merely 
1. Hocking, MGHE, 33. 3. Rev.(l940~ 636. 
2. See Macintosh, PRK. 
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in terms of antecedent experience is to be guilty of an infinite 
regression."1 
Some thinkers use kno·wledge to mean the immediate awareness 
of the experience itself; others use knowledge only for the 
, 
developed ipterpretation. The danger of the latter, says Ferre, 
even tbougb it seems preferable from a critical point 
of view, is that it makes many people think that since 
our knowledge of God is mediated by a long history, we 
now therefore have no r eal and direct experience of 
Him. In any case the reali~y of tbe religious experi-
ence must be insisted upon. 
A revolt against the inference theory as the way of knowing 
God is especially made by John Baillie in bis book, Our Knowledge 
of God. To the question, how, then, do we know God, Baillie 
declares: 
Not by reasoning from imperfect situations to the 
perfection of God's being. Not by inference from 
the fluttering knowledge of man's immediate aware-
ness and cumulative interpretations. Not by 
inference from tbe dusky dimness of man's belief . 
and flickering consciousness. It is not as a result 
of an inference of any kind, whether explicit or 
implicit, whether laboriously excogitated or swiftly 
intuited, that the knowledge of God's reality comes 
to us. It comes rather through our direct ~ersonal 
encounter with Him in the person of Christ. 
" Ferre is in general agreement with this view. However, be 
lays greater stress on tbe constructive and creative power of 
tbe mind. Tbe mind bas a greater capacity both through inference 
and through an intuitive grasp to relate itself to objective 
reality than Baillie is willing to allow. Nevertheless, in 
1. Rev.(l939)1,451. 
2. Rev. (1940), 636. 3. Baillie, KOG, 14~. 
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defense and in sympathy with Baillie be writes: 
Now, it must not be though~ that on this account there 
is no room for strict reasoning or careful inference. 
Baillie insists on the necessity of such inference but 
maintains, and with every right, that unless there is 
some element of immediacy in our knowledge of God, we 
have no knowledge of Him.l 
God reveals himself constantly through nature but what God 
is cannot be known through His effects. What He really is as 
a person can best be understood in other persons and most fully 
through the person of Christ. According to Baillie God seeks 
man through Christ in a "mediated immediacy". 2 "Mediated 
immediacy 11 also expresses most adequately Ferre's view, not 
6nly with reference to knowledge of God, but all knowledge. 
~ It bas already been said that Ferre believes an immediate 
experience of God is available to man. Christ as the incarnation 
of God's agape mediates to us the nature of God. The agape of 
Christ is the very agape of God. But God is not the far-off 
God whom man once saw in the person of Jesus. Man can here and 
now, in some degree, appropriate the agape of Christ and in so 
doing there is accessible to him an immediate experience of God. 
From the above context it can be said that Ferre's 
epistemology is a mediating position between epistemological 
monism and dualism. The danger of the former is to make 
immediate awareness equivalent to interpreted knowledge, and 
the danger of the latter is to forget the organic relatedness 
of the whole. 
1. Rev.(l939)2,1228. 2. Rev.(l939)~ 1228. 
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Tbis mediating view is also adhered to with regard to 
the widely disputed definition of truth as a correspondence 
between idea and reality. Otto Rank, approaching the problem 
of truth from a psychological analysis, asserts that both truth 
and doubt have nothing to do with reality, rather they both 
stand in opposition to it. Truth is what man believes or 
affirms and reality is what penetrates consciousness and can 
influence man only by the way of the emotional becoming either 
truth or falsehood. Rank maintains that 
the only "trueness" in terms of actual psychic 
reality is found in emotion, not in thinking, 
which at best denies or rationalizes truth, and 
not necessarily in action unless it follows from 
feeling and is in harmony with it.l 
Such recognition given here to the truth in subjectivity 
Ferre can uphold, but this separation of truth and reality can 
hardly be his view inasmuch as be can say that 11 :Vfuitebead rightly 
defines truth as 'the conformation of appearance to reality'. it,2 
Yet there is enough evidence in Ferre's writings that his notion 
of truth is more than correspondence. Correspondence means, 
basically, that man can attain knowledge of reality, but 
primarily through belief about it. / Ferre, however, as already 
indicated, maintains that there is an element of immediacy in 
knowledge. In this respect be would be nearer to the position 
of F. H. Bradley for whom the identity of truth, knowledge, and 
reality, raises difficulties, but must, nevertheless, be taken 
as necessary. 
1. Rank, TR, 80. 2. CFE, 88. 
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F. H. Bradley rejects tbe notion of truth as copying 
because facts "are manufactured by a mind wbicb abstracts one 
aspect of tbe concrete wbole, and sets this abstracted aspect 
out by itself as a real thing," and furthermore, he adds, "if 
truth is to copy fact, tben truth at least seems to be in fact 
unattainable."1 Ferre's thought is reflected by the following 
·remarks of Bradley concerning knowledge tbrougb i~nediate 
experience: 
\ e in short bave experience in wbicb there is no 
distinction between my awareness and that of wbicb 
it is aware.2 
For it is in tbe end ruin to divide experience into 
something on one side experienced as an object and 
on tbe other side something not experienced at all.3 
Bradley does not say tbat experience is ever merely 
immediate. "Outside tba.t of wbicb a man is aware, there is, 
I agree, a larger world of experience."4 Man cannot experience 
tbe total content of tbis world. If be were to do so, tben 
tbe finite self would be destroyed. Tbe conclusion finally 
accepted is tbat tbe separation of idea and being, tbe 
distinction between what an idea is and what it stands for is 
both essential and fatal to truth. Thus for Bradley, and it is 
r believed the same can be said for Ferre, 
truth is not perfect until tbis sundering of aspects 
is somehow made good, until that wbich in fact is, 
forms a consistent wbole with that wbicb it stands 
for and means. In other words truth demands at once 
1. Bradley, ETR, 108. 3. Bradley, ETR, 160. 
2. Bradley, ETR, 159. 4. Bradley, ETR, 173. 
the essential difference and identity of ideas 
and reality.l 
2. Truth as a Synthesis of Faith and Knowledge 
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Both philosophy and theology ultimately rest on what must be 
termed faith. No matter if one speaks of objective or subjective 
knowledge, or of a harmonious combination of both, knowledge is 
not to be prematurely equated with truth. Therefore Ferre would 
reject the affirmation that "we shall identify, 'truth' with 
'warranted belief' and, therefore, with 1 knowledge 1 • 11 2 Contrary 
to this be rightly maintains that there is yet unknown truth. 
Truth must at .-ileast "be such knowledge as we have, and if process 
and becoming are no illusion, then there must also be ::lOme unknown 
truth, some truth which is, but is yet to become knowledge for 
man. Truth is a combination of actuality and realizability. It 
must ever be present process plus what is beyond present process 
but relative to it. 
What then is the standard of truth? / Ferre recognizes that 
it is nonsense to think we can evade starting from the human 
standpoint, but he adds that neither self nor reason can be 
the criterion of truth. 
Self is, of course, more than reason and is, therefore, 
a better standard for truth than reason is. Personal-
ism is bigger and truer than rationalism •.• But to start 
by assuming self or assuming reason a s the final stand-
ard of truth is to start our task with a presupposition, 
if not necessarily a prejudice.3 
; Ferre equates right reason with rational knowledge 
1. Bradley, ETR, . 251. 3. FR, 25 . 
2. Werkmeister, BSK, 152. 
or philosophy. Right reason leaves the door open for any 
creative thinking or illumination of reason by prayer, 
inspiration, revelation, or any other means which might add 
179 
to knowledge. Right reason thought of in this manner makes 
both reason and experience acceptable standards of truth, yet 
one cannot confine full truth to right reason. "Truth may go 
beyond right reason even while using it as fully as possible 
both critically and creatively."l Right reason is a necessary 
aspect of faith's total inquiry which is whole-response and 
includes emotion and action as well. 
On the other band Ferre can agree with A. E. Murphy that 
while we welcome any aid that faith can bring to 
reason, we shall have to ask that faith to identify 
itself and to present its credentials.2 
Whole-response is open to inspection and therefore from the 
perspective of whole-response faith is also a part of reason. 
Truth is thus a synthesis of faith and reason, or as L. Harold 
DeWolf declares, 
Only by the union of reason and faith in the service 
of God can we hope both to know the Truth and to be 
free.3 
Whole-response especially demands that what is most 
important must also be most real. Philosophy and particularly 
the value approach is competent to indicate what are the true 
·values and bow important they are to religion. This, however, 
says Ferre, is only a one-sided approach. Philosophy can set 
1. FR, 23. 3. DeWolf, RAR, 212. 
2. Murphy, UR, 12. 
180 
forth the ideals, but it cannot say enough about the power 
that can transform a man's life in the attempt to realize them. 
Ideals can draw one forward and set goals, but they cannot 
forgive. Only in an act of faith can the ideal become more 
powerful than the actual. 
Inasmuch as the ultimate cannot be proved, truth for each 
person is basically a faith judgment. Even after man's best 
reasoning and striving, after his careful attempt to interpret 
all experience coherently, the ultimate is ever a matter of 
existential decision. "Truth in the last analysis is an 
existential ultimate."1 It is the relationship of each 
individual to all others, and from tbe religious viewpoint it 
is tbe unique relationship of each individual to God. Exis-
tentially speaking, it is a 
living, dynamic relation, constantly changing 
according to his concrete choices. The particular 
dimension of being in which one stands cannot be 
exactly duplicated. Therefore the content of truth 
varies with each viewer and with each decider.2 
This must not be taken as a denial of absolute truth; for Ferre 
it is rather the evidence of the relative nature and existen-
tiality of truth for -finite beings. 
Every person responds to what be thinks is most true and 
most real. The important question is what out there to which 
man responds can rightfully be considered tbe standard of truth. 
It would be easier, Ferre believes, if one could consider 
1. FR, 124. 2. cs, 155. 
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everything to which man reacts as equally real. 11 If we could 
only say that 'the truth is tbe whole' and leave it tberel" l 
Then one could set it aside and attempt a full description of 
it. 
Since not all that man reacts or responds to is equally 
real and true, by what criterion can be attain truth? Ferre 
examines three different approaches. The first attempts to 
explain process by that which came first; it is essentially 
the scientific method. The second is the interpretation of 
process by means of that which is here and now actual, and the 
I last and most adequate, according to Ferre, is interpretation 
by means of the most significant emergent or arrival in process. 
The first two try to explain our existence from 
within process, from within rational knowledge. 
The last gathers all knowledge it can from process 
and finds that this reaches out for explanation 
of itself beyond process.2 -
A philosophy which bas coherence as a standard, and which 
thereby would include a philosophy of time, must consider 
all three methods set forth by Ferr~. The most significant 
emergent or arrival in process as well as all the ideals 
must be interpreted by the philosophical method. Plato's 
theory of Forms is a clear illustration of philosophy 
gathering all the knowledge it can from present process and 
its reaching out beyond present process for an explanation. 
The most significant emergence indicates most accurately 
1. FR, 21-22. 2. FR, 159. 
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in what direction the process is going. And because it is most 
significant, satisfying most fully the needs of whole-response, 
/ Ferre maintains that it cannot be explained from within process 
alone. The ripest part of the fruit alone indicates what the 
ripe fruit can be. It is not all experience that is our 
criterion of truth, rather the selective ideal-actual, the 
most high as the most real, is the criterion of all experience, 
and the surest indication of the direction of process. "The 
selective ideal-actual is more true than the totality which is 
set up to judge it."1 
That there are ideals or significant emergences which judge 
/ 
man can be readily conceded, but the method whereby Ferre would 
establish these ideals and emergences as the selective ideal-
actual raises difficulties. Even if the alleged selective 
ideal-actual is 11 given", before it can be accepted as the 
criterion of truth it must be tested as to its adequacy for 
meeting man's need and for the ordering of the whole of 
experience. It must not be selected arbitrarily. Why should 
the selective ideal-actual be regarded a better clue to the 
nature of reality than all experience including experience of 
ideals and selective actuals? Does not the selective become 
selective because on the basis of all experience it points most 
coherently in the direction in which process ought to go? The 
totality of experience must confirm what ideals and emergences 
1. FR, 185. 
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are to be regarded as selective. Thus the totality of experience 
judges and is judged. It does not deny the coming into experi-
ence of the new and the novel, the more and less significant. 
Even if 11 tbe highest can be explained in no terms less than 
itself 11 1 it is only through the test of the whole of experience 
~bat it can be accredited as the highest. 
Reason, says Ferre, is one such emergent which can only 
be explained in terms of itself, and without which there could 
be no interpretation at all. There is thus a tendency to make 
reason the criterion of truth, but "reason finds a content 
which is even greater than itself."2 Reason is part of a living 
whole-response which is in interaction with the world around it. 
This greater content must answer the ultimate question of the 
why of process which is more important and prior to the bow. 
The ultimate cannot be proved and therefore no reason can be 
given for its existence. This is the existential crux of the 
problem of meaning. Yet, the ultimate cannot be totally other. 
If it is, what right have we to claim reality for ourselves? 
Ferre maintains that the most high is another emergence 
which bas come into history. It is relevant to present process 
but cannot be explained fron1 within it. Because it bas come, 
it can be known that a superbistorical and supernatural realm 
exists. The most high is other than the totality of the process 
and bas the power to transform it. If there is to be adequate 
1. FR, 198. 2. FR, 198. 
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authority and motivation, the most high must also be the most 
real, that is, the ideal that draws man must not only show him 
the way, but must also give him the power to accept it as real 
and to realize it in some measure. The ideal alone is not 
enough. The power or truth that saves must be ezistential. 
11 It must be something to which we must bow because it grips us 
with the intensity of a mystic intuition, subduing us."1 Man 
knows that he is confronted with realities which always retain 
a sense of mystery the more he ponders them. Man's reach is 
always beyond his grasp. 11 He knows all too well the truth or 
the old Chinese proverb that one cannot draw water from a 
deep well with a short rope. 11 2 
Since every human situation is different, because subjec-
tivity cannot be reduced to a rational system, because man's 
deepest thoughts cannot satisfy his deepest needs, man needs 
light from the outside. This light is given to man in the 
most significant emergent in the process of history, a 
selective ideal-actual, a given which ha,s greater content than 
reason. It is God's agape incarnated in Christ. Therefore 
man has an actual event for the center of his existential 
ultimate. It is a center that is personal, and is, therefore, 
man's most adequate actual whole-response. 
Yet it points immeasurably far beyond human 
personality ••• He mediates reality at its highest ••• 
He is our highest discontinuity, our truest 
1. FR, 207. 2. FR, 213. 
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difference from the preceding process. 1 
He is "the uniquely emergent message in history which fulfills, 
not in syllogisms but in life, not in theory but in grace and 
truth, all other messages. 112 
The most high as the most real for Ferre is God as agape. 
God's love is the 'really real' which must be taught according 
to its own nature. That which cannot be explained in terms 
less than itself, which has greater content than reason, and 
which must answer the ultimate question of the why of process 
is revelation. 
3. Christianity as God's Supreme Revelation 
i. Revelation and reason. 
Faith and reason are essentially human activities. They 
need and complement each other, but their proper synthesis 
can only be made in relation to revelation. "Faith and reason 
as human interpretations and responses are flooded over their 
banks by revelation."3 
There is no contradiction between revelation and reason. 
Reason in the broadest sense is any and all interpretations, 
and in this respect reason and revelation cannot be in conflict 
because they are on different sides of the process; reason is 
part of man's response and revelation is part of that to which 
he reacts. 11Antecedent to its arrival .the revelation is 
inaccessible to reason; consequent to it, however, it can be 
1. FR, 214. 3. ECF, 168. 
2. FR, 215. 
------- --- ----
understood and verified in life. 111 Revelation is not the 
enlightenment of passive minds which bring nothing from their 
own experience; at the same time, however, revelation is more 
than human discovery. 
Because Ferre believes revelation cannot be reduced to 
reason, be speaks of the various views of revelation as 
11 revelational antirationalisms"2 in contrast to the different 
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rationalisrnB. In revelation someth ing new breaks into history 
which thought cannot account for but can only accept as an 
emergence. 11Tbe new may be explained in terms of emergence 
or of revelation depending upon whether the problem is 
approached from the naturalistic or from the supernaturalistic 
point of view. 11 3 Ferr~ ha~ no objection to the concept of 
mystery or supernatural as necessary to an interpretation of 
revelation. 
Revelation is the eternal mystery to man of the 
eternally given. Human reason can reach up toward 
but never reach revelation; it can neither be God 
nor see from God's point of view.4 
Revelation is an apprebendable disclosure of the Absolute. 
Mystery there must be but it must not become more important than 
meaning. Ferre criticizes Paul Tillich for his "shedding and 
forfeiting of an adequate supernaturalism and personal revelation 
of God" 5 which he believes makes Tillich more sympathetic with 
modern philosophy and less at home with historic Christianity. 
1. CFE, 28. 
2. FR, 240-247. 
4. cs, 8. 
5. Rev. (1948)3,516. 
3. CFE , 27. 
---------- -
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I There is some obscurity in Ferre's affirmation that 
revelation is the eternal mystery1 and that at the s ame time 
Christianity "is the religion of revelation, not of mystery."2 
A similar obscurity is encountered when be declares, 
Even though revelation is primary and cannot be 
ultimately tested by reason, it can yet be 
tested in the secgndary sense by its organic 
relation to life, 
and at the same time asserts tha t "this incomparable majesty ••• 
and priority of God ••• must not be made an exercise for the 
teaching that ••• His revelation is a supra-rational act in 
bistory."4 It thus appears that revelation is mystery and 
yet it is not mystery; it is not supra-rational and yet it 
cannot be tested by reason. It is also difficult to under-
stand bow reason as criterion differs from the criterion of 
organic relation to life. 
/ It is, however, important to note that for Ferre only 
ultimately is reason incompetent to test revelation. He is 
concerned that revelation as God's creative activity be 
recognized as primary, and in this sense it is mystery, 
supernatural, and inaccessible to reason. In the secondary 
sense revelation is always the combined and co-operative 
activity of God and man. Ferre would avoid making revelation 
a 'disclosure' or a 'given' that is something altogether 
different from human effort or thought. Even Biblical 
1. cs, 8. 3. FR, 243. 
2. ECF, 148. 4. CFA, 32-33. 
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revelation is not sor.1et hing that is "absolutely and essentially 
••• opposite to the usual method of acquiring knowledge, by means 
of observation, research, and tbougbt."1 
If revelation is to have any meaning or purpose for man, 
it must lend itself to rational understanding. To sever 
revelation from man's rational understanding is to weaken and 
falsify religion. A similar approach to that of Ferre is made 
by George F. Thomas as be writes: 
Reason must also take the responsibility for 
interpreting the meaning of revelation independ-
ently in the light of the best Biblical scb~larsbip 
and of religious experience and reflection. 
Such revelation as man claims must be relevant to the 
immediate situation. It is because revelation satisfies 
''certain rational and experientiai needs"3 that man accepts 
its reality for the interpreting of the whole. 
ii. Christ as special revelation and as truth. 
Although God revealed Himself in nature and man in the 
past and continues to do so in the present, He revealed Himself 
most fully and completely in the person of Christ. It is the 
fact of Christ that gives the Christian faith its uniqueness, 
and its content of special revelation. 
The essence of the Christian Revelation is that 
somehow there came into historical awareness in 
the person of Jesus an understanding of God and 
His relation with men4whicb is unique in the history of the world. 
1. Brunner, RR, 23. 
2. Thomas, Art.(l951), 48. 3. CFE, 28. 4. CFE, 81. 
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The unique revelation in Jesus is not something irrational. 
It can be understood and verified, and supply us with power for 
an understanding of all experience. The revelation in Christ 
is an historical given and ultimately it is a mystery, "but yet 
reason must be used to interpr·et that givenness in every situa-
tion.111 
Christianity as man's ultimate religion is also man's 
ultimate truth. At the heart of the Christian faith is the 
conviction that the source or first principle of creation is 
agape, unlimited self-giving love which was also enacted in 
Christ's life and teachings. Ferre can say with the Fourth 
Gospel writer that "grace and truth came through Jesus Christ" 
(.;fohn 1:17). Thus be can write of "God's full truth in Cbrist,"2 
and also declare that 11 in Jesus tbe absolute truth bas been 
seen."3 
/ However, Ferre warns that this is no occasion to 11 make 
of Jesus an artificial man with God's full power and knowledge 
who could have taught us all about science and history."4 
The center of truth has been made known to us in Christ. 
This center of trutb is God's a gape. The truth of God's agape 
bas become obscured in traditional theology, often bidden in 
dogma and mythology. Ferre declares; 
It seems almost as though the Holy Spirit bad to 
develop science, history and rational philosophy 
(and that mostly outside the church) in order to 
crack this crust of traditional theology and set 
free the great truth of Christianity.5 
1. CFE, 128 . 4. CFA, 123. 
2. RC, 7. 5. RC, 7. 
3. CFA, 93. 
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In this respect Athens does have something to do with 
Jerusalem, but truth, Ferre declares, is not something contained 
in a philosophical system, as the Greek world bad dared to hope, 
nor in dogma; it is a kind of fellowship patterned after God's 
agape reflected in Christ. There is no question for Ferr~ 
about the necessity for man to use his intellectual capacities 
critically, creatively, and carefully, but the point that be 
wishes to rrake is that 
the God and ~.ather of our Lord Jesus Christ ••• 
can never be reduced to the kind of proof open 
to any science or philosophy that claims 
controlled conditions and adequate verification. 
He must be met, accepted, and understood in 
vision and power.l 
I In Ferre's thinking love is more equivalent to truth than 
reason. The emphasis on God as the rational whole is necessary, 
but man cannot set forth the claim to coherence or wholeness 
apart from the meaning and working of agape. More important 
than the interpretation God is reason, is the New Testament 
thought ''God is love" (I John 4:16). For Ferr~ "Agape is the 
truth. The truth is 'Agape." 2 Many a philosopher's treatment 
of the problem of truth often never mentions the word love, 
and if love is operative in and beyond process and purpose, 
Ferr~ rightly emphasizes truth in terms of this love. 
If reason attempts to answer the problem of the 'bow• · of 
creation and process, love answers the more ultimate question 
of the 'why'. According to Ferr~ the laws of reason are the 
1. RC, 11. 2. ECF, 153. 
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form of the Supreme Person; love is the content of the Supreme 
Person. From the viewpoint of finite creatures the very form 
of God cannot be known, but man can know the very content of 
God for His agape became incarnated in an historic person wb o 
lived and taught among men, and who has become truth for 
mankind. 
The definition of truth as a living synthesis of faith and 
knowledge is well taken but not always convincingly developed. 
There is no attempt on the part of the present writer to 
justify the removal of all mystery and all elements of the 
supernatural from religion and revelation. However, it is 
believed that Ferre's stress on the supernatural and on mystery 
can become less problematic if all given experience is regarded 
as revelation. Ultimately man is neither the source of his 
sensory experience nor his value experience. The sensory world 
is also a 'given' and therefore reason's task is to interpret 
the givenness in every situation whether it be sensory or value 
experience. 
The supernatural in Ferre's interpretation of revelation 
can also be reduc:ed to a more acceptable and dynamic view by 
a more empirical approach to the person of Jesus. If the true 
meaning of freedom and personality is to be retained, Jesus 
can be no exception to the principle that in appropriating or 
enacting God's given agape, reason must test the 'givenness' 
in relation to concrete situations. Rather than make the 
incarnation of God in Christ the distinct discontinuity 
imposed on the continuity of God's revelation and creative 
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activity, 1 it would be more correct to make the age of the 
prophets and the person of Jesus the apex of God's continuity 
in making Himself known to man. 
1. CFA, 124. 
CHAPTER VIII 
THEOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION 
1. Ferre as a Liberal 
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One of the most hazardous ventures in theological thinking 
is t h e separation of thinkers into various theological camps. 
To a large degree Ferre avoids this precarious undertaking 
by speaking of different approaches to theology rather than 
the individual thinkers. He maintains there are three main 
positions in Protestant theology: 
(1) The fundamentalistic, which is characterized 
by biblical literalism, or, its dialectic variety, 
by the rejection of general revelation and all 
rational and cultural alliances; (2) the liberal, 
which tends to dissolve revelation and reduce 
it to the reports of reason; (3} the nee-orthodox, 
which seeks for a new biblical solution beyond 
literalism and liberalism.l 
The first position, in which "dialectic variety" refers to 
Continental Lutheranism, especially Lundensian thought, Ferre 
believes to be too defensive, too inclined to worship the 
letter to the detriment of the spirit. It bas not faced 
squarely the issues raised by historical criticism and modern 
scholarship. However, be admonishes the readers that tbe 
weaknesses of traditional theology must not blind men to the 
truths which it bas to offer. The substance of its faith 
must be retained and made more effective intellectually and 
socially. 
1. Rev.(l941), 218. (All references in this chapter are to 
Ferre, unless otherwise noted.) 
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Ferre is also critical of both liberalism and neo-
orthodoxy, but considers himself more akin to the former. An 
article written by him for the Christian Century on "How My Mind 
Has Changed in the Past Ten Years" appeared under the title, 
"Beyond Liberalism and Neo-Orthodoxy."1 In his definition of 
liberalism he would differentiate between a true liberal and a 
false liberal, between Christian and extreme liberalism. 
A Christian liberal is one who in his honest quest 
for truth finds his mind and conscience mastered 
by Christ as the truth ••• He trusts God for new 
light on Christ in accordance with the new needs 
of every age and situation ••• For the Christian 
liberal Christ is the living Lord of the Bible. 
He c an accept no closed creed purporting to 
safeguard its teachings, but believes rather that 
the Holy Spirit will lead all seekers into ever 
fuller truth.2 
Ferre declares that the idea of God as redemptive love 
goes beyond man's rational knowledge, and at this stage he 
would part company with those liberals who make reason the 
ultimate criterion for religious truths. The philosophical 
arguments are helpful and adequate to give evidence of the 
existence of God; the value approach which makes God the 
creator and sustainer of value can establish the goodness of 
God, but the experience of forgiveness and redemption must 
come from a God of Love made known to man in the face of 
Christ and t he Christian experience. 
If by liberalism is meant merely an open and critical 
mind which refuses to abandon the full use of reason, then 
1. Art.(l949), 362-364 . 2. Art.(l944)1, 456. 
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Ferre would always remain a liberal. There was a time1 wben be 
considered himself a typical liberal, and tbis liberalism meant 
that man was naturally good and that human reason was tbe 
sharpest instrument for discerning religious truths. At that 
time be rebelled against Nygren's point of view that agape, God's 
completely unmerited love, was central to Christianity, and could 
only be understood through faith and received through grace. 
2. The Failure of Liberalism and Neo-Orthodoxy 
According to Ferre liberalism, as a religious movement, 
appears to have failed. 2 It came as a corrective to tbe kind 
of supernaturalism represented by Roman Catholicism, but lost 
its soul in doing its duty. It became weakened by vagueness 
and gave no clear principle of exclusion. "Its inclusive 
generosity is often little more than a lack of vigorous 
spiritual discrimination."3 
If by liberalism Ferre means the view that man is 
naturally good, it would be correct to say that such liberalism 
is not aware of the depth and subtlety of the working of sin in 
its members. Its optimism about tbe nature of man binders 
it from getting at tbe source of the problems of social 
organization and world community. It follows a blind optimism 
in its false thinking that society can be progressively 
1. During tbe time of his studies under Whitehead, Aul~n, and 
Nygren, but tbis period also marked tbe beginning of his 
doubt as to the adequacy of the liberal method. See 
Art.(l949), 362. 
2. CFE, 111-131. 3. CFE, 32. 
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changed and harmoniously organized without a continuous disci-
plined growth and change in the individual in terms of cross-
bearing, self sacrifice, and deep concern for others. It 
fails to see the power of self interest and the effect of the 
latter upon the will. Richard Niebuhr rightly describes this 
kind of liberalism when be writes of those thinkers who 
feel no great tension between the church and 
world, the social laws and the gospel, the 
workings of divine grace and human effort, the 
ethics of salvation and t~e ethics of social 
conservation or progress. 
However, an adequate liberalism need not incur the fallacy 
of a false optimism. It avoids both ends of that pitfall of 
asserting man as either naturally good or naturally evil. 
Therefore the liberalism which Ferre pronounces a failure is 
not so much the liberal method as it is the false by-products 
of the method; namely, agnosticism, relativism, historicism, 
blind optimism, man as naturally good, and the elimination of 
all supernaturalism. 
He is interested in moving toward a new form of super-
naturalism; one which would allow ample room for the liberal 
discipline, and avoid the fallacy of relativism and agnosti-
cism. He considers liberalism's stress on the use of reason 
and man's experience as the criteria of truth, as necessary 
for a certain light and freedom, but unfortunately this was 
often done at the expense of all supernaturalism. Liberalism 
came to mean "salvation through character'' and "redemption 
1. Niebuhr, CC, 83. 
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became a term often less meaningful than relig ious education."1 
For a time Ferre welcomed neo-orthodoxy as a helpful 
corrective of a spiritless liberalism, but further study led 
bim to see that 
neo-ortbodoxy came close to being a wounded wing 
of faith representing mostly a general mood of 
irrationalism, despair, and existentialist revolt 
against an inadequate liberalism.2 
To be persuaded by that more dynamic Christian faith that alone 
can set men free, Ferre maintains one must pass beyond botb 
liberalism and neo-orthodoxy. 
3. Beyond Liberalism 
.. As already noted, by far tbe main approach of Ferre toward 
a theological reconstruction is bis methodology. He believes 
tbat one of tbe main functions of Cbr~stian theology is to define 
from within its own nature its distinctive method. The truths of 
religion must evolve from tbe nature of religion itself with agape 
as tbe selective principle. In his opinion liberalism bas worked 
witb a superficial theory of knowledge. He is interested in 
taking agape, tbe basic motif of Christianity, and reworking tbe 
whole Christian history and system of theology. He declares: 
There is a great intellectual task awaiting us: to 
work out both a theology and a metaphysics in wbicb 
a£ape is central throughout. God in Christ will 
t en be central and reason itself redeemed.3 
In another article be asks: 
Can Christian thinkers work out a doctrine of 
revelation, in terms of botb modes and content, 
1. CFE, 117. 
2. Art.(1949), 363. 
3. Art.(l943), 14. 
where the entire vov'; approach is radically 
broken through and as far as possible abandoned?l 
/ 
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It is evident that Ferre wishes an affirmative answer, believing 
that the ; r ';n; approach should be substituted for the v o u~ approach. 
J I ~ 
The writer cannot agree that Q.rct rril must displace Vc:l!)$ , nor should 
there be any attempt to abandon Vou~ , and this Ferre himself is 
willing to concede in his later and more careful writings. rl ov~ 
J , 
andGtra ;r r\ mus.t work together. Although "speaking in tongues" is 
-' I / 
not the same as ar 'f rr'i. , here Ferre. can be reminded of the primacy 
of v".7>bY the 'Apostle Paul when be said: "In church I would 
rather speak five words with my mind, in order to instruct others, 
than ten thousand words in a tongue."2 
Because Ferre's doctrine of agape bas previously been 
dealt with and evaluated, 3 it remains to develop more fully and 
crit~cally the other aspects of his theological reconstruction. 
i. The fact of sin. 
At one time adhering to the optimistic view of the 
I goodness of human nature, Ferre says, further thinking led him 
to see the strength and stubbornness of sin, and bow man's 
reasoning tends to rationalize and justify his ways of acting 
and thinking. Liberalism is not aware of this for it "failed 
to see that man is mostly a sinner, actually though not 
essentially, and that with regard to religion his reason is 
darkened by sin."4 The actual self is basically evil because 
1. Art.(l944}~ 70. 3. See pp. 103-132. 
2. I Corinthians 14:19b. 4. Art.{l949), 362. 
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it is bent toward itself. Man is free but it is a conditional 
freedom in which the self is weighted toward selfishness. 
Man's true self, the image of God in man, becomes dominant only 
through the activity of God's grace. This can be rightly 
understood when one accepts the primacy of faith in God as agape. 
/ Ferre asserts that inasmuch as liberalism has failed to 
give proper consideration to the theological doctrine of "fallen 
nature" and to what Kant called radical evil in man, it has 
fostered the idolatry of man. "Liberalism failed sufficiently 
to take into account the evil will in man , and the evil will in 
society."l In line with Ferre's thought D. C. Macintosh bas 
the following to say about rationalistic liberalism's view of 
sin: 
In particular, it was too romantically optimistic 
about evolutionary progress, and needed to think 
more realistically and "existentially" about sin 
and its individual as well as social consequences.2 
Similarly, D. D. Williams writes that in liberalism there 
is a strong temptation to accept an optimism in which sin and 
evil are being progressively eliminated, and "if we reject the 
Christian pessimism of nee-orthodoxy, we must also reject this 
formula. of liberal optimism."3 
Wherever liberalism affirms man as naturally good, Ferre's 
stress. on the depth and seriousness of man 1 s sin and self-
centeredness can be accepted as a necessary corrective. There 
1. CFE, 119. 3. Williams, GGMH, 106. 
2. Macintosh, Art.(l939),28. 
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are, however, for the author, some misgivings concerning 
Ferre's interpretation of sin. He fails to see that the 
nature of freedom restrains one from speaking of man as 
naturally good or radically evil, as nature inclined toward 
the good or as :fallen nature. True indeterminism can neither 
accept a view of the nature of man as weighted toward self-
centeredness nor as weighted toward altruism. It can only 
think of man in terms of process and becoming, and of every 
moment in process as an occasion for free choice. The motives 
for action are many, and to assert action on the basis of unmixed 
motives is a bold venture. Thus the experience of the past may 
be influential to the good or bad, but if freedom is to be 
meaningful it must be freedom to choose between alternatives 
apart from a natural inclination to good or evil. 
Christian liberalism, as Ferre correctly maintains, is 
aware of the reality of sin and the need of redemption. It 
must avoid a social determinism in which society is the 
corrupter of man, a biological determinism in which sin is 
traced to hereditary animal instincts and is therefore being 
progressively eliminated, and a t heological determinism, the 
latter not altogether absent from Ferre's view. 
These are all rational attempts at an explanation of sin. 
In the writer's judgment reason, whether in the service of 
religion, education, or legislation, has removed many of the 
causes and occasions for the possibilities of sin, but a 
coherent account of the fact of sin cannot be given. It is 
part of the experience of man, and all that it means be cannot 
know. Therefore the most adequate definition of sin is in 
its negative form. Sin is man's failure to apply agape to 
concrete situations in the light of the best that he knows. 
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Although ezistential thinking receiv~s a strong emphasis 
in Ferre's thought, it is not adequately applied to his concept 
of sin. The stress on a bent toward selfishness or fallen 
nature would resolve the problem of sin in the essence of man 
as posited by the Creator. This is the temptation to "rational-
ize" sin. The existentiality of sin would ultimately rest the 
problem of sin in man's freedom and willing. 
ii. The reality and power of the Holy Spirit. 
Ferre is especially concerned that the Holy Spirit be 
recognized as a strong central doctrine and reality of the 
Christian faith. Neo-orthodo.xy and liberalism have wounded 
religion by their lack of emphasis on the power of the Holy 
Spirit. Neo-orthodo.xy "lacked the serene faith in the Holy 
Spirit which can bring strength out of weakness and clarity 
out of confusion." 1 
Liberalism with its "social gospel" has too often 
substituted general education and legislation for the power 
of the Holy Spirit. Neo-ortbodo.xy, through a penetrating 
analysis, bas brought judgment upon both the individual and 
society, but it cannot lay bold of a power that will transform 
them. It has given up the task of world transformation, thus 
1. Art. (1949), 363. 
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denying the relevance of the Holy Spirit to social reformation. 
; 
Over against the two approaches Ferre asserts the following 
convictions: 
I have already come to see, however, that the 
distinctive dimension of Christian social action 
is the light and activity of the Holy Spirit through 
the fellowship of the concerned. This fellowship 
is the community of those who care because God's 
own agape dominates their lives ••• In any case, it 
bas become clear to me that the present despair 
over the possibility of improving society is not 
a little due to lack of faith in the Holy Spirit 
as the controller and completer of God's purpose 
for history, here in human history and beyond in 
God's greater world.l 
The Holy Spirit is essentially the activity of God's 
agape. God has many ways of working, and these ways can be 
divided into either the personal or impersonal activity of God. 
The work of the Holy Spirit is always the personal working of 
God. The wrath of God is also his personal relation to man, 
but it is not the Holy Spirit. "The Holy Spirit is the face of 
the Father ••• Jesus showed us the face of the Father. He made 
the Holy Spirit real to us."2 
According to Ferre the reality of the Holy Spirit is 
understood most adequately in terms of a new birth, a new light 
and a new life. The new birth is the transformation of self-
will to a primary care and concern for others. In this sense 
the Holy Spirit is the universal family spirit. 
The Holy Spirit can possess us and free us in such 
full measure that we rejoice in one another's 
victories, even where they eclipse our own, and 
1. Art. (1949), 363. 2. PF, 37. 
----------
suffer over their fail~res, even should they set 
off our own victories. 
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The Holy Spirit is "He through whom we live the new life. 
Through Him, too, we get the new light. We may never see 
aright until we see by means of the Holy Spirit."2 No special 
favoritism is worked by the Holy Spirit. Its light and power 
is available to all who pray for it and earnestly seek it. 
Nor is the power of the Holy Spirit to be confused with man's 
own power. It is not the natural possession of man; it is 
rather a power that can possess man and transform him. 
The Holy Spirit is the spirit of Christ, and according to 
Ferre it first came into history through the incarnation. 
"Before the incarnation and the atonement the Holy Spirit was 
not operating in history as the Holy Spirit."3 Here again 
/ 
Ferre would assert that discontinuity has taken place within 
revelation. He makes a distinction between the Spirit of God 
and the Holy Spirit, and this is done especially with respect 
to the relation of the church to the world. 
The main distinction which we are to draw is that 
the former is governed by the Holy Spirit while 
the latter is under the sway of the Spirit of God.4 
The church in its highest and most vital form is the 
incarnation in history of the Holy Spirit. The Spirit of God 
bas always been operative on the creative level, but the Holy 
Spirit does not manifest itself in nature and in general history. 
1. PF, 44. 3. Art. ( 1942 r, 338' . 
2. PF, 44. 4. cs, 87. 
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But Ferr~ adds, "Nevertheless, He bas always been subliminally 
1 present, lighting every man that comes into the world. 11 
I Ferre frequently reminds his readers that this distinction 
between the Holy Spirit and Spirit of God is "definitely 
functional, not metaphysical in nature. The Spirit of God 
and the Holy Spirit are the same Spirit." 2 It is helpful to 
make this functional distinction, he believes, so that 
operationally the Spirit of God is "God's nature and activity 
on all levels below Agape" and "the Holy Spirit is God's nature 
and activity on the level of Agape." 3 The former is the 
creating Spirit, and the latter is the redeeming Spirit. The 
Spirit of God is the "push of progress" seeking organic rela-
tion to the "pull of purpose", the Holy Spirit. 
The realm of eros and nomos are of the Spirit of God. The 
Spirit of God is God's activity on a level which is preparatory 
for a higher level. It is activity on a sub-agapaic level, but 
as such it is not the level of sin for "not individuation however 
strong and falsely pursued, but spiritual egocentricity is sin. 114 
It is, however, the constant occasion for sin. 
In a s~mary statement the functional difference between 
the two Spirits can be expressed as the difference between 
creation and redemption, ~ and agape, push of progress and 
pull of purpose, individuation and unification, and fellowship 
and agape fellowship. The Spirit of God as the sub-agapaic 
1. cs, 92. 
2. cs, 88. 
3. cs, 88. 
4.- cs, 99. 
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realm is also designated as the realm of a system of values, 1 
rationalization, 2 natural normalcy,3 the secular with sacred 
aspect~,4 limited loyalties and partial perspectives,5 and the 
status quo.6 The following sentences show the context of 
several of the enumerated differences: 
In another area He appears as the Spirit of God. 
There He is often thought of as an "it", a system 
of values, some truth, or some common interest 
based upon limited ~oyalties, common needs, or 
coro~on convenience. 
When a thought or a word from the realm of the Holy 
Spirit reaches the realm of the Spirit of God, the 
specific import of its message is, if left to itself, 
distorted by the rationalizing power on the gart of 
those within the realm of the Spirit of God. 
Ferre maintains that the distinction made between Spirit 
of God and Holy Spirit is not an unbiblical interpretation. 
Ferre is aware that "in the New Testament the proper name of 
the Spirit of God is Holy Spirit,"9 but he does not recognize 
that the functional distinctions made bring confusion into the 
New Testament interpretation of Spirit. Paul was especially 
careful to distinguish spirit of man from Spirit of God, and it 
is the spirit of man which operates on the sub-agapaic level, 
coveting, rationalizing, and surrendering to limited perspectives 
and loyalties. Vfuen man becomes the possessor of the Spirit of 
God, the sub-agapaic activity is transformed to a higher level. 
1~ cs, 154. 6. cs, 162. 2; cs, 154. 7. cs, 154. 
3. cs, 158. 8; cs, 154. 
4. cs, 158. 9. Denio, The SuEreme Leader, 
5. CS, 158. 84-85, cited by Ferre, 
cs, 94. 
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This is true in Romans 8:14, "For all who are led by the Spirit 
of God are sons of God;" 8:26, "The Spirit helps us in our 
weakness ••• intercedes for us with sighs too deep for words." 
Also in I Corinthians 2:10, "The Spirit searches everything, 
even the depths of God;" 2:13, "We are taught by the Spirit." 
Because of the nature of the activity of the Spirit of God 
according to Paul, and since be can also say "the Lord is 
the Spirit,"1 it is difficult to make the alleged distinction 
and remain consistent with the Biblical interpretation. For 
Paul the Spirit of God is a gift from God and above all things 
to be desired and accepted; for Ferre it is yet something which 
binders the fuller agape fellowship. Ferre makes the Spirit of 
God the realm of the law, but Paul writes: "But now we are 
discharged from the law ••• we serve not under the old written 
code but in the new life of the Spirit."2 
The suggestion of the distinction which Ferre makes is also 
made by Rees when be writes: 
One notable limitation of the sphere assigned to the 
Holy Spirit in the New Testament, as compared to 
Hebrew and Jewish literature, is that it is nowhere 
described as the agent of creation or as a cosmic 
principle. It does not act upon external nature, 
and it stands in no causal relation to the physical 
universe ••• The Holy Spirit acts only upon humanity.3 
Such an affirmation, the writer believes, is not warranted 
in the light of New Testament studies. According to Paul, 
Spirit is power which is both personal and impersonal. In 
1. II Corinthians, 3:17. 
2. Romans 7:6. 
3. Rees, Revelation and 
God, 300, cited by 
Ferre, cs, 94. 
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addition to personal power it is also a cosmic God-power which 
is overcoming cosmic evil forces. It was his belief that the 
whole creation lived under the sway of evil and would some day 
be transformed. "The creation itself will be set free from 
its bondage to decay and obtain the glorious liberty of the 
children of God." 1 This shall come about by the power of God 
and Paul thinks of this power as the Spirit. From this it is 
especially difficult to maintain that in the New Testament 
the Holy Spirit does not act upon e7.ternal nature and has no 
relation to the physical universe. 
Paul does not equate the Spirit of God and the Spirit of 
Christ, but the functional distinction which he makes is not 
one in which the former is an obstacle to the Holy Spirit. 
Both Spirit and Christ are power. Christ is the wisdom and 
power of God. 2 To regard Spirit and Christ only as person is 
a theolog ical formulation of the church, not of Paul. Whatever 
idea Paul bad of the Spirit previous to his Christ e7.perience, 
it can be known that the work of Christ influenced his idea of 
the Spirit. However, it must be added that his idea of the 
Spirit also shaped his thinking about Christ. Spirit retained 
its characteristic as an energizing and universalizing power, 
but it ceased to be a vague supernatural power and became one, 
in the last resort, with the living Christ. For Paul Spirit 
is the energizing and universalizing power, and Christ is 
1. Romans 8:21. 2. I Corinthians 1:24. 
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the ethicizing and personalizing power which gives ethical 
content to the new life in the Spirit. 
Ferre's distinction between the Spirit of God and Holy 
Spirit also leads to difficulties in his thinking about the self. 
The contrast and interaction between the two, he believes, makes 
for a dynamic view of the self. He writes, 
Here is a dynamic view of the self, of a constantly 
struggling self, being basically possessed by the 
one or the other, but having enough freedom to 
invite the other, or rather let the other gain 
dominance, either as discrete acts, or as the 
revolution1or conversion of the self, one way or the other. 
It is the Spirit of God that offers the resistance because 
the "Spirit of God is the pull toward the self."2 This is quite 
contrary to the New Testament concept of Spirit inasmuch as Paul 
writes: "But you are not in the flesh, you are in the Spirit, if 
the Spirit of God really dwells in you."3 Too much of what 
/ Ferre would have constitute the Spirit of God should be left for 
the realm of the spirit of man, thereby avoiding the alleged 
opposition tbat the Holy Spirit receives from the Spirit of 
God, and at the same time making it possible to think of the 
self in a more autonomous manner. 
More needs to be said about "trying the spirits" in Ferre's 
interpretation of the Holy Spirit. It is because "many false 
prophets are gone out into the world" as the First Epistle of 
John rightly admonishes that one hesitates to accept the 
1. cs, 91-92. 3. Romans 8:9. 
2. cs' 90. 
I following assertion of Ferre: 
But when the wisdom and power are of God, in 
Holy Spirit, then that wisdom enters via its 
private wire beyond man's conscious defenses 
speaks with power by means of its owy subtle 
lating power in the depth conscious. 
the 
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trans-
A similar neglect of the testing of the Spirit appears in 
his affirmation that "these leaders of the blind forget that 
the Holy Spirit gives X-ray eyes to see the heavenly path and 
the right shoes to keep our feet · in slippery places."2 w. M. 
Horton gives good counsel in admonishing that "enthusiasm is 
certainly one of the signs of the presence of the Spirit. But 
can we convert the proposition and say that all enthusiasts are 
filled with the Holy Spirit?"3 
/ The writer believes that Ferre makes an important 
contribution beyond liberalism and nee-orthodoxy in his strong 
appeal to a re-emphasis on the transforming power of the Holy 
Spirit. A power that receives its motivation from New Testament 
agape; a power that can take bold of man and that man can take 
bold of and relate to concrete situations. Both liberalism 
and nee-orthodoxy are in need of a revitalized concept of the 
church. The church ceases. to be the church inasmuch as it no 
longer recognizes the power of the Holy Spirit. 
Where liberalism bas often trusted too much in the social 
gospel and in man's own adequacy, nee-orthodoxy bas failed to 
see the redemptive power which is released if men respond to 
l. cs, 155. 
2. PF, 51. 
3. Horton, OCF, 43. 
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God's unmerited love in humility and commitment. This stress 
I by Ferre is well taken. Wbat is found wanting is t he formu-
lation of the relation of the Holy Spirit to the Spirit of God, 
and Ferre's tendency, at times, to make the Spirit a private 
line of comnmnication. The Age of the Spirit is what men 
ought to pray for, but not at the cost of t he displacement 
of the Age of Reason~ Motivation and power to do that which 
one knows ought to be done have always been man's greatest 
problems. Such power and motivation of the Spirit man needs, 
but let him always "try the spirits whether they ar e of God. 11 
4. Beyond Nee-Orthodoxy 
i. The truth in nee-or thodoxy. 
According to Ferre's understanding of nee-orthodoxy 
its main principle is the transcendent will of God which has 
been fully revealed only once in Jesus, but which can be 
apprehended through God's grace in the existential situation 
in which man is aware of his utter helplessness. The unity 
and continuity of the Christian faith for the nee-orthodox 
"is the activity of God's Holy Spirit, beyond the ways of man 
and nature and contrary to all reason and desert."1 Ferre is 
not in accord with the manner in which these main principles 
are set forth, but believes they contain truth that is vital 
to Christian thinking. The stress on the divine initiative 
and reality of the Holy Spirit in an age which regards the 
1. CFE, 40. 
21.1. 
supernatural a by-gone remnant of primitive thinking bas a 
constructive message for these times. 
Another constructive influence of nee-orthodoxy is its 
understanding of the uniqueness and absoluteness of Christianity. 
I But, Ferre is critical of the procedure whereby such uniqueness 
and absoluteness are established. It fails to see the motif 
of agape as constituting the principle of exclusiveness. On 
the other hand, 11It helpfully indicates the weakness of a 
liberal theology fed on vague idealism without a strong 
principle of exclusion."l 
According to Ferre nee-orthodoxy's accent on God-centricity, 
the primacy of faith and the return to the Bible is essential to 
the heart of the Christian faith. What be objects to is "its 
kind of God, its kind of faith, and its kind of use of the 
Bible. 112 
Ferre believes nee-orthodoxy makes an important contribution 
in its penetrating analysis of the nature of man. "The conti-
nental theology bas no false view of man."3 At this point, be 
believes, it stands as a corrective to that liberal~sm which 
assumed that man was naturally good, and that fullness of 
experience and education would teach him to make the right 
choices. 
Ferre rightly rejects the extreme optimism about the nature 
of man as expressed in some liberal thinking. Especially such 
1. CFE , 41- 4 2 • 
2. Art. (1949), 362. 
3. Art.(l939), 5. 
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an extreme position as that of A. C. Garnett who writes: 
Human nature is on the side of human progress. The 
problem is to set aside the damnosa hereditas of 
prejudice, false tradition, superstition, fear, hatred, 
that survives from the childhood of the race, and to 
develop institutions adequate to its maturity. There 
is in the human heart enough of gocd will. It1remains for intelligence to enable it to find its way. 
However, in asserting that continental theology bas no 
' false view of man, Ferre gives too much encouragement to the 
theological determinism of the nee-orthodox thinkers. Such an 
appraisal of their view of man becomes especially unacceptable 
as Brunner declares: 
The sinner is a man who is no longer able not to 
sin. Thus freedom is indeed the presupposition of 
every sin, but of no single sin can it be said that 
i~ happens in freedom, but only under the compulsion 
of sin.2 
Such a view of sin makes sin an illusion. Sin which is 
committed under compulsion and in determinism can no longer be 
called sin. The reality of sin can be maintained only by 
referring its origin to free will, to a true freedom which is 
true indeterminism. 
It is important to note that although Ferre can accept 
nee-orthodoxy's stress on the seriousness and deptb of man's 
sin, he refuses to accept its pessimism. Nee-orthodoxy cuts 
the nerve of victorious living by its failure to recognize 
the power of the Holy Spirit and growth in grace which can 
come about through an understanding of it. D. D. Williams 
1. Garnett, RPR, 176; cited by 
Williams, GGMH, 35. 
2. Brunner, GM, 157. 
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similarly writes: 
Nee-orthodoxy bas recovered for us a profound 
analysis of the reality of sin and the need of 
redemption. But it has not made clear bow redemption 
actually makes any difference in this life in this 
world. 
/ Ferre's view of man as bent toward selfishness, as basically 
and radically evil, but nevertheless accountable for such self-
centeredness, is an overstatement of man's responsibility. The 
judgment against man must be judgment against his free and 
wrong choices, and not against man as he is. But Ferre's 
accent on sin as greed and selfishness, his stress that man has 
his life from God and is dependent upon God--such an emphasis 
needs to be made as much and even more than ever before. There 
is much religious indifference in American Christianity, and if 
~ American Christianity is representative of Christendom, then the 
message of man's sin and responsibility before God and man is in 
need of a new emphasis. 
ii. Nee-orthodoxy's unknown God and absurd faith. 
Ferre can accept the idea that all mystery cannot be 
removed in man's search of God and God's revelation of Himself, 
but be rejects as a falsification of the Christian faith tbe 
Kierkegaardian and Bartbian view that God is so utterly tran~ 
scendent that He cannot be known at all through rational 
reflection or human experience. Christianity "is not a mystery 
cult. It is the religion of incarnation, not of the unknown 
1. ·williams, GGMH, 35. 
or bidden God."l 
K:terkegaa:rd, with his love for ,paradox maintained that 
God and man are absolutely unlike. 
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Here we seem to be confronted with a paradox. Merely 
to obtain the knowledge that God is unlike him, man 
needs the help of God; and now be learns that God 
is absolut ely different from himself.2 · 
Barth likewise agrees that there is no way_ from man to God,3 and 
Brunner• in his earlier writings rejects all rafional r eflection 
and rel igious experience, including the experi ence of the 
numinous, as false attempts to know God. 
Metaphysics as well as religion, the sense of the 
numinous no less than the idea of the absolute, 
belong to general human reason, to the nature of 
man ••• Christian faith, however, is concerned with 
something very different ••• a knowledge of God 
which by no means is obtainable by man through 
his r eligious or _metaphysical faculties or through 
his religious experience.4 
In carrying forward the Lundensian theologian's accent 
on God as agape Ferre's thinking comes as a construct ive 
approach and corrective to neo-ortbodox irrationalism. If 
God cannot be known through religious experience, then he 
remains the unknown God and can be of no value or help to 
mankind. According to the neo-orthodox th~ God that people 
proclaim to know t hrough rel i gious experience is an idol. 
Anyone's claim to direct experience of God is evidence that 
it is not the Christian God. 
The claim that man can have immediat e experience of God 
1. ECF, 148 . 3. Barth, ER , 245. 
2. Kierkegaard, PF, 37. 4. Brunner, v~~ , 16. 
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may have its temptations to "idolatry", but much less so than 
the claim that God can only be known beyond religious experience . 
and rational reflection. Such a God, although the neo-orthodox 
deny the validity of Rudolph Otto's approach from the numinous, 1 
must primarily remain the mysterium tremendum, and the stern 
judge. Ferre is right in his observation that "Bartbianism 
stresses the power of God at the expense of His love far and 
away too strongly for us to commit ourselves fully to it."2 
He is also contributing to an acceptable theological 
reconstruction in rejecting the irrationalism that encircles 
the dialectical theologians' concept of faith. For the neo-
orthodo~ faith is basically a gift of God, or in terms of 
human experience it is a receptacle for revelation and grace 
of God. 
Faith is not something a man can "learn"; it is 
the free gift of God.3 · 
Faith is not a possession tbat man bas at his 
command, but actually an utterance and gift of 
God, which of himself ian can never bring about, 
or in any way command. 
Faith is real faith only when man bas given himself 
up and relinquished his trust in religion and rests 
on God alone.5 
Thus the crisis theologians believe that religion itself 
is in a crisis. There is no religious approach to God. 
"Religion must die. In God we are rid of it."6 Man is a 
1. Otto, IH. 4. Brunner PR, 94. 
2. CFE, 123. 5. Brunner TC, 61. 
3. Brunner, RR, 420. 6. Barth, ER, 245. 
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sinner because of his covetousness, and religion proclaims 
"Thou shalt not covet," but religion itself is the supreme 
of all des ires .• 1 
Over against this irrationalism, including Brunner's 
affirmation that faith is something altogether different from 
the act of thinking, 2 Ferr~ rightly maintains that faith is not 
a unique gift of God. Nor is it something altogether different 
from human activity or the act of think~ng, for it includes 
both human interpretations and responses. It is both 
theoretical and existential thinking about God, rather than 
some unique and independent category. Whatever the objections 
that have been made against Ferre's view of faith, this passing 
beyond Lundensian and nee-orthodox irrationalism is an encour-
aging trend in present theology. 
1. Barth, ER, 245. 2. . Brunner, GM, 64. 
CHAPTER IX 
EVALUATION 
1. Difficulties in Ferre's 
Theological Methodology 
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One of the difficulties encountered in Ferre's methodology 
is his inclination toward an exclusively existential theology 
in the sense that the whole person is involved so deeply , 
sacrificially, and critically in his thinking and living that 
objectivity and speculation become secondary. Objectivity for 
Ferre means essentially the detached, impersonal, and theoretical 
approach. Recognizing that the elimination of the rational 
approach would mean death to theology, be, nevertheless, 
expresses the extreme existential view that "theology is never 
objective, though it must use objective information. It is ever 
existential,"1 and that "philosophical application is rat ional; 
theological, existential.n2 
Theology is through and through existential, t hat 
is, completely concerned as unavoidable whole-
response with the question of man's nature and 
destiny in3relation to what is most important and most real. 
To make theology through and through existential in tbe 
sense tbat it is never objective is to invite the kind of 
irrationalism and pure existentialism that Ferre himself wishes 
to reject. If theology, in its broader sense, is an interpre-
1. FR, 132. (All references in this 
chapter are to Ferre, unless 
otherwise noted.) 
2. FR, 142. 
3. FR, 113. 
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tation of religion, it must interpret both the objective and 
existential aspects of religion, the history of religion as 
well as the nature of the religious experience. Thus theology 
must ever be both objective and existential. In making t h e 
philosophical application, rational, and the theological, 
existential, Ferre renders an injustice to both philosophy and 
theology in the same way, as already indicated, 1 when the 
objective is made the standard for philosophical truth and the 
subjective is made the standard for theological truth. 
The subjective perspective in Ferre's theological method 
is the approach of whole-response. Writing of theology as the 
interpretation of whole-response, he maintains that "as such 
it is completely and constantly subjective. It is irrevocably 
existential~2 Thus for Ferre whole-response, the subjective, 
and existential have similar meaning. But when correct whole-
response is defined as the ideal or coherent relation of reason, 
emotions, and wi11,3 then subjective denotes an exceptionally 
broad meaning making it difficult to distinguish between the 
subjective and objective. Because feeling and will best 
characterize the subjective or private aspects of consciousness, 
and because reason or systematic thought best characterize the 
objective or public approach in the interpretation of religion, 
theology is in need of both subjective and objective standards. 
1. See p. 64. 3 . FR, 7. 
2. FR, 135. 
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Having acknowledged that there is nothing in the subjective 
which is closed to philosophical interpretation, 1 and that reason 
/ is all we have in the interpretation of whole-response, Ferre 
ought to give more recognition to the subjective in the philo-
sophical method, and to both theoretical and valuational factors 
in tbe theological method. His frequent use of the "most 
important", 11 most bigbtt, and "most real" can best be understood 
in terms of valuation and power. 
The overemphasis on theology as thoroughly existential is 
not a little due to the failure to distinguish adequately between 
religion and theology. Ther e is evidence that religion is 
confused with theology as Ferre begins to write about the 
standards of philosophy and the standards of religion. In the 
elucidation of the latter be interchangeably speaks of them as 
standards of religion and standards of tbeology. 2 For Ferre 
"religion is whole-response to Reality and nothing less than 
that. It is man's necessary response as a total being to 
Reality as an unavoidable ultimate."3 Thus it can be seen that 
both religion and theology are largely thought of· in terms of 
unavoidable whole-response. The definition, however, is more 
adequate as a broad definition of religion than of ~beology 
because religion as whole-response rightly includes man's 
highest loyalty, his deepest searcbings, and the expression of 
them in relation to his fellowmen. It involves man's deeply 
1. FR, 121. 3. FR, 242. 
2. FR, 121-122, 127. 
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personal attitudes and emotionally toned beliefs, and in this 
sense there can be no objection to Ferre's assertion that 
"religion is existential111 or that the "existential is primary, 
the objective, secondary; life is primary, thought, secondary."2 
/ Much of the existential import given by Ferre to theology belongs 
more properly to the nature of religion. For him existential 
means the individual, the subjective, the deeply personal, 3 but 
even religion cannot be exclusively existential in this sense, 
for religion must ever be more than the individual and the 
deeply or critically inward; it must also be the sharing of 
highest values in co-operation with others. Religion is both 
social and individual and must express itself in fellowship 
and through institutional organization. This kind of fellow-
ship and co-operation is adequately expressed in Ferre's 
emphasis on agape. 
To distinguish more satisfactorily between religion and 
theology, Ferre needs to be more consistent in defining theology 
as the interpretation of whole-response or religion. Such a 
definition does not invalidate the existential aspect of 
theology. Theology must consider the existential situation 
encountered in religious experience, which, as Walter Horton 
rightly pointed out, involves the mind but also "the bodily 
1. FR, 118. 
2. From Ferre's manuscript of lectures, 
"Theology and Ethics," delivered at 
the Pan-Presbyterian Conference at 
Montreat, North Carolina, 1951. 
3. FR, 150. 
-~---
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organism, right down to the tear ducts and the pit of the 
stomach."l This can be rightly called psychosomatic existen-
tialism in which the intellect, feelings, and body are so 
dynamically related that the whole experience cannot be f ully 
predicated. At the same time theology is also valuational 
and theoretical inasmuch as religious values are not miracu-
lously revealed and arbitrarily accepted. Therefore theology 
is also the "systematic attempt to discover, expound, and defend 
the truth implied by the experience of the people known as 
Christians."2 
To be more accurate one would have to define theology as 
the interpretation of . the Christian religion, both past and 
present. The attempt to give a coherent account of the religious 
whole-response of all the religions would be more properly 
assigned to the field of philosophy of religion. / Due to Ferre's 
use pf an unusually broad meaning of religion and to a restricted 
circle of philosophy, theology is made to perform the task of 
philosophy. This becomes evident as Ferre examines three 
different approaches to explain process: the scientific approach 
with its analytic or reductionist me~hod; the philosophical which 
interprets process by means of that which is here and now actual; 
and the theological which interprets process by means of the most 
significant emergent in process. 3 If philosophy is properly 
1. Horton, OCF, XVIII. 
2. From notes taken in class lectures 
delivered by L. Harold DeWolf in 
Systematic Theology. 
3. FR, 159 ff. 
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thought of in terms of its synoptic and coherent method, then 
I Ferre must acknowledge philosophy as conibining all three of these 
approaches. 
In his distinction between philosophical and theological 
interpretation, he also seriously limits and wounds philosophy 
by making the latter incompetent as an arbiter of ideals and 
purpose. 1 This limitation of philosophy bas already been 
evaluated in the chapter on Truth, as also bas the limitation 
that functionally philosophy is truth for its own sake. 2 Here 
one would like to add that Socrates was willing to drink the 
cup of hemlock for the sake of truth, and therefore philosophical 
truth for him must have been more than truth that is only specu-
lative, interpretative, or for its own sake. 
I Another difficulty which presents itself in Ferre's 
theological method is his affirmation that the Christian faith 
is a discontinuity which bas taken place within God's general 
creativity and revelation in history. He declares: 
/ 
Between this new creaturehood in Christ and the 
world as a whole there is a distinctively 
discontinuous relation which is determinative 
for Christianity, along with the general 
continuous dimension between tbem.3 
Ferre is doubtless right that in the life and teachings of 
Jesus the fullest embodiment and expression of agape came into 
history and was actually realized, but such a fulfilling of God's 
purpose is not to be considered as a discontinuity. The 
1. FR, 128-130. 3. cs, 95. 
2. FR, 113. 
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embodiment of agape as reflected in Jesus is God's purpose 
for all his children, and such a fulfilling of his purpose, 
whether in history or beyond history is God's steady work in 
his eternal creativity and love. If agape embodied in Christ 
is to be considered a discontinuity, then all significant new 
insights, creative syntheses, · evolutionary stages, and emergents 
are discontinuities entering the continuity of history. 
Daniel D. Williams is right in asserting the uniqueness 
of the Christian experience, and that it bas its distinctive 
source of insight in an historic people and event, but t h is, 
be rightly shows, does not presuppose a discontinuity between 
the Christian revelation and the rest of experience. 
To speak of revelation in the prophets and in 
Christ is not then to speak of some supernatural 
doctrine added to our human knowledge from an 
extra-historical source. It is to speak of those 
happenings in human history which have so opened 
our eyes, and so transformed our minds that the 
disclosure of God to man has taken place.l 
Other difficulties encountered and already referred to 
' pertain to Ferre's view of the nature of man, the person of 
Christ, and the atonement. Concerning the first two the writer 
believes Ferre is not doing justice to the nature of freedom, 
and in the discussion of the atonement be needlessly weakens 
the principle of agape. In all three instances the theoretical 
perspective is carried beyond its legitimate function and stands 
in need of a more empirical and existential approach. In his 
1. Williams, GGMH, 50. · 
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doctrine of God it is interesting to note that the existential 
perspective is carried beyond its proper jurisdiction and stands 
in need both of a more empirical and of a more theoretical 
approach. This last difficulty will be dealt with in the last 
part of the chapter; the problem of freedom will be considered 
here. 
The reality and power of sin is that experience which 
touches the lives of all mankind. The fact that determines sin 
is man's misuse of freedom. If sin is purposive in God's larger 
plan,l and if God inclines the self toward selfishness for 
pedagogical reasons, 2 sin as man's free act against God loses 
its meaning. / Ferre recognizes sin as man's direct denial of 
God's fellowship, but adds: "yet such a denial deepens his 
individuality and enriches his freedom."3 Rebellion against 
God can hardly be accepted as an enrichment of man's freedom, 
not even in the pedagogical sense implied; it is rather a loss · 
of freedom for it reduces the possibility for the greatest 
number of creative choices in the future. The deterministic 
/ flavor in Ferre's interpretation of sin can be avoided if form 
and function, that is, divine reason and divine love, are seen 
as two inseparable aspects of God's creativity. God is responsi-
ble for the possibility of sin, but only because his purpose is 
to create the possibility for agape fellowship. God does not 
make sin purposive or functional to the creating of full 
1. ECF, 49. 3. ECF, 48. 
2. ECF, 44. 
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fellowship. Rather, his purpose for true fellowship involves 
such inevitable conditions as comprise freedom in which sin 
and rebellion are always a possibility. This is a different 
perspective from Ferre's approach in which he affirms: "That 
we are tbus over-against God and His ways is for our good 
according to His plan and purpose."1 Here there is a tendency 
to "rationalize" man's sin. A more· empirical and existential 
perspective resolves the problem of sin in man's will rather 
than his essence. 
/ Ferre rejects tbe doctrine of total depravity. He aptly 
points out that those who regard sin as having rendered our 
reason useless in matters of religious knowledge fail to see 
that then we are hopeless, for revelation, too, is no help. 
But, wben Ferre regards all of man's activities as mixed 
darkly grey with sin, or when reason is spoken of as darkened 
by sin, be renders blunt the sharpest instrument that man bas to 
distinguish between sin and love. Reason darkened by sin is 
the false use of reason. Both more reasom and more love is 
needed to illuminate and eliminate the sins that beset man. 
One other tenet of Ferre's theological method that is 
problematic with respect to the concept of freedom is his 
interpretation of Christ as the selective principle and his 
formulation of the doctrine of the person and work of Christ. 
It has already been said that to speak of a "given content" in 
1. CUG, 103. 
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Jesus or to assert that Jesus differs from us all in the 
uniquely given content of his personality1 is to impair the 
unity of his personality and to rob him of his true selfbood 
and freedom. However, here one will become aware of a d i fference 
/ between Ferre's earlier writings and his latest book, The 
Christian Understanding of God. The tendency to determinism 
is not so prevalent in this work and no reference is made to 
any given content in the personality of Jesus. In his latest 
treatise be writes: 
Christ was in Jesus in as natural a way as the 
Holy Spirit was in John Woolman without making 
him a split personality, or as naturally as Christ 
is in any one of us who accepts Him. Instead of 
splitting our personalities, He unifies tbem.2 
2. I Ferre's Contribution to Present 
Theological Thinking 
In a day when philosophy and theology are prone to go 
their own way, with logical positivism and naturalism attempting 
a divorce from theology and Barthian irrationalism seeking a 
divorce from philosophy, Ferre's thinking is a cohesive force 
to bring them together. He is ever ready to assert that reason 
is not the enemy of faith, but its greatest friend. Theologians 
must be able to show reason for the faith they uphold and this 
means that "there is real need for a competent philosophy of 
religion."3 Philosophy is not a mere handmaid to theology for 
l. CFA, 115. 
2. CUG, 190. 
3. CFE, 28-29. 
reason is not restricted to the task of clarifying the implica-
tions of revelation. Reason must interpret revelation in the 
light of man's religious experience and its relation to the whole 
of life. 
In a challenging procedure the main principle of Lundensian 
thought, namely, agape as the Christian perspective, is 
/ forcefully developed by Ferre, even to the extent that agape 
is not only the selective principle for the Christian faith 
but also the ultimate category for the understanding of the 
problem of being and becoming.l Although some objections are 
made to the manner in which agape is applied as the ultimate 
I principle, Ferre's stress on the Christian faith as an agape 
fellowship in which complete care and concern for all are 
primary and theological formulations are secondary, is a 
return to the early Christian faith and an urgent message for 
a divided Christendom. 
He makes a contribution by rejecting the irrational content 
in Lundensian thought. The complete separation of ~ and 
agape severs man from God. Ferre is right in pointing out that 
eros is not man's own creation and that it can be transformed 
to be in the service of agape. Agape is basically divine love, 
but it can be appropriated by man, and here Ferre is construe-
tively more optimistic than Reinbold Niebuhr who cannot share the 
view that agape can be applied to and transform society.2 In 
l. CUG, 11 ff. 2. Niebuhr, NDM, II, 96, 204. 
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an age when theological pessimism adds to the general pessimism 
I 
due to political, social, and economic conditions, Ferre's 
optimism is a needed corrective. 
He also corrects the irrationalism of Lundensian thought 
in his refusal to make faith a unique gift or work of God. 
Faith is not an objective, ind~pendent "given" which is 
passively received. It is not the intellectual assent to 
revealed truth; it is rather man's interpretation and total 
response to both special and general revelation. 
To assert the independence of faith and reason is being 
unjust to both. The right relation of faith and reason is one 
of mutual dependence. In developing the existential and 
theoretical aspects of faith Ferre remains true to this relation. 
In his organic approach to epistemology be rightly maintains that 
the faculties of the knowing process, namely, feeling, willing, 
and thinking, cannot be considered as independent of each other. 
As independent they are abstract notions, and Whitehead ade-
quately indicates that mere emotion, mere awareness, etc., "are 
ghosts of the old faculties banished from psychology, but still 
haunting meta.physics. 111 
Whole-response is thus a proper approach to epistemology. 
VVbole-response is mo1•e than any single aspect of the self, but 
is not to be equated with the sum total of the aspects of the 
self. The organic approach properly applied is aware that the 
1. Whitehead, PR, 27. 
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whole bas characteristics which the parts do not bave, and that 
the parts have characteristics which the whole does not have. 
There is thus a uniqueness to the feeling, willing, and thinking 
aspects of the self which cannot be subsumed under whole-
response. Such a relation adds to the difficulties involved in 
the problem of faith and reason. 
Ideal whole-response Ferre properly defines as the ideal 
co-operation of all the aspects of the self. Whole-response 
must not be severed from its divine dimension for the capacities 
to will, to think, or to feel are not man's own creations. The 
emphasis on the unitary process of knowing is not peculiar to 
/ Ferre. Those who adhere to a more rationalistic approach would 
be in sympathy with such an emphasis. The problem appears to 
be whether whole-response and whole-thinking, used synonymously 
/ 
by Ferre, should be called faith or p,eason. He believes that 
the total act of knowing, including the proper relation of will, 
passions, and reason is best described as faith because the 
various faculties are not to be equated. In the broader applica-
tion of reason in which reason is thought o~ as coherence the 
organic process of knowing is also upheld, but the total inquiry 
is considered as reason because there is no feeling and willing 
without idea. 
It seems fair to say that in a unity of consciousness, 
best understood as a feeling, willing, and thinking person, the 
first two aspects of the self most adequately characterize faith, 
especially if taken in the sense that they imply trust, including 
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man's deepest feelings. The thinking aspect most adequately 
characterizes reason, including reason in its purest form in 
terms of mathematical relations and formal lpgic. The mutual 
dependence, and yet the uniqueness of these aspects must both 
be recognized, and therefore also the mutual dependence of 
faith and reason. 
Recognizing that pure subjectivity and extreme existen-
tialism falsify religion because they take refuge in philo-
/ 
sophical mysticism and in the immediacy of experience, Ferre, 
nevertheless, rightly defends the aspect of truth experienced 
in subjectivity. To make too much of emotions and feelings 
at tbe neglect of reason invites a false subjectivity, but to 
make too much of reason at the neglect of emotions and will 
makes for a false objectivity. I Thus Ferre's admonition about 
a proper balance between the subjective and objective is well 
taken. 
Truth in subjectivity is more than tbe process of 
introspection in subjectivism. Introspection is largely a 
speculative examination of the self, the result of wbicb can be 
shared with others and can be evaluated in a detached manner. 
Subjectivity is that part of the religious experience which 
cannot be shared with others, but nevertheless, impinges 
itself upon tbe self as authentic. This is not to say that 
every phase of religious experience which defies essentialism 
can arbitrarily be called truth. It means that man's deepest 
and most significant religious experience may be part of the 
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truth even though it cannot be set within a framework of 
empirical coherence. Subjectivity takes seriously the differ-
ence between the truth about experience and the experience 
itself. As it bas been said that there is nothing in the 
intellect which did not come through sense experience--except 
the intellect itself, so it can be said that there is no 
meaning which can escape a rational coherence except the 
privacy of the meaning itself. 
I The existential perspective, so strongly stressed by Ferre, 
is especially important in the consideration of limit situations 
in which one is made aware of the existentiality of ethical 
decisions. A fireman, who is a personal friend of the writer, 
related the incident of answering an emergency call where the 
daughter and father of a certain woman had been overcome by 
illuminating gas. The firemen believed that there was an 
equal chance of recovery for both persons, but unfortunately 
they had taken with them only one resuscitator. They turned 
to the woman and requested that she indicate upon whom it 
should be used. vVbo is ready to prescribe what are the 
obligations under limit situations such as these? What if the 
two persons overcome were brothers or sistersY What if they 
were twins? Under such circumstances no past experience and 
no amount of theoretical thinking can present a certain basis 
for decision. Similar situations exist during the time of 
famine when relief administrators find themselves in a position 
where they determine who is to live and who is to die. 
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The existential aspect of faith becomes most clear in 
situations of crises. A letter written by a twenty-two year 
old Dutch patriot to his parents a few hours before he was to 
be executed by a Nazi firing squad reflects the existential 
faith in question. The crime for which tbe young patriot 
was sentenced to death was his escaping from Holland in an 
attempt to join the Dutch forces in Britain. A portion of 
the letter follows: 
Dear Father: ••• In a little while at five o'clock it 
is going to happen and that is not so terrible. It 
is, after all, only one moment, and then I shall be 
with God. Is that after all such a dreadful transi-
tion? On the contrary, it is beautiful to be in God's 
strength ••• I hope that will be a consolation to you ••• 
Therefore do not mourn, but trust in God and pray 
for strength ••• Have no hate. I die without hatred. 
God rules everything.l 
To say that one cannot understand such a trust at all is to 
forfeit both religion and theology, but to say that one can fully 
understand it would hardly fall short of sacrilege or presump-
tuousness. Here is a complete trust in God in the midst of one 
of man's greatest evils. When it is said that such a trust in 
God carries with it an existential import, it is not meant to 
be irrational. What is meant is that it bas an aspect of the 
non-rational in the sense that feeling and willing are dominant 
even after the fullest use of reason. The full meaning of the 
emotional content of such a trust cannot be predicated. This 
does not mean that the rational and non-rational are in 
1. Reader's Digest, August, 1942, 99-100. 
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contradiction. The peculiar relation and interpenetration of 
the rational and the non-rational is cogently presented by 
Rudel~· Otto as he draws analogies in which the rational is 
to the non-rational as conceptual attributes of God are to the 
experience of the 'numinous', as personal affection is to the 
'erotic', and as the natural feelings of homesickness, joy, 
and hope are to musical feeling, an experience created by 
music. 1 Non-rational used in this sense means "the feeling 
which remains where the concept fails. 112 
/ 3. Rationalism in Ferre's Theological Method 
/ Although Ferre's theological method is more properly to be 
regarded as existential, there is also ample evidence for 
considering him as one of the defenders of reason. The 
existential perspective, which looms so large in his method, 
is not a distrust of reason, not an appeal to paradox or 
irrationalism. "Reason is capable of a double role in dynamic 
conjunction. It can perform both rational and existential 
comparison."3 The problem in a theological method is the 
proper relation and application of the theoretical and 
existential ~se of reason. " For Ferre the existential perspec-
tive is vital to the understanding of faith. 
He recognizes that part of the task of philosophy is to 
interpret becoming, process, and ideals, but what is important 
1. See Otto, IH, 1-4, 42-51. 3. CUG, 84. 
2. Otto, IH, vii. 
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for him is his belief that philosophy cannot show the ideals 
more real than the actual. It is alleged that only by faith, 
not by reason, can the objectivity of ideals be established. 
This involves an existential decision based on a reflexive 
superspective which is both an historical event and fulfillment 
of the ideal in the person of Christ. I Evidently Ferre is not 
satisfied with "coherent probability" as set forth in the 
method of Edgar s. Brightman, or "warranted belief" according 
to w. H. Werkmeister. 1 Philosophy, says Ferre, 
is the coherence of the actual ••• But what is not 
yet actual is only possible or at the most 
probable, from the perspective of rational 
knowledge.2 
An ideal may be rationally realizable~ •• but given 
this world as it is, there is no knowing that it 
will be fully realized.3 
In rejecting warranted belief or coherent probability 
as an adequate basis for the affirmation of the objectivity 
/ 
of ideals, Ferre tends to limit philosophy to positivism or 
pragmatism. For him only the future can settle the problem 
of the reality of ideals, unless by existential decision one 
can accept the ideal as more real than the actual • . This tendency 
to pragmatism is also expressed when be writes: "Kant is, 
accordingly, completely right that we can see an artificer of 
the universe, but no more."4 Philosophy is thus reduced to a 
positivistic "as if" philosophy, which though rationally 
1. Werkmeister, BSK, 152. 3. FR, 122. 
2. FR, 122. 4. CUG, 160. 
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adequate, is not existentially persuasive. 
I It appears that Ferre wishes to w~ke faith into certainty 
and one can rightly question whether in so doing, be is not 
destroying the very faith which he tries to establish. Certainty 
can be attained neither in science nor in philosophy nor in 
religion. This attempt to pass beyond warranted belief would 
mean that scientific knowledge cannot be accepted as knowledge 
because it lacks certainty; and that faith makes religious 
truth more certain than scientific knowledge. Here faith 
apparently gets its force by mere assertion. 
One of the difficulties always encountered in the problem 
of religious knowledge is the r elation of the criterion of truth 
to truth itself. Are the two ultimately one? If being and 
, 
thought are not to be identified, as Ferre asserts, can he, 
without inconsistency, make love the ultimate reality and at 
the same time make it the all inclusive principle whereby truth 
is distinguished from error? I Ferre does not adequately distin-
guish between the logico-epistemological meaning of truth (the 
distinction between thought and being) and the ethico-relig ious 
meaning of truth. He is concerned mostly with the latter and 
his stress of the ethico-religious meaning of truth in terms of 
agape can be favorably accepted. Here there can be no objection 
to his assertion that "truth in the last analysis is an existen-
tial ultimate. 111 In the sense that existential means dynamically 
and personally creative with a deep care and concern for all, 
1. FR, 121. 
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it can be attributed to God as truth as well as to man in his 
search of truth. Here Ferre is right in saying that with 
respect to ontology there is a functional difference between 
philosophy and theology. Philosophy is speculative whereas 
theology is existential, completely concerned about man's 
nature and destiny in relation to the ultimate. 1 
It should be added that truth must also be a rational 
ultimate. In God as truth, form and content are inseparable; 
his creativity is grounded as much in his reason as it is in 
his willing and feeling. Truth as our existential and theoret-
ical ultimate is God as personal spirit expressing himself as 
divine reason and love. This does justice to both the existen-
tial and theoretical aspect of truth. To surrender the formal 
aspect of truth is to fall prey to a pure existentialism or to 
a pure vitalism of the Bergsonian kind. 
Because of the different uses of reason, the difference 
between rational theology and Ferre's existential theology is 
difficult to specify. This is especially so because (1) the 
older rationalistic theology bas been replaced by a more 
empirical approach, (2) experience for some thinkers includes 
the whole range of thought from sense experience to all 
consciousness, (3) reason includes that area of thought from 
formal logic to coherence. If by rationalism is meant the 
attempt to deduce religious knowledge from reason or under-
1. FR, 113. 
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standing, as distinct from either religious experience or 
revelation, then neither. Ferre nor such philosophical theists 
as Edgar S. Brightman and L. Harold DeWolf can be called 
rationalists. If existentialism means ignoring the consider-
ations of reason to follow impulses of feeling and will, then 
I Ferre also cannot be called an existentialist. 
, 
In Ferre's method there is much that goes by the name of 
existential, in the sense of dynamic and critical whole -
response, that can be subsumed under an empirical theology. 
Rationalists are willing to recognize the need for deeply 
personal decisions and commitments, and the experience of 
ideals and purpose as dynamically real. / Thus in Ferre's 
theological method it is difficult to make any clear distinc-
tion between his use of faith as "selective reason", "whole-
response", "whole-man thinking", and DeWolf's use of reason 
as a "person thinking"l or ncomprehensive reason",2 or 
Brightman's use of reason as ''coherence". For all three 
faith and reason are human responses in the sense that they 
are not unique, independent gifts from God. All three are 
agreed that faith grows out of religious experience and is 
rationally and experientially verifiable. 
, 
It is also interesting to note that Ferre's thinking of 
faith as whole-response or whole-thinking is the same definition 
that Emil Brunner in one of his earlier works gives to reason. 
1. DeWolf, RAR, 128. 2. DeWolf, RAR, 207. 
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Brunner declares: "By reason I mean not merely the intellect 
but all the faculties of man as such."l On the basis of the 
definition just given, though both stress the importance of 
ezistential thinking, the latter would consider the former 
as having surrendered to a rational and empirical theology 
because his faith arises out of human thinking and ezperience. 
/ 
The difficulty in distinguishing between Ferre's 
ezistential theology and rational theology is further enhanced 
by the ezistential thinking sometimes reflected in the writings 
of theistic rationalists. For ezample, DeWolf writes: 
But it may be replied, there may be some single 
moment in which God reveals Himself so clearly 
that all other evidences pale into insignificance. 
A man searching for his wife, feared lost in the 
bitter cold on a mountainside, may cling to the 
evidence of this fresh footprint and that crude 
cairn until be suddenly sees her alive and . well. 
Then all other evidence seems irrelevant to him, 
not because it really is irrelevant, but merely 
because be bas such evidence now as to make all 
other worthless by comparison. May there not be 
such moments of communion with God as to make 
other evidence quite unnecessary? Yes, there are 
such moments. Vfuen a person stands at such a 
mountain summit of experience be needs no other 
evidence.2 
Such an ezperience the present writer believes can rightly 
be regarded as involving ezistential thinking. Existential in 
the manner that the depth or height of the ezperience cannot 
be shared; in the manner that the ezperience cannot be set up 
as datum from which logical inference can be drawn. This is 
1. Brunner, TO, 14-15. 2. DeWolf, RAR, 200. 
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the truth implied in the teaching that religion is both taught 
and caught. Thus there is an aspect of uniqueness, originality, 
and inwardness to the Christian faith, wbich~ altbough it must 
come through experience, somehow slips through the mesh of 
empirical coherence. 
4. Existentialism in Ferre's Theological Method 
A rising interest in existential thinking is evidenced 
by the increase of literature in the field. But not all 
literature reflects the same point of view concerning the 
meaning of existentialism. Though the lines of distinction 
can be drawn between theistic and non-theistic existentialism, 
it is more difficult to set forth the distinguishing charac-
teristics of the various types of Christian existentialism. So 
many divergent views have become associated with the word 
"existential", that Ferre bas questioned whether be and others 
should not drop the term. 
From Kierkegaard on, as far as the realm of religious 
truth goes, at least, it has had the connotation that 
religious knowledge in terms of universals is 
impossible. Religious knowledge bas come to be a 
term either taboo, or a term indicating the para-
doxical, absurd, or infinitely riskful decision of 
the individua~where no theoretic theological 
foundation, no ethical application, no historic 
proof or progres~ have any validity, being objectively 
external to the reality of the individual as a deciding 
being. If we believe this severing of existence and 
essence bas been carried on to an impossible extreme 
by the "existentialists", irresponsibly making 
constructive knowledge impossible, should we then go 
on, nevertheles~ filling the term with new meaning, 
accepting all the whil~ of course, the real truths 
of discontinuity which it rightly bears, or should 
we abandon the term as a red flag and use new terms 
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more acceptable for a new day ••• ?l 
Ferre's discriminating use of e~istentialism is a construe-
. tive advance toward the correction of such forms of e~istential-
ism as are found in Kierkegaardian, Barthian, or Thomistic 
thinkers. He rightly rebukes the father of e~istentialism for 
revolting against any alliance between philosophy or theology 
and the Christian faith. This denied the relevance of the 
Christian faith to the level of history and intellectual 
inquiry, wwaking it instead a matter of passionate personal 
appropriation by faith in the lowly Christ--a faith which was 
absurd to human reason."2 
Contrary to Ferr6, Brunner in his doctrine of revelation 
as an T•Tbou relationship yields to the fallacy of p.1re 
e~istentialism by setting it aside from rational and e~peri­
ential criticism. However, as D. D. Williams critically 
observes, Brunner in his use of the philosophical method moves 
against the main line of his own argument. He introduces a 
philosophical idea, the I-Tbou encounter influenced by Martin 
Buber, at the very point where be says it does not belong, 
namely, in the description of tbe encounter between God and 
man. 3 To be fair to Brunner with respect to his doctrine of 
revelation one needs to add that there is a difference between 
his earlier and later works. In his former work be holds that 
1. 
2. 
Rev. (1948)~ 92. 
Rev. ( 1948) , 58. 
3. Williams, Rev. ( 1947 ), 1487. 
there is a sharp antithesis between faith in God and every 
system of tbought, 1 but in his book, Revelation and Reason, 
be writes that revelation and reason meet in faith, and that 
"rational thought is not abandoned--for faith itself is truly 
rational thought about God and about life as a whole." 2 
Whereas some Catholic thinkers regard St. Thomas as the 
/ 
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existentialist par-excellence, Ferre questions the accuracy of 
labeling the thought of Thomas Aquinas as true existentialism. 
I cannot help wondering about the idea that 
Thomism is basically existential and that the 
growth of essentialism bas been contrary to its 
§enius. Did not St. Thomas himself maintain that 
the first author and mover of the universe is an 
intellect"? Did be not put contemplation above 
emotion and will? ••• I know his strong emphasis 
on the dynamic in many instances; but is there 
not a strong support in his teachings for truth 
being prior to love?3 
, 
If by these questions Ferre means to imply that in the divine 
consciousness emotion and will precede intellect and that love 
is prior to truth, then be is merely substituting one extreme 
view for another. The emphasis about to be made is that these 
aspects of consciousness must be thought of as existing in unity, 
and that although uniqueness can be attributed to each, there 
is no basis for maintaining the primacy of one over the others. 
The center of Ferre's existential thinking is his develop-
ment of the agape principle as the all inclusive category. In 
his book, The Christian Understanding of God, be writes: "The 
1. Brunner, GM, 62. 3. Rev. (1948)\ 92. 
2. Brunner, RR, 429. 
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theme which we are to investigate, furthermore, is the adequacy 
of Christian love to constitute the category of categories for 
the realms of being and becoming. nl Love as the ultimate 
category is developed in a four-fold manner: love as being, 
love as becoming, love as personality, and love as spirit. 
Love as being is self-existing and self-sustaining. Love as 
becoming is self-directing. Non-being is the condition and 
occasion of love as beling. Non-being makes possible creativity, 
the nature of love to express itself; thus non-being is the 
infinite possibility. 
Start with being as ultimate, and arrive at no 
adequate doctrine of becoming; start with becoming 
as ultimate, and find no real interpretation of 
being. Start with love as ultimate, and being and 
becoming are then abstractions from the fullness 
of reality.2 
, 
Keeping true to the existentialist premise, Ferre rejects 
that approach to the problem of becoming which makes pattern 
prior to process or form prior to content. Here he disagrees 
with his admired teacher, Alfred N. Whitehead, who declared that 
11 in philosophy of organism it is not 'substance' which is 
permanent, but 'form'."3 ~ The extreme character of Ferre's view 
is made evident as be writes: 
If love, however, be infinitely creative being, and 
if the very nature of Deity is to exceed in possibility 
every and all actuality, there is then in the ultimate 
no absolute order of mathematics; for form does not 
determine function but function form. Reality is not 
formally fixed but dynamically creative.4 
1. CUG, 15. 3. Whitehead, PR, 44. 
2. CUG, 29. 4. CUG, 47-48. 
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The above approach to the problem of becoming seems to 
be a surrender to the Heraclitic doctrine of flux. In a sense 
it is more extreme because Heraclitus concluded that persisting 
and underlying all movement and change and opposition is the 
reason in things, t he logos. What or bow love can be as pure 
creativity without form, one cannot know. In t he same manner 
as the view of primordial subst'ance as void of qualities and 
as pure potentiality commits the fallacy of pure being, so 
Ferre, in maintaining that in the ultimate function determines 
form, commits the fallacy of pure becoming. Therein also lies 
t he danger of functionalism, a doctrine with which Ferre is not 
in sympathy. 
Whatever existential meaning can be derived from or given 
to the God of Exodus, "I Am that I Am," it mus t be meaning in 
terms of both form and content, the what and that, the rational 
and existential perspective. To say that Deity can transcend 
rationality, invalidates the laws of logic and mathematics, 
as well as moral laws. If the laws of log ic, mathematics, 
and morals are arbitrary creations of God, then t here must have 
been a time when God was neither rational nor moral. 
Form and function or reason and love are two aspects of a 
unity of consciousness. As far as one can know both love and 
reason are irreducible categories; love cannot be reduced to 
reason and reason is not love. In the divine consciousness as 
in the human consci cusness there is no rendering of one prior 
to the other. They are complementary and one, wit hout the other 
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is unintelligible. Because love is ultimately an irreducible 
category, because it ultimately remains the "that" instead of 
the "what", and since it is more of a personal term than a 
/ philosophical one, Ferre rightly directs attention to the 
existential import in man's knowledge of God. 
More and more the present writer can see bow love answers 
most ad~quately man's need for mat'ivatlpn and creativity, and 
reason answers most adequately man's need for authority and a 
steady light. This also affords the condition under which 
philosophy of existentialism and philosophy of essentialism 
can become reconciled. The main principle of the former is that 
existence precedes essence. Existence denotes "that" a thing 
is. The main interest of essentialism is to know "what" a thing 
is. 
The "that" and "what" are irreducible to each other, but it 
must be added that they are also inseparable from each other. 
This same relation, it bas already been said exists between 
love and reason. Whereas reason is the primary category of 
essentialism, love can rightly be made the primary category of 
Christian existentialism, remembering all the while that love 
cannot exist 'alone' and that it needs idea. Therefore if one 
speaks of a Christian existentialism, one must also speak of a 
Christian essentialism. Love as the primary category of 
existentialism fills the vacuum that remains in the atheistic 
existentialist doctrine of 'nothingness' and 'dreadful freedom'. 
It also corrects Thomistic existentialism by giving content to 
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the abstract concept of God as pure act and to the affirmation 
that essence and existence are the same in God. 1 The two 
categories of reason and love, though irreducible to each 
other, are also inseparable, two aspects of a unity of 
consciousness and thererore existentialism and essentialism 
are not contradictory, but complementary. 
Whereas Hegel says, the real is the rational and the 
r 
rational is the real, and Ferre says, . tbe real is love and 
love is the real, there is no ground for asserting the 
priority of one to the other for they are complementary aspects 
constituting the ultimate reality. Father Phelan is quite right 
when be concludes that "it is as impossible to de-essentialize 
existence as it is to de-existentialize essence. " 2 
5. Conclusions 
, 
The following conclusions present Ferre's contribution:-
1. In a day when philosophy and theology are prone to go 
their own way with logical positivism and naturalism attempting 
a divorce from theology and Barthian irrationalism seeking a 
/ divorce from philosophy, Ferre's thinking is a cohesive force 
to bring them together. 
2. He corrects Lundensian thought, nee-orthodoxy, and 
extreme liberalism at several points. 
i. In a penetrating manner he develops the main 
1. St. Thomas, ST, Vol. I, Pt. I, 
Q. 3, Art. 4, 17. 
2. Phelan, Art.(l946), 33. 
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principle of Lundensian thought, namely, agape as the Christian 
perspective, but rejects the irrational content in their method 
by refusing to make a complete separation between~ and agape, 
and by declining to make faith a unique, independent gift or 
work of God. 
ii. Wberever liberalism asserts man as naturally good 
Ferre's stress on the seriousness and depth of sin can be 
accepted as a necessary corrective, as can also his accent on 
the reality and power of the Holy Spirit. 
iii. His rejection of neo-orthodozy's unknown God 
and its view of faith as something other than human thinking 
or experience. 
3. His emphasis on whole-response, in which the emotions, 
will, and intellect are harmoniously related, as an adequate 
approach to religious epistemology. (The problem that remains 
is whether ideal whole~response is best characterized as faith 
or reason.) 
4. Ferre's use and development of the existential perspec-
tive stands for the truth that there is richness and depth of 
experience which refuses to be coined into words and which 
cannot be shared, that there is more to every mental and 
physical event than can be predicated, that there is a peculiar 
relation and interpenetration of the rational and the non-
rational, meaning by the latter the trust and feeling that 
remains where the concept fails, and that there is a uniqueness, 
originality, and inwardness to the Christian faith which defies 
essentialism. 
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The following conclusions enumerate the difficulties in 
I Ferre's method: 
1. Ferre's view of the limitations of philosophy. 
i. To make philosophy knowledge for its own sake fails 
to give proper recognition to those philosophers of the past and 
present who accented the practical and the ideal as both part 
and parcel of philosophy. 
ii. In asserting the objective as a standard for 
/ philosophy and the subjective as a standard for theology Ferre 
is being unfair to both. Coherence, which be accepts as a 
standard for both, demands the evaluating of the objective for 
theology as well as the subjective for philosophy. 
iii. Ferre would limit philosophy to the description 
of what is here and now actual, but any philosophy of time or 
any philosophy which bas an axiology must pass beyond the 
coherence of the actual. 
2. Reason for Ferre does not mean the same as coherence 
inasmuch as it stands primarily for man's intellect or specula-
tive capacity. He maintains reason is not whole-response 
because it is only a part of whole-response. Others would 
regard ideal whole-response as the highest expression of reason. 
3. Ferre's inclusive use of theology as the interpretation 
of whole-response is difficult to distinguish from philosophy as 
the interpretation of the whole of experience. In his failure 
to distinguish adequately between theology and religion much of 
the existential import given to theology more correctly belongs 
to the field of religion. 
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4. In Ferre's method the agape principle and the existential 
perspective are used beyond their legitimate jurisdiction. In 
~ 
asserting theology as through and through existential Ferre 
invites the kind of irrationalism which he himself would reject. 
Theology as the interpretation of religion must interpret both 
the objective and the existential aspects of religion, the 
history of religion as well as the vitally personal nature of 
religious experience. Thus theology must ever be both objective 
and existential. 
Ferre would make love the ultimate category but from all 
that one can know both love and reason must be aspects of the 
unity of divine consciousness, for if either is an arbitrary 
creation, then there was a time when God was love but not 
reason or reason but not love. Truth in tbe last analysis 
must be both an existential and rational ultimate, a personal 
spirit expressing himself as divine reason and love. 
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EXISTENTIALISM AND RATIONALISM IN THE THEOLOGICAL 
I 
METHOD OF NELS F. S. FERRE 
Abstract of the Dissertation 
In the theological method of Nels Ferre there is a 
peculiar intermixture of the existential and the rational. 
There is a persistent attempt to give reason its full power 
as the arbiter of religious truth, and at the same time the 
reader is invited to see the limitations of reason to the 
extent that it cannot be man's ultimate criterion. 
I In theology rationalism for Ferre is the theory that the 
reason of the natural man constitutes the final criterion of 
truth. The existential perspective is the perspective from 
whole-response, which requires the deepest passions as well 
as the intellect and will of the whole man. 
Recognizing that the elimination of the rational approach 
would mean death to theology, Ferre, nevertheless, expresses 
the view that philosophical application is rational and 
theological application is existential. In the judgment of 
the present writer Ferre corrects some existentialists and 
rationalists at several significant points, but inclines too 
far toward an exclusively existential theology. 
According to Ferre faith has both a theoretical and 
existential aspect, but the former does not say the most 
important thing about faith. Faith is primarily existential; 
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it is a deep personal concern and commitment, a living 
affirmation that the ideal is more real than the actual and 
I has the power to transform it. Problematic in Ferre's inter-
pretation of faith is his assertion that a ~gulf" exists 
between faith and reason which necessitates a leap in man's 
fullest response to reality. For him faith and reason contra-
dict each other as well as complement each other. The function 
of faith is essentially to give the experience of certainty 
where rational verification is impossible. The function of 
reason is to interpret and systematize man's historical and 
present experience. 
There is also much evidence in Ferre's thought that he 
regards reason as both competent and necessary in ascertaining 
religious truth. He is in sympathy with some of the views of 
the nee-orthodox thinkers but comes to the defense of reason as 
they deny the rational and experiential verification of religion. 
Both religion and faith, for Ferre , are characterized suitably 
by his popular term "whole-response", and when be writes that 
reason is the final court of appeal in tbe interpretation of 
whole-response, be speaks as a friend and not as a foe of the 
rational approach. 
Both philosophy and theology have as their task t he inter-
pretation of the whole of human knowledge and experience but 
philosophy, be maintains, labors under the handicap of being 
limited to what is here and now actual. He does not mean that 
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philosophy must not evaluate ideals, purpose, or whatever is 
possible on the basis of the actual; he believes philosophy 
cannot establish purpose and ideals as more real than the 
actual. '!'his can only be done in faith. Philosophy is 
knowledge for its own sake and theology is the interpretation 
of the unavoidable response to reality in which each person 
is critically and dynamically involved. 
The standards of philosophical truth are inclusiveness, 
coherence, and objectivity. Theological truth is inclusive, 
coherent, and subjective. In Ferre's method philosophical 
coherence and theological coherence are not to be e~uated. 
The former is partial coherence, the coherence of present 
process and present and past experience, and the latter is 
ideal coherence anticipatorily attained. He maintains that 
it is not the whole of experience but a certain content of 
experience which most adequately constitutes the criterion 
for what is ultimately most real. This content of experience 
be calls the selective actual which is characterized by our 
most creative and redeeming insights, the best man in history, 
and the best whole-response made. Here the problem of the 
criterion of truth is not satisfactorily answered because 
the selective actual cannot stand as the final criterion 
until the validity of the selective actual itself bas been 
established by the test of coherently ordered experience. 
In addition to the selective actual, Ferre also posits 
262 
the selective ideal and the existential ultimate as standards 
of r eligion, all of which receive their clearest content and 
expression in the person of Jesus Christ. Christ is the 
content of revelation and the center of Christianity. What 
be reveals is God's agape for be is the incarnation of divine 
agape. Thus agape becomes the selective principle which 
qualifies t he Christian faith as man's ultimate religion, 
and which is also the metaphysical principle whereby one can 
most adequately interpret all reality. 
/ Ferre needs to give more attention to the observation that 
Christ as given revelation or agape must yet be interpreted 
through human media and experience. Because love is always 
relational, it is necessary that the alleged given agape be 
interpreted by reason to distinguish it from a false kind of 
love. ·This does not eliminate the possibility of finding 
Christ the living principle which is the religious and moral 
ideal, and which both judges and reconciles man. 
For Ferre it is the problem of evil that especially demands 
existential thinking. The detached approach to the problem of 
evil, Ferre maintains, is fatal to truth. Rational knowledge 
falls short of giving man the necessary equipment to face the 
problem of disvalue. Man's encounter with evil is a deeply 
personal encounter and must therefore find its solution in 
dynamic whole-response. 
, 
The following conclusions present Ferre's contribution: 
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1. In a day when philosophy and theology are prone to go 
their own way with logical positivism and naturalism attempting 
a divorce from theology and Barthia~ irrationalism seeking a 
I divorce from phiiosophy, Ferre's thinking is a cohesive force 
to bring them together. 
2. He corrects Lundensian thought, nee-orthodoxy, and 
extreme liberalism at several points. 
i. In a penetrating manner be develops the main 
principle of Lundensian thought, namely agape as the Christian 
perspective, but rejects the irrational content in their method 
by refusing to make a complete separation between agape and eros, 
and by declining to make faith a unique, independent gift or work 
of God. 
, 
ii. Ferre corrects nee-orthodoxy by rejecting its 
unknown God and its view of faith as something other than 
human thinking or experience. 
iii. Wnerever liberalism asserts man as naturally good 
,/ 
Ferre'~ stress on the seriousness arid depth of sin can be 
accepted as a necessary corrective, as can also his accent on 
the reality and power of the Holy Spirit. 
3. His emphasis on whole-response, in which the emoti.ons, 
will, and intellect are harmoniously related, is an adequate 
approach to relig ious epistemology. (The problem that remains 
is whether ideal whole-response is best characterized as faith 
or reason.) 
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/ 4. Ferre's use and development of the ex istential perspec-
tive stands for the truth that t here is richnes s and depth of 
experience which refuses to be coined into words and which 
cannot be shared, that there is more to every mental and 
( 
physical event th an can be predicated, that there is a peculiar 
relation and interpenetration of the rational and the non-
rational, meaning by the latter the trust and feeling that 
remains where the concept fails, and that there is a uniqueness, 
originality, and inwardness to the Christian faith wnich defies 
essentialism. 
The following conclusions enumerate the d ifficulties in 
.. 
Ferre's method: 
1. I Ferre's view of the limitations of philosophy. 
i. To make philosophy knowledge for its own sake fails 
to g ive proper recognition to those philosophers of the past and 
present who have accented the practica l and the ideal as both part 
and parcel of philosophy. 
ii. In asserting the objective as a standard for 
; philosophy and the subjective as a standard for theology Ferre 
is being unfair to both. Coherence, which be accepts as a 
standard for both, demands the evaluating of the objective for 
theology as well as t he subjective for philosophy. 
iii. " Ferre would limit philosophy to the description 
of what is here and now actual, but any philosophy of time or 
any philosophy which has an axiology must pass beyond the 
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coherence of the actual. 
I 2. Reason for Ferre does not mean the same as coherence 
inasmuch as it stands primarily for man's intellect or specula-
tive capacity. He maintains reason is not whole-response 
because it is only a part of whole-response. Others would 
regard ideal whole-response as the highest expression of reason. 
, 
3. Ferre's inclusive use of theology as the interpretation 
of whole-response is difficult to distinguish from philosophy as 
the interpretation of the whole of experience. In his failure 
to distinguish adequately between theology and religion much of 
the existential import given to theology more correctly belongs 
to religion. 
4. 
. I In Ferre's method the agape principle and the existential 
perspective are used beyond their legitiw~te jurisdiction. In 
, 
asserting theology as through and through existential Ferre 
invites the kind of irrationalism which he himself would reject. 
Theology as the interpretation of religion must interpret both 
the objective and the existential aspects of religion, the 
history of religion as well as the vitally personal nature 
of religious experience. Thus theology must ever be both 
objective and existential. 
~ . Ferre would make love the ultimate category but from all 
that one can know both love and reason must be aspects of the 
unity of divine consciousness, for if either is an arbitrary 
creation, then there was a time when God was love but not 
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reason or reason but not love. Truth in the last analysis 
must be both an existential and rational ultimate, a personal 
s p irit expressing himself as divine reason and love. 
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